1
00:00:46,353 --> 00:00:48,835
"Laura, at this stage,
2
00:00:48,853 --> 00:00:51,336
"I can offer nothing
more than my word.
3
00:00:51,354 --> 00:00:53,695
"I am a senior
government employee
4
00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:55,835
"in the intelligence community.
5
00:00:55,853 --> 00:00:57,835
"I hope you'll understand
that contacting you is
6
00:00:57,853 --> 00:01:00,002
"extremely high-risk,
and you are willing to agree
7
00:01:00,020 --> 00:01:03,502
"to the following precautions
before I share more.
8
00:01:03,519 --> 00:01:06,502
"This will not be
a waste of your time.
9
00:01:06,520 --> 00:01:09,169
"The following sounds complex,
but should only take minutes
10
00:01:09,187 --> 00:01:11,668
"to complete
for someone technical.
11
00:01:11,686 --> 00:01:15,169
"I would like to confirm out of
email that the keys we exchanged
12
00:01:15,187 --> 00:01:19,078
"were not intercepted and
replaced by your surveillance.
13
00:01:19,103 --> 00:01:21,612
"Please confirm that no one
has ever had a copy
14
00:01:21,637 --> 00:01:24,612
"of your private key and that it
uses a strong pass-phrase.
15
00:01:24,637 --> 00:01:26,645
"Assume your adversary
is capable
16
00:01:26,670 --> 00:01:29,169
"of one trillion guesses
per second.
17
00:01:29,187 --> 00:01:31,669
"If the device you store
the private key
18
00:01:31,687 --> 00:01:34,169
"and enter your pass-phrase on
has been hacked,
19
00:01:34,187 --> 00:01:37,645
"it is trivial to decrypt
our communications.
20
00:01:37,670 --> 00:01:40,669
"Understand that the above steps
are not bullet-proof
21
00:01:40,687 --> 00:01:42,836
"and are intended only
to give us breathing room.
22
00:01:42,854 --> 00:01:45,169
"In the end,
if you publish the source material,
23
00:01:45,187 --> 00:01:47,169
"I will likely be
immediately implicated.
24
00:01:47,187 --> 00:01:49,195
"This must not deter you
from releasing
25
00:01:49,220 --> 00:01:52,195
"the information I will provide.
26
00:01:52,220 --> 00:01:55,195
"Thank you, and be careful.
27
00:01:55,220 --> 00:01:57,770
CitizenFour."
28
00:02:19,503 --> 00:02:23,046
The bottom line is,
surveillance means
29
00:02:23,071 --> 00:02:26,029
that there are facts
that we no longer abide to.
30
00:02:26,054 --> 00:02:27,669
If you take away
the surveillance,
31
00:02:27,687 --> 00:02:30,313
there are no facts that
the government can manufacture.
32
00:02:30,338 --> 00:02:31,812
Ah, that's right, and this is
33
00:02:31,837 --> 00:02:33,478
all about creating
an independent record.
34
00:02:33,503 --> 00:02:37,478
To me, this goes to the question
35
00:02:37,503 --> 00:02:41,313
of independently verifying
what the government is doing.
36
00:02:41,338 --> 00:02:44,612
That's why I keep going back
to that question.
37
00:02:44,637 --> 00:02:47,812
More with
David Sirota after CBS News,
38
00:02:47,837 --> 00:02:51,803
traffic, and weather
on KKZN Denver/Boulder, AM 7...
39
00:02:57,837 --> 00:03:00,113
Hey, can you hear me?
40
00:03:00,138 --> 00:03:02,770
I am here, David. How are you?
41
00:03:06,146 --> 00:03:08,446
Well, I would just point...
Start by pointing to what
42
00:03:08,471 --> 00:03:10,780
Barack Obama himself said
about those questions
43
00:03:10,805 --> 00:03:13,863
when he was running for
the office that he now occupies.
44
00:03:13,888 --> 00:03:16,113
In December of 2007,
he said, quote,
45
00:03:16,138 --> 00:03:19,446
"The President does not have
the power under the Constitution
46
00:03:19,471 --> 00:03:22,246
"to unilaterally authorize
a military attack in a situation
47
00:03:22,271 --> 00:03:26,146
that does not involve stopping an actual
or imminent threat to the nation."
48
00:03:26,171 --> 00:03:29,503
So, by Obama's own words,
the President does not have the power
49
00:03:29,521 --> 00:03:31,837
that he is now exercising
under the Constitution.
50
00:03:31,855 --> 00:03:35,670
And as far as why it matters, in...
On August 1, 2007,
51
00:03:35,688 --> 00:03:39,337
when he laid out his reasons why
he was running for office
52
00:03:39,355 --> 00:03:41,580
and why he thought it was
so important to change the way
53
00:03:41,605 --> 00:03:43,503
we were doing things,
he said, quote,
54
00:03:43,521 --> 00:03:46,280
"No more ignoring the law
when it's inconvenient.
55
00:03:46,305 --> 00:03:47,947
"That is not who we are.
56
00:03:47,972 --> 00:03:50,114
"We will again set
an example for the world
57
00:03:50,139 --> 00:03:53,680
that the law is not subject to
the whims of stubborn rulers."
58
00:03:53,705 --> 00:03:55,880
So, to allow presidents
to simply start wars
59
00:03:55,905 --> 00:03:58,004
on their own, without any...
60
00:04:22,055 --> 00:04:24,564
"You asked why I picked you.
61
00:04:24,589 --> 00:04:27,030
"I didn't. You did.
62
00:04:27,055 --> 00:04:29,347
"The surveillance you've
experienced means you've been
63
00:04:29,372 --> 00:04:32,214
"'selected' - a term
which will mean more to you
64
00:04:32,239 --> 00:04:36,364
"as you learn about how
the modern SIGINT system works.
65
00:04:36,389 --> 00:04:39,581
"For now, know that
every border you cross,
66
00:04:39,606 --> 00:04:41,080
"every purchase you make,
67
00:04:41,105 --> 00:04:42,581
"every call you dial,
68
00:04:42,606 --> 00:04:45,648
"every cell phone tower you pass,
friend you keep,
69
00:04:45,673 --> 00:04:48,171
"article you write,
site you visit,
70
00:04:48,189 --> 00:04:49,647
"subject line you type,
71
00:04:49,672 --> 00:04:51,314
"and packet you route is
72
00:04:51,339 --> 00:04:54,004
"in the hands of a system
whose reach is unlimited,
73
00:04:54,022 --> 00:04:56,671
"but whose safeguards are not.
74
00:04:56,689 --> 00:04:59,171
"Your victimization
by the NSA system
75
00:04:59,189 --> 00:05:01,005
"means that you are
well aware of the threat
76
00:05:01,022 --> 00:05:05,005
"that unrestricted secret police
pose for democracies.
77
00:05:05,023 --> 00:05:07,872
This is a story
few but you can tell."
78
00:06:02,140 --> 00:06:04,172
Thank you
for inviting me here, uh,
79
00:06:04,190 --> 00:06:08,005
to give me the opportunity to, uh,
express my, uh, story,
80
00:06:08,023 --> 00:06:10,005
but let me give you some
of my background.
81
00:06:10,023 --> 00:06:12,505
Um, I spent about 4 years
in the military,
82
00:06:12,523 --> 00:06:15,505
then I went into NSA,
directly, so...
83
00:06:15,523 --> 00:06:19,699
So I ended up with about
37 years of service combined.
84
00:06:19,724 --> 00:06:21,782
Most of it was a lot of fun,
I tell you.
85
00:06:21,807 --> 00:06:23,807
It was really a lot of fun,
breaking these puzzles,
86
00:06:23,832 --> 00:06:25,712
you know, solving problems
and things like that,
87
00:06:25,737 --> 00:06:27,615
so...
And that's really what I did.
88
00:06:27,640 --> 00:06:29,582
I fundamentally started
working out with data,
89
00:06:29,607 --> 00:06:32,365
looking at data and data systems
and how you do that.
90
00:06:32,390 --> 00:06:35,699
I was developing this concept of,
um, analysis
91
00:06:35,724 --> 00:06:37,699
that you could
lay it out in such a way
92
00:06:37,724 --> 00:06:40,198
that it could be coded
and executed electronically,
93
00:06:40,223 --> 00:06:42,815
meaning you could
automate analysis, okay?
94
00:06:42,840 --> 00:06:44,282
And it has to do with metadata
95
00:06:44,307 --> 00:06:46,415
and using
metadata relationships.
96
00:06:46,440 --> 00:06:49,415
So that was the whole...
That was my whole theme there at NSA.
97
00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:51,415
That was... Eventually,
that's what I ended up to.
98
00:06:51,440 --> 00:06:53,815
I was the only one there doing that,
by the way.
99
00:06:53,840 --> 00:06:57,982
So, uh, any rate,
9/11 happened and, uh...
100
00:06:58,007 --> 00:07:01,149
it must have been, uh,
right after... A few days,
101
00:07:01,174 --> 00:07:03,505
no more than a week after,
uh, 9/11...
102
00:07:03,523 --> 00:07:05,949
That they, uh, decided to begin
103
00:07:05,974 --> 00:07:09,116
actively, uh,
spying on everyone in this country.
104
00:07:09,141 --> 00:07:12,366
And they wanted the back part
of our program
105
00:07:12,391 --> 00:07:15,283
to run all the spying,
all right?
106
00:07:15,308 --> 00:07:18,448
So... Ahem...
That's exactly what they did.
107
00:07:18,473 --> 00:07:20,949
And then they started
taking the Telecom data
108
00:07:20,974 --> 00:07:23,782
and then expanded after that,
so...
109
00:07:23,807 --> 00:07:25,815
I mean, the one I knew was AT&T,
110
00:07:25,840 --> 00:07:29,416
and that one provided
320 million records every day.
111
00:07:29,441 --> 00:07:32,866
That program was
re-authorized every 45 days
112
00:07:32,891 --> 00:07:35,149
by the...
What I called the "yes committee,"
113
00:07:35,174 --> 00:07:39,649
which was Hayden and Tenet and...
The DOJ.
114
00:07:39,674 --> 00:07:42,649
The program was called
Stellar Wind.
115
00:07:42,674 --> 00:07:45,283
So first I went to the House
Intelligence Committee,
116
00:07:45,308 --> 00:07:47,316
then the staff member
that I personally knew there,
117
00:07:47,341 --> 00:07:50,649
and, uh, she then went to
the chairman of that committee.
118
00:07:50,674 --> 00:07:53,449
Nancy Pelosi was
the minority rep.
119
00:07:53,474 --> 00:07:56,482
They were all briefed
into the program at the time,
120
00:07:56,507 --> 00:07:59,583
by the way, and all the other
programs that were going on,
121
00:07:59,608 --> 00:08:02,116
including all these
CIA programs.
122
00:08:02,141 --> 00:08:05,173
I wasn't alone in this;
There were 4 others out of NSA,
123
00:08:05,191 --> 00:08:07,673
and we were all trying to work
internally in the government
124
00:08:07,691 --> 00:08:10,673
for... Over these years trying
to get them to come around
125
00:08:10,691 --> 00:08:13,449
to being constitutionally
acceptable and take it into
126
00:08:13,474 --> 00:08:16,082
the courts and have the courts'
oversight of it, too.
127
00:08:16,107 --> 00:08:19,583
So we... We naively kept
thinking that that could, uh,
128
00:08:19,608 --> 00:08:23,316
that could happen,
and, uh, it never did.
129
00:08:23,341 --> 00:08:27,840
But any rate, after that,
and all the stuff we were doing,
130
00:08:27,858 --> 00:08:31,840
they decided to, uh, raid us,
to keep us quiet, threaten us, you know.
131
00:08:31,858 --> 00:08:34,750
So we were raided, um,
simultaneously, 4 of us.
132
00:08:34,775 --> 00:08:36,783
In my case,
they came in with guns drawn.
133
00:08:36,808 --> 00:08:40,024
I don't know why they did that,
but they did, so...
134
00:08:59,025 --> 00:09:01,616
"Laura, I will answer
135
00:09:01,641 --> 00:09:04,284
"what I remember of
your questions as best I can.
136
00:09:04,309 --> 00:09:06,833
"Forgive the lack of structure;
I am not a writer,
137
00:09:06,858 --> 00:09:10,200
"and I have to draft this
in a great hurry.
138
00:09:10,225 --> 00:09:14,284
"What you know
as Stellar Wind has grown.
139
00:09:14,309 --> 00:09:17,584
"SSO, the expanded
Special Source Operations
140
00:09:17,609 --> 00:09:20,250
"that took over Stellar Wind's
share of the pie,
141
00:09:20,275 --> 00:09:23,284
"has spread all over the world
to practically include
142
00:09:23,309 --> 00:09:26,284
"comprehensive coverage
of the United States.
143
00:09:26,309 --> 00:09:29,983
"Disturbingly, the amount of
U.S. communication ingested
144
00:09:30,008 --> 00:09:32,950
"by NSA is still increasing.
145
00:09:32,975 --> 00:09:35,751
"Publicly, we complain
that things are going dark,
146
00:09:35,776 --> 00:09:38,950
"but in fact,
our accesses are improving.
147
00:09:38,975 --> 00:09:41,784
"The truth is that the NSA
has never in its history
148
00:09:41,809 --> 00:09:44,641
collected more than
it does now."
149
00:09:46,058 --> 00:09:49,507
"I know the location of most
domestic interception points
150
00:09:49,525 --> 00:09:51,918
"and that the largest
telecommunication companies
151
00:09:51,943 --> 00:09:55,008
"in the U.S. are betraying
the trust of their customers,
152
00:09:55,026 --> 00:09:57,317
"which I can prove.
153
00:09:57,342 --> 00:09:59,674
"We are building the greatest
weapon for oppression
154
00:09:59,692 --> 00:10:02,175
"in the history of man,
yet its directors
155
00:10:02,192 --> 00:10:05,650
"exempt themselves
from accountability.
156
00:10:05,675 --> 00:10:09,341
"NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,
157
00:10:09,359 --> 00:10:11,507
"which I can prove.
158
00:10:11,525 --> 00:10:15,951
"Billions of U.S. communications
are being intercepted.
159
00:10:15,976 --> 00:10:18,507
"In gathering evidence
of wrongdoing,
160
00:10:18,525 --> 00:10:20,841
"I focused on the wronging of
the American people,
161
00:10:20,859 --> 00:10:23,817
"but believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under
162
00:10:23,842 --> 00:10:27,868
"is the highest privilege compared to
how we treat the rest of the world.
163
00:10:27,893 --> 00:10:30,674
"This I can also prove.
164
00:10:30,692 --> 00:10:34,018
"On cyber operations,
the government's public position
165
00:10:34,043 --> 00:10:36,368
"is that we still lack
a policy framework.
166
00:10:36,393 --> 00:10:37,841
"This, too, is a lie.
167
00:10:37,859 --> 00:10:40,008
"There is a detailed
policy framework,
168
00:10:40,026 --> 00:10:42,701
"a kind of martial law
for cyber operations
169
00:10:42,726 --> 00:10:44,342
"created by the White House.
170
00:10:44,360 --> 00:10:46,841
"It's called Presidential
Policy Directive 20
171
00:10:46,859 --> 00:10:49,701
"and was finalized at
the end of last year.
172
00:10:49,726 --> 00:10:52,151
"This I can also prove.
173
00:10:52,176 --> 00:10:54,675
"I appreciate your concern
for my safety,
174
00:10:54,693 --> 00:10:57,201
"but I already know how
this will end for me,
175
00:10:57,226 --> 00:10:59,451
"and I accept the risk.
176
00:10:59,476 --> 00:11:01,841
"If I have luck
and you are careful,
177
00:11:01,859 --> 00:11:04,008
"you will have
everything you need.
178
00:11:04,026 --> 00:11:07,008
"I ask only that you ensure
this information makes it home
179
00:11:07,026 --> 00:11:09,342
to the American public."
180
00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:14,368
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens' emails?
181
00:11:14,393 --> 00:11:15,975
No.
182
00:11:17,366 --> 00:11:19,842
Does the NSA intercept.
183
00:11:19,860 --> 00:11:23,535
Americans' cell phone
conversations?
184
00:11:23,560 --> 00:11:24,535
No.
185
00:11:24,560 --> 00:11:27,035
- Google searches?
- No.
186
00:11:27,060 --> 00:11:29,618
- Text messages?
- No.
187
00:11:29,643 --> 00:11:32,618
- Amazon.com orders?
- No.
188
00:11:32,643 --> 00:11:34,451
- Bank records?
- No.
189
00:11:34,476 --> 00:11:37,451
What judicial consent
is required
190
00:11:37,476 --> 00:11:41,119
for NSA to intercept
communications
191
00:11:41,144 --> 00:11:44,418
and information involving
American citizens?
192
00:11:44,443 --> 00:11:47,418
Within the United States,
that would be the FBI lead.
193
00:11:47,443 --> 00:11:49,752
If it was a foreign actor
in the United States,
194
00:11:49,777 --> 00:11:51,919
the FBI would still have the
lead and could work that
195
00:11:51,944 --> 00:11:56,418
with the... With NSA or other
intelligence agencies as authorized.
196
00:11:56,443 --> 00:12:00,618
But to conduct that kind of...
Of collection in the United States,
197
00:12:00,643 --> 00:12:03,119
it would have to go
through a court order,
198
00:12:03,144 --> 00:12:05,119
and the court would have
to authorize it.
199
00:12:05,144 --> 00:12:09,260
We're not authorized to do it,
nor do we do it.
200
00:12:16,144 --> 00:12:18,152
All rise.
201
00:12:18,177 --> 00:12:20,119
The United States
Court of Appeals
202
00:12:20,144 --> 00:12:22,619
for the Ninth Circuit
is now in session.
203
00:12:22,644 --> 00:12:25,276
Please be seated.
204
00:12:33,277 --> 00:12:36,252
Good morning,
and welcome to the Ninth Circuit.
205
00:12:36,277 --> 00:12:39,252
The first case for argument is.
206
00:12:39,277 --> 00:12:42,369
Jewel versus National
Security Agency.
207
00:12:42,394 --> 00:12:45,026
You may proceed.
208
00:12:46,811 --> 00:12:48,676
May it please the court,
Kevin Bankston
209
00:12:48,694 --> 00:12:53,202
for Carolyn Jewel and her fellow
plaintiff appellants in Jewel v. NSA.
210
00:12:53,227 --> 00:12:57,202
Your Honours,
plaintiffs have specifically alleged
211
00:12:57,227 --> 00:13:00,035
that their own communications
and communications records
212
00:13:00,060 --> 00:13:02,036
have been acquired
by the government.
213
00:13:02,061 --> 00:13:04,753
But the District Court found
that we had failed
214
00:13:04,778 --> 00:13:07,703
to allege facts that
differentiated the injury
215
00:13:07,728 --> 00:13:10,202
that our plaintiffs suffered
from the injuries suffered
216
00:13:10,227 --> 00:13:12,652
by every other AT&T user
217
00:13:12,677 --> 00:13:15,438
whose communications and records have
been acquired by the government,
218
00:13:15,444 --> 00:13:18,419
basically concluding
that so long as everyone is
219
00:13:18,444 --> 00:13:21,419
being surveilled,
no one has standing to sue.
220
00:13:21,444 --> 00:13:23,920
Uh, however, to deny standing
to persons who are injured
221
00:13:23,945 --> 00:13:27,086
simply because many others
are also injured would mean
222
00:13:27,111 --> 00:13:29,351
that the most injurious and
widespread government actions
223
00:13:29,376 --> 00:13:30,953
could be questioned by nobody.
224
00:13:30,978 --> 00:13:33,419
Do you have
anything concrete that, in fact,
225
00:13:33,444 --> 00:13:39,153
a specific communication
of your client was intercepted?
226
00:13:39,178 --> 00:13:42,153
We have evidence that
all the communications passing
227
00:13:42,178 --> 00:13:45,153
between AT&T's network and,
uh, other networks
228
00:13:45,178 --> 00:13:48,120
in their Northern California
facility have been intercepted.
229
00:13:48,145 --> 00:13:51,153
And so that would necessarily
include the Internet communications
230
00:13:51,178 --> 00:13:53,753
of our Northern California,
uh, plaintiffs, so...
231
00:13:53,778 --> 00:13:55,537
Okay, thank you.
232
00:13:55,562 --> 00:13:57,693
Thank you, Your Honours.
233
00:14:03,811 --> 00:14:06,986
May it please the court, I am Thomas Byron
from the Department of Justice,
234
00:14:07,011 --> 00:14:09,177
here on behalf of
the government defendants.
235
00:14:09,195 --> 00:14:14,053
We think this litigation need
not be resolved in federal court
236
00:14:14,078 --> 00:14:17,253
in light of the oversight
of the political branches,
237
00:14:17,278 --> 00:14:19,704
both legislative and executive,
238
00:14:19,729 --> 00:14:23,203
which provides
a better opportunity
239
00:14:23,228 --> 00:14:26,704
for oversight and resolution
of the concerns raised
240
00:14:26,729 --> 00:14:31,203
concerning nationwide policies
of alleged surveillance,
241
00:14:31,228 --> 00:14:33,344
uh, in... In these...
In these complaints...
242
00:14:33,362 --> 00:14:36,370
Even if it's revealed that
one or more of the plaintiffs
243
00:14:36,395 --> 00:14:39,871
had email or telephone
conversations intercepted
244
00:14:39,896 --> 00:14:42,871
that had nothing to do
with national security?
245
00:14:42,896 --> 00:14:45,370
Your Honour,
I don't know that anyone necessarily
246
00:14:45,395 --> 00:14:48,011
would have standing to raise
the particular claims
247
00:14:48,029 --> 00:14:49,987
at issue in these two cases.
248
00:14:50,012 --> 00:14:53,453
We think instead
that the kinds of claims
249
00:14:53,478 --> 00:14:56,453
at issue here against
these defendants
250
00:14:56,478 --> 00:14:58,921
are those that are better
suited to resolution
251
00:14:58,946 --> 00:15:01,320
before the... The representative
branches of our government.
252
00:15:01,345 --> 00:15:04,844
So what role would the,
uh, judiciary have,
253
00:15:04,862 --> 00:15:08,345
uh, if your, uh,
approach is adopted?
254
00:15:08,363 --> 00:15:10,510
Judge Pregerson,
I think that the...
255
00:15:10,528 --> 00:15:14,011
I mean, we just...
Just get out of the way? Is that it?
256
00:15:14,029 --> 00:15:17,011
Well, Judge Pregerson,
I think that there is a narrow category,
257
00:15:17,029 --> 00:15:21,178
a subset of cases,
in which it may be appropriate
258
00:15:21,196 --> 00:15:24,921
to step aside for that
narrow category of cases.
259
00:15:24,946 --> 00:15:27,487
But the judiciary plays a role.
260
00:15:27,512 --> 00:15:29,987
- To be sure, Judge Pregerson...
- In our system.
261
00:15:30,012 --> 00:15:32,987
Yes, Your Honour.
And we don't mean to diminish that.
262
00:15:33,012 --> 00:15:36,511
You know,
you're asking us to abdicate that role.
263
00:15:36,529 --> 00:15:38,770
No, Your Honour, um,
but it is a question
264
00:15:38,795 --> 00:15:41,705
of this court's discretion
whether to reach that issue.
265
00:15:41,730 --> 00:15:44,011
Um, we do think that
there is simply no way
266
00:15:44,029 --> 00:15:46,154
for the litigation
to proceed without risk
267
00:15:46,179 --> 00:15:48,705
of divulging
those very questions
268
00:15:48,730 --> 00:15:51,204
of privileged information
that would cause,
269
00:15:51,229 --> 00:15:54,037
as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,
270
00:15:54,062 --> 00:15:58,145
exceptionally grave damage to
national security if disclosed.
271
00:16:01,863 --> 00:16:04,288
So thanks for having me.
272
00:16:04,313 --> 00:16:07,513
If anybody has any questions, like I said,
just... Basically just raise your hand
273
00:16:07,529 --> 00:16:10,511
and I'll try to call on you
as soon as I possibly can.
274
00:16:10,529 --> 00:16:14,538
So who here actually feels like
they are under surveillance
275
00:16:14,563 --> 00:16:16,038
pretty regularly?
276
00:16:16,063 --> 00:16:18,178
Everyone at Occupy is, no?
277
00:16:18,196 --> 00:16:19,678
Everyone inside of Occupy.
278
00:16:19,696 --> 00:16:22,155
How many people here have been
arrested and had their...
279
00:16:22,180 --> 00:16:24,820
At their court date, they had their
phone taken into the back room?
280
00:16:24,845 --> 00:16:28,038
How many people here had
their retina scanned?
281
00:16:28,063 --> 00:16:29,371
Wow.
282
00:16:29,396 --> 00:16:32,088
Um, so you guys are actually,
in a sense,
283
00:16:32,113 --> 00:16:34,179
the canaries in the coal mine,
right?
284
00:16:34,197 --> 00:16:36,471
Because the incentives are all
lined up against you.
285
00:16:36,496 --> 00:16:40,346
Any of you see on the subway,
"Link your MetroCard to your debit card"?
286
00:16:40,364 --> 00:16:42,511
- Yeah.
- Right? On, like, auto refill?
287
00:16:42,529 --> 00:16:45,209
This is a concept which is key to
everything we'll talk about today,
288
00:16:45,230 --> 00:16:47,988
and it's called linkability...
Take one piece of data
289
00:16:48,013 --> 00:16:50,012
and link it to another
piece of data.
290
00:16:50,030 --> 00:16:53,588
So, for example, if you have your
MetroCard and you have your debit card,
291
00:16:53,613 --> 00:16:56,213
you have those things and you can
draw a line between them, right?
292
00:16:56,238 --> 00:16:58,621
So that's, like,
not a scary thing,
293
00:16:58,646 --> 00:17:01,512
except your bank card is tied
to everything else that you do
294
00:17:01,530 --> 00:17:05,589
during the day, so now they know where
you're going, when you make purchases.
295
00:17:05,614 --> 00:17:09,272
So when they decide to target you, they
can actually re-create your exact steps
296
00:17:09,297 --> 00:17:11,988
with a MetroCard and with
a credit card alone;
297
00:17:12,013 --> 00:17:13,988
Like, literally where you go
and what you buy,
298
00:17:14,013 --> 00:17:18,512
and potentially, by linking that data with
other people on similar travel plans,
299
00:17:18,530 --> 00:17:21,488
they can figure out who you
talk to and who you met with.
300
00:17:21,513 --> 00:17:25,012
When you then take cell phone data,
which logs your location,
301
00:17:25,030 --> 00:17:27,179
and you link up purchasing data,
302
00:17:27,197 --> 00:17:29,679
MetroCard data,
and your debit card,
303
00:17:29,697 --> 00:17:32,346
you start to get what
you could call "metadata"
304
00:17:32,364 --> 00:17:34,488
in aggregate
over a person's life.
305
00:17:34,513 --> 00:17:37,512
And metadata,
in aggregate, is content.
306
00:17:37,530 --> 00:17:40,539
It tells a story about you
which is made up of facts,
307
00:17:40,564 --> 00:17:42,488
but is not necessarily true.
308
00:17:42,513 --> 00:17:46,512
So, for example, just because you were on the
corner and all those data points point to it,
309
00:17:46,530 --> 00:17:48,512
it doesn't mean
you committed the crime.
310
00:17:48,530 --> 00:17:52,289
So it's important to note that if someone has
a perception of you having done a thing,
311
00:17:52,314 --> 00:17:54,956
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.
312
00:17:54,981 --> 00:17:57,956
So just keep in mind that what
happens to you guys, for example,
313
00:17:57,981 --> 00:18:01,639
with fingerprints and
retinal scans and photographs,
314
00:18:01,664 --> 00:18:04,180
that is what is going to happen
to people in the future
315
00:18:04,198 --> 00:18:06,672
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest
316
00:18:06,697 --> 00:18:10,173
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.
317
00:18:10,198 --> 00:18:13,206
This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front,
318
00:18:13,231 --> 00:18:15,822
and I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer
319
00:18:15,847 --> 00:18:18,180
because I know Senator
Feinstein wants to move on.
320
00:18:18,198 --> 00:18:23,180
So, does the NSA collect
any type of data at all
321
00:18:23,198 --> 00:18:27,373
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?
322
00:18:27,398 --> 00:18:29,423
No, sir.
323
00:18:29,448 --> 00:18:31,923
It does not?
324
00:18:31,948 --> 00:18:33,846
Not wittingly.
325
00:18:33,864 --> 00:18:37,347
There are cases where
they could inadvertently,
326
00:18:37,365 --> 00:18:41,280
perhaps, uh, collect, but not...
Not wittingly.
327
00:19:06,365 --> 00:19:08,323
"The encrypted archive
328
00:19:08,348 --> 00:19:10,823
"should be available
to you within 7 days.
329
00:19:10,848 --> 00:19:13,981
The key will follow
when everything else is done."
330
00:19:15,398 --> 00:19:18,874
"The material I provide and
investigative effort required
331
00:19:18,899 --> 00:19:21,323
"will be too much
for any one person.
332
00:19:21,348 --> 00:19:24,823
"I recommend, at a very minimum,
you involve Glenn Greenwald.
333
00:19:24,848 --> 00:19:26,981
I believe you know him."
334
00:19:28,698 --> 00:19:33,680
"The plain text of the payload will include
my true name details for the record,
335
00:19:33,698 --> 00:19:38,680
"though it will be your decision as to
whether or how to declare my involvement.
336
00:19:38,698 --> 00:19:43,757
"My personal desire is that you paint
the target directly on my back.
337
00:19:43,782 --> 00:19:48,680
"No one, not even my most trusted
confidant, is aware of my intentions,
338
00:19:48,698 --> 00:19:53,181
"and it would not be fair for them to
fall under suspicion for my actions.
339
00:19:53,199 --> 00:19:57,324
"You may be the only one who can prevent
that, and that is by immediately nailing me
340
00:19:57,349 --> 00:20:01,265
to the cross, rather than trying
to protect me as a source."
341
00:20:03,149 --> 00:20:07,074
"On timing,
regarding meeting up in Hong Kong,
342
00:20:07,099 --> 00:20:12,057
"the first rendezvous attempt will
be at 10 a.m. local time on Monday.
343
00:20:12,082 --> 00:20:17,074
"We will meet in the hallway outside
of the restaurant in the Mira Hotel.
344
00:20:17,099 --> 00:20:21,591
"I will be working on a Rubik's
Cube so you can identify me.
345
00:20:21,616 --> 00:20:26,090
"Approach me, and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.
346
00:20:26,115 --> 00:20:31,124
"I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure
and suggest you try the lounge instead.
347
00:20:31,149 --> 00:20:33,657
"I'll offer to show you where it is,
and at that point
348
00:20:33,682 --> 00:20:35,624
"we're good.
349
00:20:35,649 --> 00:20:38,615
You simply need
to follow naturally."
350
00:21:14,233 --> 00:21:17,758
As far as positioning,
I mean, if you want us to sit
351
00:21:17,783 --> 00:21:19,258
in any particular way
or whatever...
352
00:21:19,283 --> 00:21:21,283
- You know, I'm gonna...
- I'm gonna go over there.
353
00:21:21,308 --> 00:21:23,472
- Okay.
- I can get better light.
354
00:21:27,916 --> 00:21:29,865
This one will...
355
00:21:31,367 --> 00:21:33,848
- So this...
- Um, there's, you know,
356
00:21:33,866 --> 00:21:37,349
so many different,
enormous stories
357
00:21:37,367 --> 00:21:39,515
just that are kind of
stand-alone stories.
358
00:21:39,532 --> 00:21:42,158
- Mm-hmm.
- Um, that even,
359
00:21:42,183 --> 00:21:44,503
like, you know,
certain things about an individual document
360
00:21:44,528 --> 00:21:45,925
that can just be
their own story.
361
00:21:45,950 --> 00:21:48,425
Um, and I just want to start
churning those stories out.
362
00:21:48,450 --> 00:21:51,458
I... I basically woke up this morning
and already started writing stories.
363
00:21:51,483 --> 00:21:54,458
Um, so I'm hoping to,
you know, start
364
00:21:54,483 --> 00:21:56,758
publishing within, like,
a day or two days...
365
00:21:56,783 --> 00:21:58,791
- Okay.
- As long as you're good with that.
366
00:21:58,816 --> 00:22:00,292
- Yeah.
- Um, and,
367
00:22:00,317 --> 00:22:03,125
so, as far as, like,
the stuff we have to talk about,
368
00:22:03,150 --> 00:22:05,824
I mean, I'm kind of, like,
dichotomizing it,
369
00:22:05,849 --> 00:22:09,091
um, between, you know,
370
00:22:09,116 --> 00:22:11,208
stuff that I'd like to talk to
you about in terms of, like,
371
00:22:11,233 --> 00:22:13,258
the documents and the content,
and Laura has a bunch of questions
372
00:22:13,283 --> 00:22:15,883
about that as well, sort of working
through the documents, getting
373
00:22:15,908 --> 00:22:18,925
your take on a lot of this stuff that,
you know, will help me
374
00:22:18,950 --> 00:22:22,625
understand it better, but then, also,
the sort of "you" story, right?
375
00:22:22,650 --> 00:22:24,592
- Like, the who you are...
- Yeah.
376
00:22:24,617 --> 00:22:26,926
Why... What you've done,
why you've done what you've done.
377
00:22:26,951 --> 00:22:28,959
- Yeah.
- And I'd love to do that first...
378
00:22:28,984 --> 00:22:31,125
- Okay.
- Um, in part because
379
00:22:31,150 --> 00:22:33,292
- you're the only one who could do that...
- Yeah.
380
00:22:33,317 --> 00:22:35,317
So, I'd like to just get it done
so that it's done,
381
00:22:35,342 --> 00:22:37,926
um, and also because,
you know, it might be
382
00:22:37,951 --> 00:22:39,926
- that you want to do that early...
- Yeah.
383
00:22:39,951 --> 00:22:42,292
- Because...
- Who knows what could happen, yeah.
384
00:22:42,317 --> 00:22:44,592
It might be necessary,
we might choose to have that done early.
385
00:22:44,617 --> 00:22:47,592
What are your... Tell me your thoughts
on just where you are with that.
386
00:22:47,617 --> 00:22:51,126
So, the primary one on that... I think
I've expressed it a couple times online...
387
00:22:51,151 --> 00:22:53,625
Is... I feel the modern media
388
00:22:53,650 --> 00:22:56,349
has a big focus
on personalities.
389
00:22:56,367 --> 00:22:58,542
- Totally.
- And I'm a little concerned
390
00:22:58,567 --> 00:23:01,682
the more we... Focus on that,
391
00:23:01,700 --> 00:23:04,709
the more they're gonna use
that as a distraction, um,
392
00:23:04,734 --> 00:23:07,016
and I... I don't necessarily
want that to happen,
393
00:23:07,034 --> 00:23:09,183
which is why I've consistently said,
you know,
394
00:23:09,201 --> 00:23:11,376
"I'm not the story here."
395
00:23:11,401 --> 00:23:13,376
Um... Ha ha ha! Nervous, huh?
396
00:23:13,401 --> 00:23:15,350
That was a very,
very cheap pen...
397
00:23:15,368 --> 00:23:17,408
- Ha ha ha!
- Just, with the slightest force, broke.
398
00:23:17,433 --> 00:23:19,426
- Go ahead.
- Um...
399
00:23:19,451 --> 00:23:21,376
But, uh, yeah.
400
00:23:21,401 --> 00:23:24,426
Anything I can do
to help you guys, uh,
401
00:23:24,451 --> 00:23:26,376
get this out, I will do.
402
00:23:26,401 --> 00:23:30,376
I don't have, uh,
any experience with media,
403
00:23:30,401 --> 00:23:34,350
uh, with how this works,
um, so I'm kind of,
404
00:23:34,368 --> 00:23:36,226
uh, learning as I go.
405
00:23:36,251 --> 00:23:38,825
Right,
so I just want to get a sense
406
00:23:38,850 --> 00:23:40,730
of... Why did you decide
to do what you've done?
407
00:23:40,751 --> 00:23:42,876
- So, for me, it...
- It all comes down
408
00:23:42,901 --> 00:23:46,209
to state power against
the people's ability
409
00:23:46,234 --> 00:23:48,710
to meaningfully oppose
that power.
410
00:23:48,735 --> 00:23:51,710
And I'm sitting there,
uh, every day
411
00:23:51,735 --> 00:23:58,159
getting paid to design methods
to amplify that state power.
412
00:23:58,184 --> 00:24:00,326
And I'm realizing that if,
you know,
413
00:24:00,351 --> 00:24:03,159
the policy switches
that are the only things
414
00:24:03,184 --> 00:24:06,659
that restrain these states,
uh, were changed,
415
00:24:06,684 --> 00:24:09,659
there... You couldn't
meaningfully oppose these.
416
00:24:09,684 --> 00:24:11,993
I mean, you would have
to be the most incredibly
417
00:24:12,018 --> 00:24:14,960
sophisticated technical
actor in existence.
418
00:24:14,985 --> 00:24:19,509
I mean, I'm not sure there's anybody,
no matter how gifted you are,
419
00:24:19,534 --> 00:24:23,459
uh, who could oppose all
of the offices and all
420
00:24:23,484 --> 00:24:26,659
of the bright people...
Even all the mediocre people out there...
421
00:24:26,684 --> 00:24:29,459
With all of their tools
and all their capabilities.
422
00:24:29,484 --> 00:24:33,459
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration
423
00:24:33,484 --> 00:24:36,459
be betrayed and walked
away from and, in fact,
424
00:24:36,484 --> 00:24:39,184
- actually advance...
- Uh-huh, uh-huh.
425
00:24:39,202 --> 00:24:42,516
The things that had been
promised to be sort of
426
00:24:42,534 --> 00:24:45,659
curtailed and reined in
and dialled back,
427
00:24:45,684 --> 00:24:48,351
and actually get worse,
particularly drone strikes...
428
00:24:48,369 --> 00:24:50,351
Which I also learned at NSA,
we could...
429
00:24:50,369 --> 00:24:53,377
We could watch drone videos
from our desktops...
430
00:24:53,402 --> 00:24:57,160
Um... Uh, as... As I saw that,
431
00:24:57,185 --> 00:24:59,351
that really hardened me
to action.
432
00:24:59,369 --> 00:25:01,377
- In real time?
- In real time, yeah.
433
00:25:01,402 --> 00:25:03,351
You... It'll stream
434
00:25:03,369 --> 00:25:06,351
a lower quality of the video
to your desktop.
435
00:25:06,369 --> 00:25:08,493
Typically you'd be watching
surveillance drones
436
00:25:08,518 --> 00:25:10,684
as opposed to actually, like,
you know, murder drones,
437
00:25:10,702 --> 00:25:12,826
where they're going
out there and bomb somebody.
438
00:25:12,851 --> 00:25:15,850
But you'll have a drone that's
just following somebody's house
439
00:25:15,868 --> 00:25:18,684
for hours and hours,
and you won't know who it is
440
00:25:18,702 --> 00:25:21,351
because, you know,
you don't have the context for that.
441
00:25:21,369 --> 00:25:25,184
But it's just a page,
where it's lists and lists
442
00:25:25,202 --> 00:25:27,677
of drone feeds in all of
these different countries,
443
00:25:27,702 --> 00:25:29,851
under all these different code names,
and you can
444
00:25:29,869 --> 00:25:32,761
just click on which one
you want to see.
445
00:25:32,786 --> 00:25:34,761
Right, but...
446
00:25:34,786 --> 00:25:36,894
So if your self-interest is
447
00:25:36,919 --> 00:25:39,394
to live in a world in which
there's maximum privacy,
448
00:25:39,419 --> 00:25:42,561
doing something that could
put you into prison,
449
00:25:42,586 --> 00:25:45,044
in which your privacy is
completely destroyed,
450
00:25:45,069 --> 00:25:47,018
is sort of
the antithesis of that.
451
00:25:47,036 --> 00:25:51,094
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?
452
00:25:51,119 --> 00:25:54,684
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched,
453
00:25:54,702 --> 00:25:57,627
and there's never been anything in
the history of man that's like it.
454
00:25:57,652 --> 00:26:02,684
I mean, you could, again,
have children from one part of the world
455
00:26:02,702 --> 00:26:05,493
having an equal discussion
456
00:26:05,518 --> 00:26:08,794
where, you know,
they were sort of granted, um,
457
00:26:08,819 --> 00:26:12,185
the same respect for their
ideas and conversation,
458
00:26:12,203 --> 00:26:15,161
with experts in a field from
another part of the world
459
00:26:15,186 --> 00:26:19,161
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all of the time.
460
00:26:19,186 --> 00:26:21,961
Um, and it was...
It was free and unrestrained,
461
00:26:21,986 --> 00:26:25,961
and we've seen, uh, the...
The chilling of that, the cooling of that,
462
00:26:25,986 --> 00:26:29,794
and the changing of that model toward
something in which people self-police
463
00:26:29,819 --> 00:26:34,161
their own views, and they literally make
jokes about ending up on "the list"
464
00:26:34,186 --> 00:26:36,660
if they donate
to a political cause
465
00:26:36,685 --> 00:26:39,211
or if they say something
in a discussion.
466
00:26:39,236 --> 00:26:43,827
Uh, and it's become an expectation
that we're being watched.
467
00:26:43,852 --> 00:26:46,994
Um, many people I've talked to have
mentioned that they're careful about
468
00:26:47,019 --> 00:26:50,661
what they type into search engines because
they know that it's being recorded,
469
00:26:50,686 --> 00:26:55,878
and that limits the boundaries of
their intellectual exploration.
470
00:26:55,903 --> 00:26:59,878
Uh... and... I'm...
471
00:26:59,903 --> 00:27:03,185
I am more willing to...
472
00:27:03,203 --> 00:27:06,018
risk... imprisonment
473
00:27:06,036 --> 00:27:09,378
or any other negative outcome,
personally,
474
00:27:09,403 --> 00:27:13,352
than I am willing to risk
475
00:27:13,370 --> 00:27:16,044
the curtailment
of my intellectual freedom
476
00:27:16,069 --> 00:27:19,518
and that of those around me
477
00:27:19,536 --> 00:27:23,478
whom I care for, uh, equally as I...
I do for myself.
478
00:27:23,503 --> 00:27:26,685
And again, that... That's not to
say that I am self-sacrificing
479
00:27:26,703 --> 00:27:30,494
because it gives me...
I feel good
480
00:27:30,519 --> 00:27:35,652
in my human experience to know that I
can contribute to the good of others.
481
00:27:50,553 --> 00:27:53,029
Uh, could you elaborate on that?
482
00:27:53,054 --> 00:27:55,429
So, uh, I don't know
483
00:27:55,454 --> 00:27:57,518
how much of the... programs
484
00:27:57,536 --> 00:28:00,685
and the actual technical capacities
everybody's talked to you about,
485
00:28:00,703 --> 00:28:02,685
but there's
an infrastructure in place
486
00:28:02,703 --> 00:28:05,712
in the United States
and worldwide
487
00:28:05,737 --> 00:28:08,186
that NSA has built,
488
00:28:08,204 --> 00:28:13,212
in cooperation with
other governments as well...
489
00:28:13,237 --> 00:28:16,686
that intercepts
490
00:28:16,704 --> 00:28:19,962
basically every digital
communication,
491
00:28:19,987 --> 00:28:24,962
every radio communication,
every analogue communication
492
00:28:24,987 --> 00:28:28,379
that it has sensors
in place to detect.
493
00:28:28,404 --> 00:28:32,929
And, uh, with these capabilities,
basically,
494
00:28:32,954 --> 00:28:35,853
the... The vast majority
495
00:28:35,871 --> 00:28:40,019
of human and, uh,
computer-to-computer communications,
496
00:28:40,037 --> 00:28:45,045
device-based communications, which sort of
inform the relationships between humans,
497
00:28:45,070 --> 00:28:49,045
um, are automatically
ingested without targeting.
498
00:28:49,070 --> 00:28:53,713
And that allows individuals
to retroactively search
499
00:28:53,738 --> 00:28:57,546
your communications based
on self-certifications.
500
00:28:57,571 --> 00:29:00,713
So, for example,
if I wanted to see
501
00:29:00,738 --> 00:29:04,212
the content of your email or,
you know,
502
00:29:04,237 --> 00:29:07,379
your wife's phone calls
or anything like that,
503
00:29:07,404 --> 00:29:11,596
um, all I have to do is use
what's called a "selector,"
504
00:29:11,621 --> 00:29:15,046
um, any kind of... thing
505
00:29:15,071 --> 00:29:18,713
in the communications chain
that might uniquely
506
00:29:18,738 --> 00:29:21,880
or almost uniquely identify
you as an individual.
507
00:29:21,905 --> 00:29:24,380
And I'm talking about things
like email addresses,
508
00:29:24,405 --> 00:29:27,380
IP addresses,
phone numbers, credit cards,
509
00:29:27,405 --> 00:29:31,046
um, even passwords
that are unique to you,
510
00:29:31,071 --> 00:29:33,546
that aren't used by anyone else.
511
00:29:33,571 --> 00:29:36,596
Um, I can input those
into the system,
512
00:29:36,621 --> 00:29:39,046
and it will not only go back
through the database and go,
513
00:29:39,071 --> 00:29:42,679
"Have I seen this
anywhere in the past?"
514
00:29:42,704 --> 00:29:46,046
it will, um,
basically put an additional level
515
00:29:46,071 --> 00:29:49,020
of scrutiny on it,
moving into the future,
516
00:29:49,038 --> 00:29:52,687
that says, "If this is detected
now or at any time in the future",
517
00:29:52,705 --> 00:29:56,796
I want this to go to me immediately
and alert me in real time"
518
00:29:56,821 --> 00:29:58,930
that you're communicating
with someone,
519
00:29:58,955 --> 00:30:00,904
things like that.
520
00:30:03,538 --> 00:30:05,547
So I don't know who you are
521
00:30:05,572 --> 00:30:07,046
or anything about you.
522
00:30:07,071 --> 00:30:09,020
Okay. Um...
523
00:30:09,038 --> 00:30:12,714
I work for, uh,
Booz Allen Hamilton,
524
00:30:12,739 --> 00:30:14,854
a defence contractor.
525
00:30:14,872 --> 00:30:17,663
Uh, I'm sort of on loan to NSA.
526
00:30:17,688 --> 00:30:20,687
I don't talk to a Booz Allen boss,
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen;
527
00:30:20,705 --> 00:30:22,130
It's all from NSA.
528
00:30:22,155 --> 00:30:24,330
- Uh, so I don't know your name.
- Oh, ha!
529
00:30:24,355 --> 00:30:27,854
Sorry. I, uh...
My name is Edward Snowden.
530
00:30:27,872 --> 00:30:29,830
I go by Ed.
531
00:30:29,855 --> 00:30:32,354
Um, Edward Joseph Snowden
is the full name.
532
00:30:32,372 --> 00:30:33,520
Uh, S-N...
533
00:30:33,538 --> 00:30:35,663
O-W-D-E-N.
534
00:30:35,688 --> 00:30:37,520
And, uh, where are you from?
535
00:30:37,538 --> 00:30:41,021
Uh, I'm originally...
I was born in North Carolina,
536
00:30:41,039 --> 00:30:43,297
uh, small town, Elizabeth City.
537
00:30:43,322 --> 00:30:45,881
There's a Coast Guard station there;
I'm from a military family.
538
00:30:45,906 --> 00:30:48,496
- Yeah.
- But I spent most of my time
539
00:30:48,521 --> 00:30:51,997
growing up around, uh,
Fort Meade in Maryland.
540
00:30:52,022 --> 00:30:54,964
Uh, and your family,
541
00:30:54,989 --> 00:30:57,997
uh, what's the
consequences for them?
542
00:30:58,022 --> 00:31:02,164
This, uh, this is actually
what has made this hardest.
543
00:31:02,189 --> 00:31:06,164
Uh, my family doesn't know,
uh, what's happening.
544
00:31:06,189 --> 00:31:08,764
They're...
They're unaware. Um...
545
00:31:08,789 --> 00:31:11,497
I don't think I'll...
546
00:31:11,522 --> 00:31:14,047
be able to keep the family ties
547
00:31:14,072 --> 00:31:18,464
that I've had for my life, um,
548
00:31:18,489 --> 00:31:22,164
because of the risk of associating them,
uh, with this.
549
00:31:22,189 --> 00:31:25,664
And I'll leave, you know,
what to publish on this
550
00:31:25,689 --> 00:31:27,997
and what not to publish
to you guys.
551
00:31:28,022 --> 00:31:30,464
I trust you to be
responsible on this.
552
00:31:30,489 --> 00:31:35,298
Um... But basically,
the closer I stay to my family,
553
00:31:35,323 --> 00:31:37,521
the more likely they are
to be leaned on...
554
00:31:37,539 --> 00:31:39,131
So you don't want me
to report this?
555
00:31:39,156 --> 00:31:40,631
I mean, we know that, yeah.
556
00:31:40,656 --> 00:31:42,631
We definitely want
to do whatever we can
557
00:31:42,656 --> 00:31:45,631
not to include them
or bring them into the mix.
558
00:31:45,656 --> 00:31:48,355
- Sure, I...
- That's fine. I won't...
559
00:31:48,373 --> 00:31:49,688
- Let me now...
- I'm sorry to interrupt you.
560
00:31:49,706 --> 00:31:51,586
Can we just stop for a second,
do the documents,
561
00:31:51,611 --> 00:31:53,598
and then go back to that?
That make sense?
562
00:31:53,623 --> 00:31:54,765
Uh, what do I need?
563
00:31:54,790 --> 00:31:57,548
Do I need an email address
that we're using, or...
564
00:31:57,573 --> 00:31:59,664
Well, so you can...
You can send them...
565
00:31:59,689 --> 00:32:02,889
Once you've encrypted it, you can send it
from whatever you think is appropriate.
566
00:32:02,914 --> 00:32:05,664
The main thing is you've got
to encapsulate all of this...
567
00:32:05,689 --> 00:32:08,164
- Uh-huh.
- In a way that it can't
568
00:32:08,189 --> 00:32:10,298
- be decrypted and read...
- Right.
569
00:32:10,323 --> 00:32:12,464
- When it's in transit across the network...
- Right.
570
00:32:12,489 --> 00:32:15,464
Or on either of the end
points that it's received at.
571
00:32:15,489 --> 00:32:17,464
Okay, I mean, just so you know,
these documents are basically
572
00:32:17,489 --> 00:32:19,849
- all gonna be uploaded in, like...
- Yeah, and that's fine.
573
00:32:19,874 --> 00:32:21,464
You know, 48 hours,
72 hours, whatever.
574
00:32:21,489 --> 00:32:23,497
This is simply... You know,
you want to get in the process
575
00:32:23,522 --> 00:32:25,522
of doing this for everything
because it seems hard,
576
00:32:25,547 --> 00:32:27,464
- but it's not hard. This is super easy.
- Okay.
577
00:32:27,489 --> 00:32:29,631
- So just walk me through it, and...
- Okay.
578
00:32:29,656 --> 00:32:34,323
Show me... Show me the actual folder
structure where these files are first.
579
00:32:36,539 --> 00:32:39,022
How many documents did
you say there were?
580
00:32:39,040 --> 00:32:40,497
- 7.
- All right.
581
00:32:40,522 --> 00:32:42,682
- Well, while you're working...
- Okay, go ahead, yeah.
582
00:32:42,707 --> 00:32:44,132
- Did you want to...
- Okay.
583
00:32:44,157 --> 00:32:46,465
How many documents
are we talking about?
584
00:32:46,490 --> 00:32:48,664
Because when the
Guardian did WikiLeaks,
585
00:32:48,689 --> 00:32:50,998
technical people set up a system
586
00:32:51,023 --> 00:32:53,522
so that they were available
for anybody to see.
587
00:32:53,540 --> 00:32:55,189
- Mm-hmm.
- And I just wondered
588
00:32:55,207 --> 00:32:57,632
if it's possible to
do the same thing.
589
00:32:57,657 --> 00:33:00,665
That... That would be
the ideal end game,
590
00:33:00,690 --> 00:33:04,098
um, but... because...
591
00:33:04,123 --> 00:33:07,798
Because some of these documents
are legitimately classified,
592
00:33:07,823 --> 00:33:11,265
in ways that could cause harm
to people and methods...
593
00:33:11,290 --> 00:33:15,799
Um, I'm comfortable in my technical
ability, uh, to protect them.
594
00:33:15,824 --> 00:33:17,824
I mean, you could literally
shoot me or torture me,
595
00:33:17,849 --> 00:33:21,299
and I could not disclose
the password if I wanted to.
596
00:33:21,324 --> 00:33:25,299
Um... You know, I...
I have the sophistication to do that.
597
00:33:25,324 --> 00:33:28,998
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,
598
00:33:29,023 --> 00:33:31,522
but there are a number
of them that couldn't.
599
00:33:31,540 --> 00:33:33,689
But the question becomes,
600
00:33:33,707 --> 00:33:37,356
can an organization
actually control
601
00:33:37,374 --> 00:33:40,356
that information in that manner
602
00:33:40,374 --> 00:33:43,799
without risking basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?
603
00:33:43,824 --> 00:33:45,432
But I... I do agree with that.
604
00:33:45,457 --> 00:33:49,133
Honestly, I don't want to be the
person making the decisions
605
00:33:49,158 --> 00:33:51,465
on what should be public
and what shouldn't,
606
00:33:51,490 --> 00:33:53,766
which is why...
Rather than publishing these
607
00:33:53,791 --> 00:33:57,099
on my own, um,
or putting them out openly...
608
00:33:57,124 --> 00:33:59,133
- I'm running them through journalists...
- Yes.
609
00:33:59,158 --> 00:34:01,665
So that my bias,
you know, and my things...
610
00:34:01,690 --> 00:34:04,300
Because clearly I have
some strongly held views...
611
00:34:04,325 --> 00:34:07,966
Are removed from that equation,
and the public interest
612
00:34:07,991 --> 00:34:10,099
is being represented in
the most responsible manner.
613
00:34:10,124 --> 00:34:12,049
Yeah.
614
00:34:12,074 --> 00:34:14,383
Actually, given... Given your...
615
00:34:14,408 --> 00:34:18,216
Sort of, you know,
geographic, uh...
616
00:34:18,241 --> 00:34:20,383
familiarity with the U.K.
and whatnot,
617
00:34:20,408 --> 00:34:24,383
I... I'd like to point out
that GCHQ, um,
618
00:34:24,408 --> 00:34:28,883
has, uh,
probably the most invasive...
619
00:34:28,908 --> 00:34:31,049
- I've heard that, yeah.
- Ha!
620
00:34:31,074 --> 00:34:33,550
Network intercept program
anywhere in the world.
621
00:34:33,575 --> 00:34:36,099
- Yeah, yeah.
- Uh, it's called Tempora,
622
00:34:36,124 --> 00:34:38,190
T-E-M-P-O-R-A,
623
00:34:38,208 --> 00:34:41,523
and it's the world's first "full take,"
they call it...
624
00:34:41,541 --> 00:34:45,490
And that means content in addition
to metadata... On everything.
625
00:34:47,491 --> 00:34:49,999
- Um, so this...
- This is what I'd like to do
626
00:34:50,024 --> 00:34:52,690
just in terms of scheduling,
if it's good with everybody else.
627
00:34:52,708 --> 00:34:54,690
Um, are you...
Do you feel like you're done...
628
00:34:54,708 --> 00:34:56,466
- I am done, yeah.
- With what you... Okay.
629
00:34:56,491 --> 00:34:58,966
So I... I'm anxious to
630
00:34:58,991 --> 00:35:00,999
go back,
get those articles done,
631
00:35:01,024 --> 00:35:03,499
and then there's
a bunch of documents
632
00:35:03,524 --> 00:35:05,333
that aren't about those
first 2 or 3 stories
633
00:35:05,358 --> 00:35:07,000
- that I'd like to spend time with you...
- Sure, yeah.
634
00:35:07,025 --> 00:35:09,099
You know, kind of going over,
um, and...
635
00:35:09,124 --> 00:35:10,499
Ha ha! I'm not going anywhere!
636
00:35:10,524 --> 00:35:12,857
You're available?
You want to check your book first?
637
00:35:12,875 --> 00:35:15,857
Yeah... Ha ha! Let me, uh,
let me check my schedule.
638
00:35:15,875 --> 00:35:17,675
Is that good for you, Laura?
Do you want to...
639
00:35:17,700 --> 00:35:19,333
- It's great.
- Okay.
640
00:35:34,125 --> 00:35:36,100
Hello?
641
00:35:36,125 --> 00:35:37,550
Yes.
642
00:35:37,575 --> 00:35:41,208
Uh, my meal was great.
Thank you very much.
643
00:35:43,075 --> 00:35:46,550
Uh, no, I still have some left,
and I think I'm gonna be eating it later,
644
00:35:46,575 --> 00:35:49,707
so, uh, you can just
leave me alone for now.
645
00:35:51,042 --> 00:35:54,574
Okay, great. Thank you so much.
Have a good one. Bye.
646
00:35:56,575 --> 00:35:59,707
Let's, uh, fix that real quick.
647
00:36:01,691 --> 00:36:04,267
So, uh, another fun thing
I was telling Laura about:
648
00:36:04,292 --> 00:36:06,134
This... All of these
new VOIP phones,
649
00:36:06,159 --> 00:36:08,857
they have little computers in them,
and you can hot-mic these
650
00:36:08,875 --> 00:36:10,191
over the network... Uh-huh.
651
00:36:10,209 --> 00:36:12,634
All the time,
even when the receiver's down, so,
652
00:36:12,659 --> 00:36:15,167
as long as it's plugged in,
it can be listening in on you.
653
00:36:15,192 --> 00:36:18,167
And I hadn't... Hadn't even
considered that earlier, but yeah.
654
00:36:18,192 --> 00:36:20,217
- Okay.
- There are so many ways we can...
655
00:36:20,242 --> 00:36:22,500
This could be...
Everything that's in here
656
00:36:22,525 --> 00:36:24,685
is pretty much gonna be on
public record at some point.
657
00:36:24,692 --> 00:36:26,858
- We should operate on that...
- Yeah, yeah.
658
00:36:26,875 --> 00:36:28,500
- Basis, because...
- I think we are.
659
00:36:28,525 --> 00:36:30,405
So, do you have your
airgapped machine with you?
660
00:36:30,430 --> 00:36:33,063
- I do, I do.
- You can pop that out.
661
00:36:36,075 --> 00:36:37,967
Do you have an understanding
or commitment
662
00:36:37,992 --> 00:36:40,634
on when you guys are going to
press with the first stories?
663
00:36:40,659 --> 00:36:43,691
Uh, it's about 7:00 or
8:00 in the morning in London.
664
00:36:43,709 --> 00:36:45,825
Uh-huh. Okay.
665
00:36:47,226 --> 00:36:49,491
Oh, let's see here.
666
00:36:56,126 --> 00:36:59,101
Oh, hey, look,
there's the other one.
667
00:36:59,126 --> 00:37:01,935
Let's not leave
the same SD cards
668
00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:04,301
in our laptops forever,
in the future.
669
00:37:04,326 --> 00:37:05,909
Heh!
670
00:37:10,243 --> 00:37:14,885
Did you know this was still kicking
around in your, uh, in your laptop?
671
00:37:14,910 --> 00:37:16,601
- Yeah, I mean, that was the...
- Em, okay.
672
00:37:16,626 --> 00:37:18,768
- Okay, just... Just making sure.
- Okay. Yeah.
673
00:37:18,793 --> 00:37:21,359
Heh! This is that right there.
674
00:37:21,377 --> 00:37:24,218
You will have a new one
that looks exactly identical
675
00:37:24,243 --> 00:37:27,718
that's a different archive, so you might
want to take a Sharpie to it or something.
676
00:37:27,743 --> 00:37:31,768
Could you, uh, pass me my magic,
uh, mantle of power?
677
00:37:31,793 --> 00:37:33,734
Sorry. Mm-hmm.
678
00:37:33,759 --> 00:37:36,326
I'm gonna go pick up...
679
00:37:39,709 --> 00:37:43,192
Is that about
the possibility of...
680
00:37:43,210 --> 00:37:45,708
Visual, yeah. Visual collection.
681
00:37:51,627 --> 00:37:53,602
I don't think, at this point,
there's anything
682
00:37:53,627 --> 00:37:55,602
in this regard
that will shock us.
683
00:37:55,627 --> 00:37:58,501
We've become pretty...
684
00:37:58,526 --> 00:38:00,501
In fact, Ewen said before,
he's like, he's like,
685
00:38:00,526 --> 00:38:03,001
"I'm never leaving my room."
He's like, "I'm never leaving anything
686
00:38:03,026 --> 00:38:05,386
in my room again, not a single machine."
I was like, "You've
687
00:38:05,411 --> 00:38:06,810
"been infected
by the paranoia bug.
688
00:38:06,828 --> 00:38:09,501
It happens to all of us!"
Ha ha ha!
689
00:38:09,526 --> 00:38:11,807
And the way he said it,
he was like, "I would never leave"
690
00:38:11,832 --> 00:38:13,969
a single device in
the room again alone."
691
00:38:13,994 --> 00:38:16,542
- Heh!
- My bag is getting heavier and heavier.
692
00:38:18,577 --> 00:38:20,501
Your evil influence.
693
00:38:20,526 --> 00:38:22,501
That's your evil influence, Ed.
694
00:38:22,526 --> 00:38:25,192
All right, I'm going to need you
to enter your root password
695
00:38:25,210 --> 00:38:27,692
'cause I don't know what it is.
696
00:38:27,710 --> 00:38:31,136
If you want to use this,
you're more than welcome to.
697
00:38:31,161 --> 00:38:34,501
Okay. It looks like your root password's
about 4 characters long anyway.
698
00:38:34,526 --> 00:38:36,446
It's usually a lot longer,
but that's just, like,
699
00:38:36,471 --> 00:38:38,002
a one-time-only thing, right?
700
00:38:38,027 --> 00:38:40,525
- So it is, uh...
- It had been a lot longer,
701
00:38:40,543 --> 00:38:42,525
but ever since I knew
that it was just, like,
702
00:38:42,543 --> 00:38:45,026
a one-time-only session one,
I've been making it shorter.
703
00:38:45,044 --> 00:38:47,193
- Is that not good?
- It's actually not.
704
00:38:47,211 --> 00:38:49,668
I was expressing this with Laura,
either.
705
00:38:49,693 --> 00:38:52,668
The issue is, because of the fact
that it's got a hardware MAC address
706
00:38:52,693 --> 00:38:56,635
and things like that, if people are
able to identify your machine,
707
00:38:56,660 --> 00:38:58,668
- and they're able to...
- Consider the fact
708
00:38:58,693 --> 00:39:00,219
you're about to break
the most upsetting story...
709
00:39:00,244 --> 00:39:01,884
- Right, that's true, that's true.
- Yeah,
710
00:39:01,909 --> 00:39:03,501
so they might kind
of prioritize you...
711
00:39:03,526 --> 00:39:05,668
It's 10 letters.
I type very quickly.
712
00:39:05,693 --> 00:39:07,193
- It actually is 10 letters.
- Okay.
713
00:39:07,211 --> 00:39:09,360
So 10 letters
would be good if they
714
00:39:09,378 --> 00:39:11,668
- had to brute-force the entire key space.
- Right.
715
00:39:11,693 --> 00:39:15,692
Um, that would still probably only
take a couple of days for NSA.
716
00:39:15,710 --> 00:39:17,719
Um...
717
00:39:17,744 --> 00:39:20,719
That's a fire alarm.
718
00:39:20,744 --> 00:39:22,669
Okay.
719
00:39:22,694 --> 00:39:25,360
Well, hopefully... It just sounds like
720
00:39:25,378 --> 00:39:28,269
a 3-second test, or is...
721
00:39:28,294 --> 00:39:31,026
Do you want to call
the desk and ask?
722
00:39:31,044 --> 00:39:33,526
- No.
- I think it's fine.
723
00:39:33,544 --> 00:39:36,344
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that it just...
724
00:39:36,369 --> 00:39:38,026
- Has that happened before?
- Ahem.
725
00:39:38,044 --> 00:39:41,936
Maybe they got mad that they couldn't
listen in to us via the phone anymore.
726
00:39:41,961 --> 00:39:45,603
Has the fire
alarm gone off before?
727
00:39:45,628 --> 00:39:48,636
No, that's the first
time that's happened.
728
00:39:48,661 --> 00:39:51,303
Yeah, see, just in case,
they've got, like, an alert
729
00:39:51,328 --> 00:39:55,327
that goes to... Uh, that's...
That's unusual.
730
00:39:57,328 --> 00:39:59,360
We probably...
731
00:39:59,378 --> 00:40:01,803
- We might have to evacuate.
- Shouldn't ignore that.
732
00:40:01,828 --> 00:40:03,770
I don't know.
733
00:40:03,795 --> 00:40:05,686
- You think...
- Long as it's not continuous.
734
00:40:05,711 --> 00:40:07,636
It's not continuous.
735
00:40:07,661 --> 00:40:11,293
No, I'm just saying, if it...
If it continues.
736
00:40:12,878 --> 00:40:15,887
And then we go,
and we meet the guys down in the lobby?
737
00:40:15,912 --> 00:40:19,170
- Yeah... Ha ha! Right?
- Yeah.
738
00:40:19,195 --> 00:40:21,336
Yeah, let's, uh, let's just...
Let's leave it for now.
739
00:40:21,361 --> 00:40:23,911
Let me, uh, finish this up.
740
00:40:25,711 --> 00:40:26,860
All right.
741
00:40:35,694 --> 00:40:37,970
Not that they're gonna answer,
'cause they
742
00:40:37,995 --> 00:40:40,494
- probably got, like, 7,000 calls.
- Yeah.
743
00:40:42,329 --> 00:40:45,970
Hi, uh, we hear a loud
buzzing on the 10th floor.
744
00:40:45,995 --> 00:40:48,127
Can you tell us what that is?
745
00:40:49,528 --> 00:40:51,470
Oh, okay.
746
00:40:51,495 --> 00:40:53,794
Okay, great. Thank you. Bye.
747
00:40:55,245 --> 00:40:56,720
Fire alarm testing maintenance.
748
00:40:56,745 --> 00:40:58,053
- That's good.
- Yeah, yeah.
749
00:40:58,078 --> 00:40:59,278
That's what we wanted to hear.
750
00:40:59,295 --> 00:41:02,270
Nice of them to, uh...
Nice of them
751
00:41:02,295 --> 00:41:05,411
to let us know
about that in advance.
752
00:41:07,579 --> 00:41:11,053
Um... I just wanted to give
you kind of a quick tour.
753
00:41:11,078 --> 00:41:13,554
Uh, when Laura was looking at this,
she was kind of salivating
754
00:41:13,579 --> 00:41:16,194
and couldn't stop, like,
actually reading the documents...
755
00:41:16,212 --> 00:41:18,270
- We'll try and restrain ourselves...
- Yeah.
756
00:41:18,295 --> 00:41:19,804
Without promising
that we'll succeed.
757
00:41:19,829 --> 00:41:21,387
Yeah, I just wanted
to kind of explain,
758
00:41:21,412 --> 00:41:24,771
a... A brief overview of what these
are and how they're organized.
759
00:41:24,796 --> 00:41:26,916
Um, the beginning are just
some documents of interest.
760
00:41:26,941 --> 00:41:31,270
Uh, the primary purpose of the second
archive is to bring the focus over to SSO,
761
00:41:31,295 --> 00:41:34,437
as opposed to, uh, PRISM,
and this is in general,
762
00:41:34,462 --> 00:41:37,054
uh, it's... SSO are the
Special Source Operations.
763
00:41:37,079 --> 00:41:41,604
Those are the worldwide passive
collection on networks.
764
00:41:41,629 --> 00:41:43,171
They're both domestic
to the U.S.
765
00:41:43,196 --> 00:41:45,138
And international.
766
00:41:45,163 --> 00:41:47,138
There's a lot of different
ways they do it...
767
00:41:47,163 --> 00:41:49,104
But, uh, corporate partnerships
768
00:41:49,129 --> 00:41:51,437
are one of the primary things,
uh, they do domestically.
769
00:41:51,462 --> 00:41:53,462
They also do this with
multinationals that might be
770
00:41:53,487 --> 00:41:55,567
headquartered in the U.S.
who they can kind of coerce
771
00:41:55,592 --> 00:41:57,971
and just pay into
giving them access,
772
00:41:57,996 --> 00:41:59,470
and they also do it bilaterally
773
00:41:59,495 --> 00:42:01,470
with the assistance
of certain governments.
774
00:42:01,495 --> 00:42:03,637
And that's basically on
the premise that they go,
775
00:42:03,662 --> 00:42:05,470
"All right, we'll help you
set this system up
776
00:42:05,495 --> 00:42:07,138
if you give us all
the data from it."
777
00:42:07,163 --> 00:42:08,721
Um, so yeah.
778
00:42:08,746 --> 00:42:11,388
There's... There's...
779
00:42:11,413 --> 00:42:13,694
There's a lot more in here
than any one person
780
00:42:13,712 --> 00:42:15,888
- or probably one team could do.
- Right.
781
00:42:15,913 --> 00:42:17,861
Um, XKeyscore Deep-Dive,
782
00:42:17,879 --> 00:42:21,528
uh, XKeyscore in general...
And there's a huge folder
783
00:42:21,546 --> 00:42:24,028
of documentation on XKeyscore
and how it works...
784
00:42:24,046 --> 00:42:27,004
Is the front-end system
that analysts use
785
00:42:27,029 --> 00:42:30,171
for querying that sort of ocean of raw
SIGINT that I was telling you about.
786
00:42:30,196 --> 00:42:33,695
All of that stuff where you can
sort of do the retroactive searches
787
00:42:33,713 --> 00:42:35,888
and live searches and get
flagging and whatnot,
788
00:42:35,913 --> 00:42:38,212
XKeyscore is
the front end for that.
789
00:42:40,029 --> 00:42:43,471
I'm just gonna show you one slide here
'cause, uh, Laura thought
790
00:42:43,496 --> 00:42:47,028
it was valuable, and I was
talking about kind of how these,
791
00:42:47,046 --> 00:42:52,104
uh, capabilities ramp up
in sophistication over time.
792
00:42:52,129 --> 00:42:53,722
This is kinda nice.
793
00:42:53,747 --> 00:42:56,221
As of fiscal year 2011,
they could monitor
794
00:42:56,246 --> 00:42:59,471
1 billion telephone
or Internet sessions,
795
00:42:59,496 --> 00:43:02,471
simultaneously,
per one of these devices.
796
00:43:02,496 --> 00:43:05,005
And they could collect
at the rate of about
797
00:43:05,030 --> 00:43:07,671
125 gigabytes a second,
798
00:43:07,696 --> 00:43:09,471
which is a terabit.
799
00:43:09,496 --> 00:43:11,305
That's just
each one of these devices.
800
00:43:11,330 --> 00:43:12,838
That's for each one
of these, yeah.
801
00:43:12,863 --> 00:43:15,471
How many TUMULT
machines would that be, then?
802
00:43:15,496 --> 00:43:18,855
Uh, per this, back then,
there were 20 sites.
803
00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:21,838
There's 10 at DOD installations,
804
00:43:21,863 --> 00:43:25,362
but these are all outdated;
We've expanded pretty rapidly.
805
00:43:25,380 --> 00:43:29,528
Uh, but still, 20 sites,
that's at least 20 billion.
806
00:43:29,546 --> 00:43:31,555
This all needs to get out,
you know what I mean?
807
00:43:31,580 --> 00:43:34,055
It's like... Just in terms
808
00:43:34,080 --> 00:43:37,105
of understanding
the capabilities.
809
00:43:37,130 --> 00:43:40,196
- Like, it's so opaque.
- It's not science fiction.
810
00:43:40,214 --> 00:43:42,654
- This stuff is happening right now.
- No, that's what I mean.
811
00:43:42,679 --> 00:43:44,363
It's like the...
The magnitude of it,
812
00:43:44,381 --> 00:43:48,389
and... And, like, this is a pretty
inaccessible technical document.
813
00:43:48,414 --> 00:43:51,222
- Ha ha! Yeah.
- But even this, like, is
814
00:43:51,247 --> 00:43:53,272
- really chilling, do you know what I mean?
- Yeah.
815
00:43:53,297 --> 00:43:56,055
And, yeah, I mean, we should have...
We should be having debates
816
00:43:56,080 --> 00:43:58,055
about whether we want
governments...
817
00:43:58,080 --> 00:44:00,556
I mean, this is massive
and extraordinary.
818
00:44:00,581 --> 00:44:02,556
- It's... It's amazing.
- Yeah.
819
00:44:02,581 --> 00:44:05,005
Even though you know it, you know,
even though you know that,
820
00:44:05,030 --> 00:44:08,529
- to see it, like, the physical blueprints of it...
- Mm-hmm.
821
00:44:08,547 --> 00:44:11,029
And sort of the technical
expressions of it,
822
00:44:11,047 --> 00:44:15,613
brutally hits home in, like,
a super-visceral way that is so needed.
823
00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:22,723
This is CNN Breaking News.
824
00:44:22,748 --> 00:44:26,196
An explosive new report
is reigniting the concerns
825
00:44:26,214 --> 00:44:30,723
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's security.
826
00:44:30,748 --> 00:44:34,222
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency
827
00:44:34,247 --> 00:44:38,105
blanket access to millions
of Verizon customers' records
828
00:44:38,130 --> 00:44:39,556
on a daily basis.
829
00:44:39,581 --> 00:44:41,105
Earlier,
I had the chance to conduct
830
00:44:41,130 --> 00:44:43,056
the first TV interview
with the reporter
831
00:44:43,081 --> 00:44:45,222
who broke this story wide open,
832
00:44:45,247 --> 00:44:47,723
Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian.
833
00:44:47,748 --> 00:44:49,773
Congratulations on the scoop.
834
00:44:49,798 --> 00:44:54,123
Explain for our viewers
why this is important.
835
00:44:54,148 --> 00:44:56,197
It's important because
people have understood
836
00:44:56,215 --> 00:44:58,197
that the law that this was done under...
Which is
837
00:44:58,215 --> 00:45:00,529
the Patriot Act,
enacted in the wake of 9/11...
838
00:45:00,547 --> 00:45:02,529
Was a law that allowed
the government
839
00:45:02,547 --> 00:45:05,363
very broad powers to get
records about people
840
00:45:05,381 --> 00:45:08,363
with a lower level
of suspicion than
841
00:45:08,381 --> 00:45:10,223
probable cause,
the traditional standard.
842
00:45:10,248 --> 00:45:12,408
So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,
843
00:45:12,433 --> 00:45:14,364
if the government had
even any suspicion
844
00:45:14,382 --> 00:45:16,529
that you were involved
in a crime or terrorism,
845
00:45:16,547 --> 00:45:18,723
they could get a lot of
information about you.
846
00:45:18,748 --> 00:45:21,839
What this court order does
that makes it so striking is
847
00:45:21,864 --> 00:45:23,863
that it's not directed
at any individuals
848
00:45:23,881 --> 00:45:25,973
who they believe
or have suspicion
849
00:45:25,998 --> 00:45:28,839
of committing crimes or are part
of a terrorist organization.
850
00:45:28,864 --> 00:45:30,364
It's collecting
the phone records
851
00:45:30,382 --> 00:45:32,340
of every single customer
852
00:45:32,365 --> 00:45:34,839
of Verizon business
and finding out
853
00:45:34,864 --> 00:45:36,506
every single call
that they've made,
854
00:45:36,531 --> 00:45:38,440
internationally and locally,
so it's
855
00:45:38,465 --> 00:45:40,006
indiscriminate
and it's sweeping.
856
00:45:40,031 --> 00:45:41,839
It's a government
program designed
857
00:45:41,864 --> 00:45:43,697
to collect information
about all Americans,
858
00:45:43,715 --> 00:45:45,390
not just people where
they believe there's
859
00:45:45,415 --> 00:45:47,980
reason to think they've
done anything wrong.
860
00:46:47,099 --> 00:46:50,365
Ah, it's... It's a tough situation,
you know,
861
00:46:50,383 --> 00:46:52,530
hearing that the person
that you love,
862
00:46:52,548 --> 00:46:55,057
that you've spent
the decade with,
863
00:46:55,082 --> 00:46:57,664
may not be coming back.
864
00:47:01,049 --> 00:47:04,031
What did they ask her?
865
00:47:04,049 --> 00:47:07,031
Um, when was the
last time she saw me,
866
00:47:07,049 --> 00:47:10,031
where am I, um, what am I doing,
867
00:47:10,049 --> 00:47:13,057
you know,
what does she know about my illness,
868
00:47:13,082 --> 00:47:17,558
- things like that.
- Hmm.
869
00:47:17,583 --> 00:47:20,531
So, yeah, they're, um,
870
00:47:20,549 --> 00:47:23,057
they're pretty solidly aware,
871
00:47:23,082 --> 00:47:25,531
'cause, uh... Heh!
872
00:47:25,549 --> 00:47:29,165
I'm clearly not at home, ill.
873
00:47:48,866 --> 00:47:50,808
- Hello?
- Hello?
874
00:47:50,833 --> 00:47:54,999
Hello. Let me disconnect
from the Internet.
875
00:47:56,883 --> 00:47:59,341
So...
876
00:47:59,366 --> 00:48:01,507
There's some news?
877
00:48:01,532 --> 00:48:03,507
Yes, there was indeed some news.
878
00:48:03,532 --> 00:48:06,008
I have config, today, I think,
879
00:48:06,033 --> 00:48:08,008
maybe just a few hours ago?
880
00:48:08,033 --> 00:48:11,558
What...
What kind of people visited?
881
00:48:11,583 --> 00:48:14,008
Uh... An HR lady,
882
00:48:14,033 --> 00:48:16,507
I'm assuming from NSA,
as opposed
883
00:48:16,532 --> 00:48:18,975
to, uh,
as opposed to Booz Allen,
884
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,342
because she was accompanied
by a police officer,
885
00:48:21,367 --> 00:48:23,309
- which means NSA police.
- Mmm.
886
00:48:23,334 --> 00:48:26,374
And they were planning to break into my
house, which regular police don't do.
887
00:48:26,399 --> 00:48:28,309
- Um...
- Does she live there?
888
00:48:28,334 --> 00:48:31,975
Yeah, she lives there,
so I told her to cooperate fully...
889
00:48:32,000 --> 00:48:34,199
- I can't find my phone.
- Just one second.
890
00:48:34,217 --> 00:48:35,417
You know, worry about herself.
891
00:48:35,442 --> 00:48:36,550
You know what I'm gonna do?
892
00:48:36,575 --> 00:48:38,442
I'll just take out the
stuff I want to use.
893
00:48:38,467 --> 00:48:39,892
Okay.
894
00:48:39,917 --> 00:48:42,366
Okay, well, look,
I mean, this is not
895
00:48:42,384 --> 00:48:44,366
- a surprising development.
- Nah, yeah, I know.
896
00:48:44,384 --> 00:48:47,104
I planned for it, but it's just...
You know, when it's impacting them
897
00:48:47,129 --> 00:48:49,329
and they're talking to you,
it's a little bit different.
898
00:48:49,354 --> 00:48:50,892
Absolutely.
899
00:48:50,917 --> 00:48:52,942
But it's possible that they
900
00:48:52,967 --> 00:48:54,975
just noticed that
you're missing.
901
00:48:55,000 --> 00:48:56,508
I guess it's not
really a possibility.
902
00:48:56,533 --> 00:49:00,166
It is, but, yeah, they're...
I mean...
903
00:49:03,217 --> 00:49:06,833
Um, let me just get rid of this.
904
00:49:08,217 --> 00:49:10,866
Sorry, I obviously was
focused on other things
905
00:49:10,884 --> 00:49:13,842
than appearance this morning, so...
Ha! Sorry.
906
00:49:13,867 --> 00:49:15,842
- How was...
- How did she react?
907
00:49:15,867 --> 00:49:18,842
- Was she relatively calm about it?
- She's relatively calm...
908
00:49:18,867 --> 00:49:21,366
Does she know anything about
what you're doing and why?
909
00:49:21,384 --> 00:49:24,699
She has no idea, um, and that's...
I mean,
910
00:49:24,717 --> 00:49:27,542
I... I feel badly about that,
911
00:49:27,567 --> 00:49:29,532
but that's the only way
I could think of where,
912
00:49:29,550 --> 00:49:31,508
like, she can't be in trouble.
913
00:49:31,533 --> 00:49:33,532
Did you just basically do a
"I have to go somewhere for reasons
914
00:49:33,550 --> 00:49:35,310
that I can't tell you about"
kind of thing...
915
00:49:35,335 --> 00:49:37,699
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation.
916
00:49:37,717 --> 00:49:40,699
Um, and I...
I left a note saying, "Hey",
917
00:49:40,717 --> 00:49:42,776
I'm going to be gone
for a while for work,"
918
00:49:42,801 --> 00:49:44,961
- which isn't unusual for me in my business...
- Right.
919
00:49:44,986 --> 00:49:46,675
You know, so...
920
00:49:46,700 --> 00:49:49,176
Okay, so let me ask you a
couple things just quickly.
921
00:49:49,201 --> 00:49:51,226
Are they gonna be able
to go into your stuff
922
00:49:51,251 --> 00:49:53,009
and figure out what you took?
923
00:49:53,034 --> 00:49:55,343
Um...
924
00:49:55,368 --> 00:49:59,675
in... In some kind of,
some sort of, like,
925
00:49:59,700 --> 00:50:01,310
peripheral senses,
but not necessarily...
926
00:50:01,335 --> 00:50:03,310
- Not with great specificity...
- Yes.
927
00:50:03,335 --> 00:50:07,310
Uh, because I cast such a wide net,
if they do that, the only thing
928
00:50:07,335 --> 00:50:09,393
they're gonna do is they're gonna have a
heart attack 'cause they're gonna go,
929
00:50:09,418 --> 00:50:11,310
- "He had access to everything"...
- Yeah.
930
00:50:11,335 --> 00:50:14,809
And they're not gonna know what
specifically has been done.
931
00:50:14,834 --> 00:50:17,809
Now, I think they're gonna start
to actually feel a little better,
932
00:50:17,834 --> 00:50:21,809
although they're not gonna be,
uh, wild about this in any case,
933
00:50:21,834 --> 00:50:25,310
when they see that the stories
are kind of cleaving to a trend.
934
00:50:25,335 --> 00:50:28,776
You know, it's not like, "Here's the
list of everybody who works everywhere."
935
00:50:28,801 --> 00:50:31,776
Right. I also think,
you know, they're gonna be paranoid
936
00:50:31,801 --> 00:50:36,310
in the extreme and assuming all
kinds of worst-case scenarios,
937
00:50:36,335 --> 00:50:39,476
which is gonna, you know,
I think, make them react
938
00:50:39,501 --> 00:50:41,509
in ways that probably aren't,
like, gonna be
939
00:50:41,534 --> 00:50:44,476
particularly rational
on their part.
940
00:50:44,501 --> 00:50:46,976
But, at the same time,
there's...
941
00:50:47,001 --> 00:50:49,476
I do think they're limited
for the moment.
942
00:50:49,501 --> 00:50:52,443
I... I agree, and I mean,
I had kind of time
943
00:50:52,468 --> 00:50:56,443
to set a stage where... We all enjoy at
least a minimum level of protection,
944
00:50:56,468 --> 00:50:58,443
you know, no matter who we are,
who's involved in this.
945
00:50:58,468 --> 00:51:00,109
- You know, you're either a journalist...
- Right.
946
00:51:00,134 --> 00:51:01,574
Or you're either out
of jurisdiction,
947
00:51:01,599 --> 00:51:04,533
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.
948
00:51:04,551 --> 00:51:06,911
I think it's over, you know,
the weeks, when they have times
949
00:51:06,936 --> 00:51:10,560
to get lawyers, really sort of go,
"This is a special situation.
950
00:51:10,585 --> 00:51:12,533
How can we interpret this
to our advantage?"
951
00:51:12,551 --> 00:51:14,711
Like, we... We see them do
this all the time, you know,
952
00:51:14,736 --> 00:51:17,034
whether it's drones
or wiretapping or whatever.
953
00:51:17,052 --> 00:51:20,533
They'll go, "Well, according
to this law from the 1840s",
954
00:51:20,551 --> 00:51:23,034
- "you know, we have X, Y, or Z authority."
- Mm-hmm.
955
00:51:23,052 --> 00:51:25,692
But that... That takes time,
and that takes a great deal of effort.
956
00:51:25,717 --> 00:51:28,367
Yeah, and also, you know,
I mean, I think the more public
957
00:51:28,385 --> 00:51:30,843
we are out there, too,
like, as journalists,
958
00:51:30,868 --> 00:51:33,277
and the more protection
that's gonna give it as well.
959
00:51:33,302 --> 00:51:37,727
Have you started to give thought to
when you're ready to come forward?
960
00:51:37,752 --> 00:51:40,727
I'm... I'm ready whenever, um,
961
00:51:40,752 --> 00:51:43,727
honestly, I think there's
sort of an agreement
962
00:51:43,752 --> 00:51:46,560
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.
963
00:51:46,585 --> 00:51:48,145
That's my primary
concern at this point.
964
00:51:48,170 --> 00:51:50,561
I don't want to get
myself into the issue
965
00:51:50,586 --> 00:51:53,034
before it's gonna happen anyway,
and where it takes away
966
00:51:53,052 --> 00:51:54,717
from the stories
that are getting out.
967
00:52:33,319 --> 00:52:36,978
We're talking about
tens of millions of Americans,
968
00:52:37,003 --> 00:52:39,144
who weren't suspected
of doing anything,
969
00:52:39,169 --> 00:52:40,878
who were surveilled in this way.
970
00:52:40,903 --> 00:52:42,045
Hold your thoughts for a moment.
971
00:52:42,070 --> 00:52:43,470
I want to continue
this conversation
972
00:52:43,495 --> 00:52:45,678
because these are really important,
sensitive issues,
973
00:52:45,703 --> 00:52:48,344
and the public out there has
a right to know what's going on.
974
00:52:48,369 --> 00:52:51,344
- Stand by...
- This is CNN Breaking News.
975
00:52:51,369 --> 00:52:54,534
Well, another explosive
article has just appeared,
976
00:52:54,552 --> 00:52:56,534
this time in
the Washington Post.
977
00:52:56,552 --> 00:52:59,534
It's breaking news,
and it reveals another broad
978
00:52:59,552 --> 00:53:02,195
and secret U.S. government
surveillance program.
979
00:53:02,220 --> 00:53:05,011
The Washington Post
and the Guardian in London
980
00:53:05,036 --> 00:53:08,701
reporting that the NSA
and the FBI are tapping directly
981
00:53:08,719 --> 00:53:12,701
into the central servers
of 9 leading Internet companies,
982
00:53:12,719 --> 00:53:15,561
including Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook,
983
00:53:15,586 --> 00:53:18,561
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.
984
00:53:18,586 --> 00:53:21,535
The Post says they're
extracting audio, video,
985
00:53:21,553 --> 00:53:25,035
photographs, emails,
documents, and connection logs
986
00:53:25,053 --> 00:53:27,728
that enable analysts
to track a person's movements
987
00:53:27,753 --> 00:53:30,035
and contacts over time.
988
00:53:30,053 --> 00:53:32,278
Let's discuss
this latest revelation.
989
00:53:32,303 --> 00:53:33,728
They're coming out fast.
990
00:53:33,753 --> 00:53:35,945
Uh, Bill Binney,
the former official of the NSA
991
00:53:35,970 --> 00:53:37,895
who quit back in 2001.
992
00:53:37,920 --> 00:53:39,895
You were angry
over what was going on.
993
00:53:39,920 --> 00:53:42,078
You're known as
a whistle-blower right now.
994
00:53:42,103 --> 00:53:44,343
Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?
995
00:53:44,368 --> 00:53:46,228
Well, I assume it's
just a continuation
996
00:53:46,253 --> 00:53:47,868
of what they've been
doing all along.
997
00:53:47,886 --> 00:53:49,369
- So you're not surprised.
- No.
998
00:53:49,387 --> 00:53:51,427
Do you have any idea who's
leaking this information?
999
00:53:51,452 --> 00:53:53,678
I don't know who leaked this.
1000
00:53:53,703 --> 00:53:55,845
I have no doubt that
the administration
1001
00:53:55,870 --> 00:53:57,845
will launch an investigation,
1002
00:53:57,870 --> 00:53:59,845
not into who approved
these programs,
1003
00:53:59,870 --> 00:54:02,011
but into who leaked
the information.
1004
00:54:02,036 --> 00:54:04,678
I am not shocked that
the companies are denying it.
1005
00:54:04,703 --> 00:54:06,845
- I don't assume...
- Do you believe them?
1006
00:54:06,870 --> 00:54:09,369
There may be some technical
basis on which they can say
1007
00:54:09,387 --> 00:54:12,036
that "we are not
actively collaborating"
1008
00:54:12,054 --> 00:54:14,012
or "they don't have
what we consider
1009
00:54:14,037 --> 00:54:16,979
in our own definition to be
direct access to our servers,"
1010
00:54:17,004 --> 00:54:20,345
but what I do know is I have
talked to more than one person
1011
00:54:20,370 --> 00:54:23,979
who has sat at a desk
at a web portal
1012
00:54:24,004 --> 00:54:28,729
and typed out commands and reached
into those servers from a distance.
1013
00:54:28,754 --> 00:54:31,511
So whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.
1014
00:54:31,536 --> 00:54:34,203
Well, what I would call it
is the single-biggest infringement
1015
00:54:34,221 --> 00:54:37,678
on American civil liberties
probably of all time, isn't it?
1016
00:54:37,703 --> 00:54:39,678
- And this story...
- You have the New York Times now today
1017
00:54:39,703 --> 00:54:42,146
saying that the administration
has lost all credibility.
1018
00:54:42,171 --> 00:54:44,179
Yeah, the New York Times
slammed President Obama
1019
00:54:44,204 --> 00:54:45,645
for this and,
frankly I was used to that.
1020
00:54:45,670 --> 00:54:47,350
The New York Times used
to slam George Bush
1021
00:54:47,375 --> 00:54:49,511
for protecting the country
and for the steps he took.
1022
00:54:49,536 --> 00:54:50,869
I don't want us
to drop our guard.
1023
00:54:50,887 --> 00:54:52,370
I don't want us
to be struck again.
1024
00:54:52,388 --> 00:54:54,446
As we saw in Boston, Anderson,
1025
00:54:54,471 --> 00:54:57,313
people are willing to sacrifice
their civil liberties.
1026
00:54:57,338 --> 00:54:58,946
People sheltered
inside because...
1027
00:54:58,971 --> 00:55:00,811
How can you believe
in freedom, do you think...
1028
00:55:00,836 --> 00:55:02,811
I mean, try and play
devil's advocate for me...
1029
00:55:02,836 --> 00:55:04,479
When you have secret courts,
1030
00:55:04,504 --> 00:55:06,479
secret operations like PRISM,
1031
00:55:06,504 --> 00:55:08,479
secret investigations
which go into
1032
00:55:08,504 --> 00:55:11,279
every spit and cough
of every American's lives,
1033
00:55:11,304 --> 00:55:13,812
without any member of the
American public knowing about it?
1034
00:55:13,837 --> 00:55:15,812
- That's not freedom, is it?
- In 2008,
1035
00:55:15,837 --> 00:55:18,146
they eliminated
the warrant requirement
1036
00:55:18,171 --> 00:55:20,146
for all conversations
except ones
1037
00:55:20,171 --> 00:55:22,479
that take place by
and among Americans
1038
00:55:22,504 --> 00:55:24,479
exclusively on American soil.
1039
00:55:24,504 --> 00:55:26,979
So they don't need
warrants now for people
1040
00:55:27,004 --> 00:55:28,979
who are foreigners
outside of the U.S.,
1041
00:55:29,004 --> 00:55:31,512
but they also don't need
warrants for Americans
1042
00:55:31,537 --> 00:55:33,813
who are in the United States,
communicating with people
1043
00:55:33,838 --> 00:55:36,146
reasonably believed to
be outside of the U.S.
1044
00:55:36,171 --> 00:55:38,346
So again,
the fact that there are no checks,
1045
00:55:38,371 --> 00:55:41,146
no oversight about who's looking
over the NSA's shoulder,
1046
00:55:41,171 --> 00:55:42,947
means that they can take
whatever they want.
1047
00:55:42,972 --> 00:55:45,146
And the fact that it's all
behind a wall of secrecy
1048
00:55:45,171 --> 00:55:47,479
and they threaten people
who want to expose it,
1049
00:55:47,504 --> 00:55:49,479
means that whatever
they're doing,
1050
00:55:49,504 --> 00:55:51,646
even violating the law,
is something that we're
1051
00:55:51,671 --> 00:55:53,313
unlikely to know
until we start having
1052
00:55:53,338 --> 00:55:55,897
real investigations
and real transparency
1053
00:55:55,922 --> 00:55:57,870
into what it is that
the government is doing.
1054
00:55:57,888 --> 00:55:59,870
Glenn Greenwald,
congratulations again
1055
00:55:59,888 --> 00:56:01,897
on exposing what is
a true scandal.
1056
00:56:01,922 --> 00:56:04,004
I appreciate you joining me.
1057
00:56:49,339 --> 00:56:52,980
Hey, I just, uh,
heard from Lindsay
1058
00:56:53,005 --> 00:56:57,113
and, uh, she's still alive,
which is good, and... And free.
1059
00:56:57,138 --> 00:57:01,731
My rent checks apparently are no
longer getting through to my landlord,
1060
00:57:01,756 --> 00:57:05,147
uh, so they said if we
don't pay them in 5 days,
1061
00:57:05,172 --> 00:57:07,647
we'll be evicted,
which is strange because I've got
1062
00:57:07,672 --> 00:57:11,113
a system set up that
automatically pays them.
1063
00:57:11,138 --> 00:57:15,614
Uh... So there's that,
and apparently there's construction trucks
1064
00:57:15,639 --> 00:57:20,304
all over the street of my house,
so that's, uh...
1065
00:57:21,672 --> 00:57:23,805
I wonder what they're
looking for.
1066
00:58:04,889 --> 00:58:06,847
Heh!
1067
00:58:06,872 --> 00:58:10,680
It is, uh...
It is an unusual feeling
1068
00:58:10,705 --> 00:58:13,871
that's kind of hard to...
Hard to, like, describe
1069
00:58:13,889 --> 00:58:16,680
or... Or convey in words,
1070
00:58:16,705 --> 00:58:18,680
but not knowing
what's going to happen
1071
00:58:18,705 --> 00:58:21,847
the next day, the next hour,
the next week,
1072
00:58:21,872 --> 00:58:24,514
it's scary, but at the same
time it's liberating, you know?
1073
00:58:24,539 --> 00:58:27,847
The, uh...
The planning comes a lot easier
1074
00:58:27,872 --> 00:58:30,272
because you don't have that many
variables to take into play.
1075
00:58:30,297 --> 00:58:33,648
You can only...
Act and then act again.
1076
00:58:33,673 --> 00:58:36,398
Now all these phone
calls are being recorded digitally,
1077
00:58:36,423 --> 00:58:39,705
not for content,
but for origin and destination.
1078
00:58:39,723 --> 00:58:42,038
Now word the government is
going right into the servers
1079
00:58:42,056 --> 00:58:43,981
of these large
Internet companies.
1080
00:58:44,006 --> 00:58:46,648
How does the government,
politically speaking,
1081
00:58:46,673 --> 00:58:48,815
make the argument
that this is essential
1082
00:58:48,840 --> 00:58:51,648
to national security and not
a dramatic overreach
1083
00:58:51,673 --> 00:58:54,039
in terms of personal privacy?
1084
00:58:54,057 --> 00:58:56,705
It's difficult, Matt, because,
as Peter was pointing out,
1085
00:58:56,723 --> 00:58:59,538
overnight we had an
extraordinary late-night,
1086
00:58:59,556 --> 00:59:02,565
close-to-midnight announcement
and a declassification
1087
00:59:02,590 --> 00:59:04,281
from the Director of
National Intelligence.
1088
00:59:04,306 --> 00:59:05,565
They are scrambling.
1089
00:59:05,590 --> 00:59:07,231
The administration's
already supported
1090
00:59:07,256 --> 00:59:09,182
strongly by leaders
in both parties
1091
00:59:09,207 --> 00:59:10,681
from the intelligence
committees.
1092
00:59:10,706 --> 00:59:13,348
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia,
1093
00:59:13,373 --> 00:59:16,315
at the top-secret, you know,
super-classified level...
1094
00:59:16,340 --> 00:59:18,348
- Yeah.
- Where anybody working intelligence
1095
00:59:18,373 --> 00:59:20,149
can work on anything they want.
1096
00:59:20,174 --> 00:59:22,214
- Yeah.
- That's what this is. I'm giving it to you.
1097
00:59:22,239 --> 00:59:24,648
What's appropriate, what's not.
1098
00:59:24,673 --> 00:59:27,073
Um, it's going to be documents of,
you know, different types:
1099
00:59:27,098 --> 00:59:30,373
Pictures and PowerPoints and
Word documents, stuff like that.
1100
00:59:30,391 --> 00:59:32,115
- Um...
- Sorry. Can I take that seat?
1101
00:59:32,140 --> 00:59:33,722
Yeah.
1102
00:59:35,090 --> 00:59:36,982
- I'm sorry.
- I'll get you to repeat.
1103
00:59:37,007 --> 00:59:39,449
So, in these documents,
they all show...
1104
00:59:39,474 --> 00:59:41,449
Yeah, there'll be a
couple more documents on that.
1105
00:59:41,474 --> 00:59:44,449
That's only one part, though;
Like, it talks about Tempora
1106
00:59:44,474 --> 00:59:47,566
and a little more thing,
that's the Wiki article itself.
1107
00:59:47,591 --> 00:59:50,015
It was also talking about
a self-developed tool
1108
00:59:50,040 --> 00:59:52,949
called UDAQ, U-D-A-Q.
1109
00:59:52,974 --> 00:59:56,982
It's their search tool for all the stuff
they collect, was what it looked like.
1110
00:59:57,007 --> 00:59:58,949
- Yeah.
- It's going to be projects,
1111
00:59:58,974 --> 01:00:02,373
it's going to be troubleshooting
pages for a particular tool...
1112
01:00:02,391 --> 01:00:05,373
Thanks.
And what's the next step?
1113
01:00:05,391 --> 01:00:07,539
When do you think you'll go public,
uh...
1114
01:00:07,557 --> 01:00:09,872
Ah... I think it's pretty soon.
1115
01:00:09,890 --> 01:00:12,649
I mean, with the reaction,
this escalated more quickly.
1116
01:00:12,674 --> 01:00:15,115
I think, pretty much as soon as
they start trying to make this
1117
01:00:15,140 --> 01:00:18,566
- about me, which should be any day now...
- Yeah.
1118
01:00:18,591 --> 01:00:20,900
Um, I'll...
I'll come out just to go,
1119
01:00:20,925 --> 01:00:22,873
"Hey, you know, this is, uh,
1120
01:00:22,891 --> 01:00:26,206
this is not a question of somebody
skulking around in the shadows."
1121
01:00:26,224 --> 01:00:27,983
- Yeah.
- "These are public issues."
1122
01:00:28,008 --> 01:00:29,616
"These are not my issues,
you know.
1123
01:00:29,641 --> 01:00:32,849
"These are everybody's issues,
and I'm not afraid of you.
1124
01:00:32,874 --> 01:00:35,149
"You know, you're not going
to bully me into silence
1125
01:00:35,174 --> 01:00:37,232
"like you've done
to everybody else.
1126
01:00:37,257 --> 01:00:39,616
"And if nobody else is
gonna do it, I will,
1127
01:00:39,641 --> 01:00:42,449
"and hopefully when I'm gone,
whatever you do to me,
1128
01:00:42,474 --> 01:00:44,616
there will be somebody else
who'll do the same thing."
1129
01:00:44,641 --> 01:00:47,783
It'll be the sort of Internet
principle of the hydra;
1130
01:00:47,808 --> 01:00:51,349
You know, "you can stomp one person,
but there's gonna be 7 more of us."
1131
01:00:51,374 --> 01:00:53,340
Yeah.
1132
01:00:55,391 --> 01:00:57,349
Uh,
are you getting more nervous?
1133
01:00:57,374 --> 01:01:00,873
Um... Heh! I mean...
1134
01:01:00,891 --> 01:01:02,040
No.
1135
01:01:02,058 --> 01:01:03,515
I... I think, uh,
1136
01:01:03,540 --> 01:01:06,183
I think the way
I look at stress,
1137
01:01:06,208 --> 01:01:09,150
particularly because I
sort of knew this was coming,
1138
01:01:09,175 --> 01:01:13,374
you know, because I sort of
volunteered to walk into it,
1139
01:01:13,392 --> 01:01:15,873
um...
1140
01:01:15,891 --> 01:01:18,374
I... I'm already sort of...
1141
01:01:18,392 --> 01:01:20,649
familiar with the idea.
1142
01:01:20,674 --> 01:01:23,816
I'm not worried about it.
When somebody, like, busts in the door,
1143
01:01:23,841 --> 01:01:25,873
suddenly I'll get nervous
and it'll affect me.
1144
01:01:25,891 --> 01:01:29,150
But until they do...
I... I... Um, you know.
1145
01:01:29,175 --> 01:01:31,150
I'm eating a little less;
That's the only...
1146
01:01:31,175 --> 01:01:33,658
Only difference, I think.
1147
01:01:38,925 --> 01:01:42,983
Let's talk about the issue
with when we're gonna say who you are.
1148
01:01:43,008 --> 01:01:45,650
- Yeah.
- This is... You know,
1149
01:01:45,675 --> 01:01:47,650
- you have to talk me through this...
- Mm-hmm.
1150
01:01:47,675 --> 01:01:49,817
Because I have a big
worry about this...
1151
01:01:49,842 --> 01:01:52,350
- Okay, tell me.
- Which is that
1152
01:01:52,375 --> 01:01:54,817
if we come out and...
1153
01:01:54,842 --> 01:01:57,784
I know that you believe
that your...
1154
01:01:57,809 --> 01:02:00,033
- detection is inevitable...
- Uh-huh.
1155
01:02:00,058 --> 01:02:01,984
And that it's
inevitable imminently.
1156
01:02:02,009 --> 01:02:03,569
There's, you know,
in the New York Times
1157
01:02:03,594 --> 01:02:06,317
today, Charlie Savage,
the fascinating Sherlock Holmes
1158
01:02:06,342 --> 01:02:09,516
of political reporting,
deduced that the fact
1159
01:02:09,541 --> 01:02:12,117
that there has been these leaks in
succession probably means that there's
1160
01:02:12,142 --> 01:02:14,382
some one person who's decided
to leak a bunch of stuff...
1161
01:02:14,407 --> 01:02:16,984
Somebody else quoted you
as saying it was one of your readers.
1162
01:02:17,009 --> 01:02:19,450
- And somebody else who put another thing...
- Yeah... So, you know, we're...
1163
01:02:19,475 --> 01:02:21,984
I mean, it's fine.
I want people to... I want it to be,
1164
01:02:22,009 --> 01:02:23,529
- you know, like...
- Yeah, yeah, yeah.
1165
01:02:23,554 --> 01:02:25,041
You know, like,
this is a person.
1166
01:02:25,059 --> 01:02:26,579
I want to start
introducing the concept
1167
01:02:26,604 --> 01:02:28,984
that this is a person
who has a particular set
1168
01:02:29,009 --> 01:02:31,208
of political objectives
about informing
1169
01:02:31,226 --> 01:02:33,507
the world about what's taking place,
like, you know, so...
1170
01:02:33,532 --> 01:02:35,567
- Mm-hmm.
- I'm keeping it all anonymous,
1171
01:02:35,592 --> 01:02:38,234
totally, but I want
to start introducing you
1172
01:02:38,259 --> 01:02:40,401
in that kind of incremental way,
1173
01:02:40,426 --> 01:02:42,516
but here's the thing.
1174
01:02:42,541 --> 01:02:45,516
What I am concerned about is
that if we come out and say,
1175
01:02:45,541 --> 01:02:47,781
"Here's who this is,
here's what he did," the whole thing
1176
01:02:47,806 --> 01:02:50,184
that we talked about,
that we're gonna basically be doing
1177
01:02:50,209 --> 01:02:52,569
the government's work for them,
and we're gonna basically be
1178
01:02:52,594 --> 01:02:55,208
handing them,
you know, a confession,
1179
01:02:55,226 --> 01:02:58,683
um, and helping them
identify who found it.
1180
01:02:58,708 --> 01:03:01,708
I mean, maybe you're right, maybe
they'll... Maybe they'll find out quickly,
1181
01:03:01,733 --> 01:03:04,517
and maybe they'll know, but is there
any possibility that they won't?
1182
01:03:04,542 --> 01:03:09,017
Are we... Are we kind of giving them
stuff that we don't... Or... Or... Or...
1183
01:03:09,042 --> 01:03:11,208
The possibility that they know,
but they don't want
1184
01:03:11,226 --> 01:03:12,746
to reveal it because
they don't know...
1185
01:03:12,760 --> 01:03:14,541
Or that they don't know,
and we're going to be telling them.
1186
01:03:14,559 --> 01:03:16,639
Like, is it a possibility
that they're going to need,
1187
01:03:16,664 --> 01:03:19,067
like, 2, 3 months of uncertainty,
and we're going
1188
01:03:19,092 --> 01:03:20,735
to be solving
that problem for them?
1189
01:03:20,760 --> 01:03:23,208
Or...
Let me just say the "or" part...
1190
01:03:23,226 --> 01:03:25,735
Maybe it doesn't matter to you,
like, maybe you want it.
1191
01:03:25,760 --> 01:03:28,401
Maybe... Maybe...
I mean, you're not coming out
1192
01:03:28,426 --> 01:03:31,184
because you think
inevitably they're going
1193
01:03:31,209 --> 01:03:33,234
to catch you,
and you want to do it first.
1194
01:03:33,259 --> 01:03:35,541
You're coming out because
you want to fucking come out
1195
01:03:35,559 --> 01:03:37,735
- and you want to be heard.
- Oh, there is that. I mean, that's the thing.
1196
01:03:37,760 --> 01:03:40,234
I... I don't want to hide
on this and skulk around.
1197
01:03:40,259 --> 01:03:41,708
I don't think I should have to.
1198
01:03:41,726 --> 01:03:44,401
Um, obviously there are
circumstances that are saying that.
1199
01:03:44,426 --> 01:03:47,208
I think it is powerful
to come out and be like,
1200
01:03:47,226 --> 01:03:51,042
"Look, I'm not afraid, you know, and I
don't think other people should, either.
1201
01:03:51,060 --> 01:03:54,042
"You know, I was sitting in the
office right next to you last week.
1202
01:03:54,060 --> 01:03:57,042
"You know, we all have a stake in this,
this is our country,
1203
01:03:57,060 --> 01:04:01,068
"and the balance of power between
the citizenry and the government is
1204
01:04:01,093 --> 01:04:04,042
"becoming that of
the ruling and the ruled,
1205
01:04:04,060 --> 01:04:07,541
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate."
1206
01:04:07,559 --> 01:04:12,068
Okay, so that's what I need to hear,
that this is not about...
1207
01:04:12,093 --> 01:04:15,376
But I... I do want to say
I don't think there's a case
1208
01:04:15,394 --> 01:04:18,708
that I'm not going to be discovered
in the fullness of time.
1209
01:04:18,726 --> 01:04:20,708
It's a question of time frame.
You're right.
1210
01:04:20,726 --> 01:04:23,007
It could take them a long time...
I don't think it will...
1211
01:04:23,032 --> 01:04:25,376
But I... I didn't try to hide
the footprint because, again,
1212
01:04:25,394 --> 01:04:27,434
- I intended to come forward the whole time.
- Okay.
1213
01:04:27,459 --> 01:04:31,402
I'm going to post this morning just a
general defence of whistle-blowers...
1214
01:04:31,427 --> 01:04:33,402
- That's fine, yeah.
- And you in particular
1215
01:04:33,427 --> 01:04:35,042
without saying
anything about you.
1216
01:04:35,060 --> 01:04:37,185
I'm gonna go post that right when
I get back, and I'm also doing,
1217
01:04:37,210 --> 01:04:38,851
like, a big "fuck you"
to all the people
1218
01:04:38,876 --> 01:04:40,636
who keep, like,
talking about investigations.
1219
01:04:40,661 --> 01:04:43,152
- Like, that... I want that to be, like...
- Yeah.
1220
01:04:43,177 --> 01:04:46,376
The fearlessness and the "fuck you" to,
like, the bullying tactics
1221
01:04:46,394 --> 01:04:50,018
has got to be completely
pervading everything we do.
1222
01:04:50,043 --> 01:04:51,518
And I think that's brilliant.
1223
01:04:51,543 --> 01:04:53,518
I mean,
your principles on this I love,
1224
01:04:53,543 --> 01:04:56,652
I can't support them enough,
um, because it is.
1225
01:04:56,677 --> 01:04:59,652
It's inverting the model that
the government has laid out,
1226
01:04:59,677 --> 01:05:02,518
where people who are trying to,
you know, say the truth skulk around
1227
01:05:02,543 --> 01:05:05,103
and they hide in the dark and they
quote anonymously and whatnot.
1228
01:05:05,128 --> 01:05:06,685
- I say yes, fuck that.
- Okay.
1229
01:05:06,710 --> 01:05:09,018
- Let's just...
- So here's the plan then,
1230
01:05:09,043 --> 01:05:11,018
I mean, and this is the thing.
It's like...
1231
01:05:11,043 --> 01:05:12,986
Once you...
Like, I think we all just felt
1232
01:05:13,011 --> 01:05:15,251
- the fact that this is the right way to do it.
- Mm-hmm.
1233
01:05:15,276 --> 01:05:16,685
It's the... You feel the power
1234
01:05:16,710 --> 01:05:18,319
of your choice,
you know what I mean?
1235
01:05:18,344 --> 01:05:20,819
It's like... And I want that
power to be felt in the world.
1236
01:05:20,844 --> 01:05:23,352
- Okay.
- And it is the bi... I mean, it's
1237
01:05:23,377 --> 01:05:25,352
the ultimate standing up to them,
right?
1238
01:05:25,377 --> 01:05:27,485
Like,
"I'm not gonna fucking hide
1239
01:05:27,510 --> 01:05:29,030
- "even for, like, one second."
- Yeah.
1240
01:05:29,044 --> 01:05:31,019
"I am gonna get
right in your face.
1241
01:05:31,044 --> 01:05:32,684
- Yeah.
- "You don't have to investigate."
1242
01:05:32,709 --> 01:05:34,892
- Ha ha!
- "There's nothing to investigate. Here I am."
1243
01:05:34,917 --> 01:05:36,953
- Yeah.
- You know, and... And
1244
01:05:36,978 --> 01:05:38,852
I think that is just
incredibly powerful.
1245
01:05:38,877 --> 01:05:40,852
And then the question
just becomes.
1246
01:05:40,877 --> 01:05:43,019
"How do we do this in the right,
you know,
1247
01:05:43,044 --> 01:05:44,986
the perfect way,"
and that's my burden.
1248
01:05:45,011 --> 01:05:48,819
And that's what I'm gonna... I...
So today is gonna be the story in
1249
01:05:48,844 --> 01:05:51,444
the morning, assuming that it doesn't
change in the Guardian, then
1250
01:05:51,469 --> 01:05:54,309
it's gonna be the story in the morning,
just to keep the momentum going,
1251
01:05:54,334 --> 01:05:57,353
just to keep, like, the disclosures coming,
a big one at night.
1252
01:05:57,378 --> 01:06:00,153
Now it's becoming like,
"Okay, this is
1253
01:06:00,178 --> 01:06:01,876
- "a major leak."
- Mm-hmm.
1254
01:06:01,894 --> 01:06:03,903
And after today,
when we post the true stuff,
1255
01:06:03,928 --> 01:06:06,786
things that we're gonna post,
it's gonna be,
1256
01:06:06,811 --> 01:06:10,294
"What the fuck is this leak and
who did it?" I guarantee you.
1257
01:06:19,894 --> 01:06:22,869
- I just want to make sure...
- Move over slightly.
1258
01:06:22,894 --> 01:06:25,014
Do you want me to
move a little more over, or... Okay.
1259
01:06:25,039 --> 01:06:26,453
I just want to... All right.
1260
01:06:26,478 --> 01:06:28,903
Hmm.
1261
01:06:28,928 --> 01:06:30,876
All right, we're rolling.
1262
01:06:30,894 --> 01:06:33,403
So let's just begin with some
basic background information,
1263
01:06:33,428 --> 01:06:35,403
like, just state your name,
1264
01:06:35,428 --> 01:06:37,570
what position you held in
the intelligence community,
1265
01:06:37,595 --> 01:06:40,543
and... And how long you worked
within that community.
1266
01:06:40,561 --> 01:06:43,570
Okay, um, just so I'm aware
of where we're going,
1267
01:06:43,595 --> 01:06:45,853
how in-depth are we going...
Just in general,
1268
01:06:45,878 --> 01:06:47,798
like, "I am currently an
infrastructure analyst,"
1269
01:06:47,823 --> 01:06:49,710
you know, Booz Allen Hamilton,
1270
01:06:49,728 --> 01:06:51,877
- not going through my whole back story?
- Yep.
1271
01:06:51,895 --> 01:06:53,853
- Okay.
- Just like, yeah, summary, kind of.
1272
01:06:53,878 --> 01:06:56,044
Okay. Uh, my name's Ed Snowden.
1273
01:06:56,062 --> 01:06:58,070
I am, uh, 29 years old.
1274
01:06:58,095 --> 01:07:00,519
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton
1275
01:07:00,544 --> 01:07:03,044
as an infrastructure
analyst for NSA,
1276
01:07:03,062 --> 01:07:05,519
uh, in Hawaii.
1277
01:07:05,544 --> 01:07:07,737
And what are some of
the positions that you held
1278
01:07:07,762 --> 01:07:09,686
previously within
the intelligence community?
1279
01:07:09,711 --> 01:07:12,170
Uh, I have been
a systems engineer,
1280
01:07:12,195 --> 01:07:14,877
a systems administrator, uh...
1281
01:07:14,895 --> 01:07:17,353
Senior advisor, uh,
1282
01:07:17,378 --> 01:07:20,187
for the, uh,
Central Intelligence Agency,
1283
01:07:20,212 --> 01:07:22,877
solutions consultant, and a, uh,
1284
01:07:22,895 --> 01:07:25,820
telecommunications
information systems officer.
1285
01:07:25,845 --> 01:07:30,519
And what kind of clearances have...
Have you held, what kind of classification?
1286
01:07:30,544 --> 01:07:34,677
Uh, Top Secret, uh... Hmm.
1287
01:07:36,346 --> 01:07:41,378
So people in my levels of access for
systems administration or as a...
1288
01:07:41,396 --> 01:07:44,120
Infrastructure analyst
typically have, uh,
1289
01:07:44,145 --> 01:07:48,487
higher accesses than an NSA
employee would normally have.
1290
01:07:48,512 --> 01:07:52,020
Uh, normal NSA employees have
a combination of clearances
1291
01:07:52,045 --> 01:07:56,020
called TS, SI, TK, and Gamma.
1292
01:07:56,045 --> 01:07:58,687
Um, that's, uh, Top Secret,
1293
01:07:58,712 --> 01:08:00,687
uh, Signals Intelligence,
1294
01:08:00,712 --> 01:08:02,354
Talent Keyhole, and Gamma.
1295
01:08:02,379 --> 01:08:04,354
And they all, uh,
relate to certain things
1296
01:08:04,379 --> 01:08:06,854
that are sort of core
to the NSA mission.
1297
01:08:06,879 --> 01:08:09,354
As a systems administrator,
1298
01:08:09,379 --> 01:08:11,354
you get a special
clearance called PRIVAC,
1299
01:08:11,379 --> 01:08:14,187
for Privileged Access,
which allows you to be
1300
01:08:14,212 --> 01:08:17,154
exposed to information
of any classification,
1301
01:08:17,179 --> 01:08:20,345
regardless of what your
position actually needs.
1302
01:08:55,230 --> 01:08:57,711
Now, just before we go,
a reminder of our top story, and that's
1303
01:08:57,729 --> 01:09:00,738
that the former CIA
technical worker Edward Snowden
1304
01:09:00,763 --> 01:09:03,988
says he's responsible
for leaking information
1305
01:09:04,013 --> 01:09:06,487
that the U.S. authorities
had been monitoring
1306
01:09:06,512 --> 01:09:08,878
phone and Internet data.
1307
01:09:08,896 --> 01:09:10,955
The U.S. Justice Department
confirmed it's in
1308
01:09:10,980 --> 01:09:14,188
the first stages
of a criminal investigation.
1309
01:09:14,213 --> 01:09:16,455
Leave it longer or cut it shorter?
What do you think?
1310
01:09:16,480 --> 01:09:19,654
As far as the video that people saw?
Am I less identifiable now?
1311
01:09:19,679 --> 01:09:21,155
- Lose it.
- Lose it?
1312
01:09:21,180 --> 01:09:22,988
'Cause I can't go
all the way down.
1313
01:09:23,013 --> 01:09:24,488
It's still gonna be stubble.
1314
01:09:24,513 --> 01:09:26,479
I don't have
the blade for closer.
1315
01:09:28,313 --> 01:09:32,355
Will you be talking to any
other media about this story today?
1316
01:09:32,380 --> 01:09:33,821
I am.
1317
01:09:33,846 --> 01:09:35,789
Um, will you be coming
to our office?
1318
01:09:35,814 --> 01:09:37,854
Basically we'd be interested to ask,
of course, about where
1319
01:09:37,879 --> 01:09:39,288
is Snowden now,
what his plans are.
1320
01:09:39,313 --> 01:09:40,955
Well, I'm obviously not going
to talk about that,
1321
01:09:40,980 --> 01:09:42,455
so unless you have any other questions,
this is gonna be
1322
01:09:42,480 --> 01:09:44,538
- a pretty pointless interview.
- What are your plans, please?
1323
01:09:44,563 --> 01:09:46,521
Are you staying in Hong
Kong for the time being?
1324
01:09:46,546 --> 01:09:47,655
For a little while.
1325
01:09:47,680 --> 01:09:50,121
And do you have
any hopes to write more
1326
01:09:50,146 --> 01:09:53,121
about this story, or are you stopping
new writing about this story?
1327
01:09:53,146 --> 01:09:54,822
No, I'm gonna continue to write about it.
1328
01:09:54,847 --> 01:09:56,847
Have you had any pressure
from the U.S. authorities
1329
01:09:56,872 --> 01:09:59,322
- about continuing to report on this?
- No.
1330
01:09:59,347 --> 01:10:02,155
And have you heard anything
about what could be
1331
01:10:02,180 --> 01:10:04,655
the attitude of
Hong Kong authorities
1332
01:10:04,680 --> 01:10:06,655
towards this case,
whether they've contacted you
1333
01:10:06,680 --> 01:10:09,022
or asked you anything
about the whereabouts
1334
01:10:09,047 --> 01:10:11,288
of Snowden and whether
that is another...
1335
01:10:11,313 --> 01:10:14,822
I haven't heard from the
authorities of any government.
1336
01:10:14,847 --> 01:10:17,855
And where do you think
this story is going,
1337
01:10:17,880 --> 01:10:20,156
for you and,
of course, for Snowden,
1338
01:10:20,181 --> 01:10:22,122
and, of course,
for the U.S. media
1339
01:10:22,147 --> 01:10:23,956
and the U.S.
administration in general?
1340
01:10:23,981 --> 01:10:26,521
Well, for me, I can tell I'm
gonna continue to report on...
1341
01:10:26,546 --> 01:10:28,822
Do my reporting on what
the government has been doing,
1342
01:10:28,847 --> 01:10:30,822
and what I think my readers
should know about.
1343
01:10:30,847 --> 01:10:33,239
Um, as for him,
I don't think anyone knows.
1344
01:10:33,264 --> 01:10:35,455
They could have
people come after me, or any
1345
01:10:35,480 --> 01:10:37,406
of their third-party partners.
1346
01:10:37,431 --> 01:10:40,380
You know, they work closely
with a number of other nations.
1347
01:10:40,398 --> 01:10:43,122
Or, you know,
they could pay off the triads or, you know,
1348
01:10:43,147 --> 01:10:45,022
any of their agents or assets.
1349
01:10:45,047 --> 01:10:47,855
Uh, we have a CIA station
just up the road,
1350
01:10:47,880 --> 01:10:50,096
at the consulate here
in Hong Kong.
1351
01:11:15,981 --> 01:11:17,456
Hello, I'm Daniela Ritorto.
1352
01:11:17,481 --> 01:11:20,989
Facing a criminal investigation,
1353
01:11:21,014 --> 01:11:23,856
the whistle-blower who revealed
details on how the U.S.
1354
01:11:23,881 --> 01:11:27,823
is monitoring phone calls
and Internet data goes public.
1355
01:11:27,848 --> 01:11:30,880
Security forces
in Afghanistan say a number
1356
01:11:30,898 --> 01:11:34,856
of Taliban insurgents
have targeted Kabul's airport.
1357
01:11:34,881 --> 01:11:37,206
Now it's time
for our newspaper review
1358
01:11:37,231 --> 01:11:39,856
and looking at what's making
headlines around the world.
1359
01:11:39,881 --> 01:11:41,856
Let's start with the Guardian,
our top story,
1360
01:11:41,881 --> 01:11:45,823
which is revealing the identity
of the former CIA employee
1361
01:11:45,848 --> 01:11:48,823
who the paper says leaked
information exposing the scale...
1362
01:11:48,848 --> 01:11:51,689
- Shit.
- Of American surveillance of the Internet.
1363
01:11:51,714 --> 01:11:53,689
Edward Snowden.
1364
01:11:53,714 --> 01:11:55,190
What a great story.
1365
01:11:55,215 --> 01:11:56,689
Kira, Ewen, what do you think?
1366
01:11:56,714 --> 01:11:58,594
Well, I think it's
a fantastic story, first off.
1367
01:11:58,619 --> 01:12:00,677
It could be straight out
of a John le Carre novel.
1368
01:12:00,702 --> 01:12:03,522
I mean, when you read what he did,
yes, he got the material.
1369
01:12:03,547 --> 01:12:06,689
He then decided to go to the place he
identified as being very difficult...
1370
01:12:06,714 --> 01:12:09,713
- Goddamn it.
- For America to get at him, which is Hong Kong
1371
01:12:09,731 --> 01:12:11,880
because, of course,
technically inside China,
1372
01:12:11,898 --> 01:12:15,047
the one country-two systems
policy there, meaning
1373
01:12:15,065 --> 01:12:18,357
he would get potentially
some protection from it all.
1374
01:12:18,382 --> 01:12:21,240
All very well-planned;
It could have been just out of a spy novel.
1375
01:12:21,265 --> 01:12:22,764
But what about the details?
1376
01:12:26,265 --> 01:12:29,897
Well, that could
make it worse, but...
1377
01:12:31,815 --> 01:12:33,240
I don't know.
1378
01:12:33,265 --> 01:12:36,064
Only shows the lower half
of my face.
1379
01:12:50,599 --> 01:12:53,598
Every weekend,
here on BBC World News.
1380
01:12:58,015 --> 01:13:00,324
For in-depth,
on-the-point analysis
1381
01:13:00,349 --> 01:13:02,815
with a global perspective,
join me...
1382
01:13:05,349 --> 01:13:08,741
only on BBC World News.
1383
01:13:08,766 --> 01:13:11,741
Snowden says
he'd become increasingly dismayed
1384
01:13:11,766 --> 01:13:14,958
by what he saw as
the growing power of the NSA,
1385
01:13:14,983 --> 01:13:18,124
hence his decision to pass on
documents which are said
1386
01:13:18,149 --> 01:13:21,324
to reveal not only that
the organization monitored
1387
01:13:21,349 --> 01:13:25,324
millions of phone calls, but that it
had direct access to some of the...
1388
01:13:25,349 --> 01:13:27,749
- How do you feel?
- Biggest Internet companies in the world.
1389
01:13:27,774 --> 01:13:31,124
Um... What happens happens.
1390
01:13:31,149 --> 01:13:34,657
We've, uh, we've talked about this;
I knew what the risks were
1391
01:13:34,682 --> 01:13:37,325
and if I get arrested,
I get arrested.
1392
01:13:37,350 --> 01:13:41,124
Uh... We were able
to get the information,
1393
01:13:41,149 --> 01:13:45,124
uh, that needed to get out, out.
1394
01:13:45,149 --> 01:13:48,048
And you and Glenn are
able to keep reporting,
1395
01:13:48,066 --> 01:13:51,574
uh, regardless
of what happens to me.
1396
01:13:51,599 --> 01:13:55,098
Now what 29-year-old
Edward Snowden said...
1397
01:13:58,149 --> 01:14:01,541
of phone records
and monitored Internet data.
1398
01:14:01,566 --> 01:14:03,458
The Guardian newspaper
revealed his identity...
1399
01:14:03,483 --> 01:14:05,458
- Yes?
- At his own request.
1400
01:14:05,483 --> 01:14:07,124
From Washington,
David Willis has this.
1401
01:14:07,149 --> 01:14:09,765
Uh, I'm sorry. Who's asking?
1402
01:14:11,600 --> 01:14:14,074
Uh, I'm afraid you have the wrong room.
Thank you.
1403
01:14:14,099 --> 01:14:17,065
Wall Street Journal.
1404
01:14:28,049 --> 01:14:30,148
Yes?
1405
01:14:32,016 --> 01:14:34,148
Uh, I'm sorry. Say again?
1406
01:14:36,516 --> 01:14:38,491
Uh, no. No, thank you. No calls.
1407
01:14:38,516 --> 01:14:40,992
Uh, I think they have
the wrong number.
1408
01:14:41,017 --> 01:14:43,959
Yeah, no calls.
Thank you. Uh, wait.
1409
01:14:43,984 --> 01:14:47,992
I'm sorry. If it's, uh,
if it's two men from the front desk,
1410
01:14:48,017 --> 01:14:50,491
uh, they can call,
but no outside calls.
1411
01:14:50,516 --> 01:14:53,524
Wait, actually,
just let them through.
1412
01:14:53,549 --> 01:14:55,825
Wait, wait. Ma'am?
1413
01:14:55,850 --> 01:14:58,349
Fuck.
1414
01:15:01,383 --> 01:15:03,482
Yes?
1415
01:15:08,350 --> 01:15:11,482
Uh, wait. Is it, uh,
is it a lawyer?
1416
01:15:12,850 --> 01:15:15,491
Yeah, no, no, no,
I mean the people who are asking.
1417
01:15:15,516 --> 01:15:18,649
Ask them if they are lawyers.
1418
01:15:23,934 --> 01:15:26,825
Uh, no. Tell her that,
uh, she has the wrong number
1419
01:15:26,850 --> 01:15:29,283
and there's no Mr. Snowden here.
1420
01:16:14,127 --> 01:16:15,547
Yeah.
1421
01:16:17,134 --> 01:16:19,767
Hi, I'm the, uh, client.
Heh heh!
1422
01:16:21,651 --> 01:16:24,266
Uh, pretty good. I...
I'm doing well.
1423
01:16:39,684 --> 01:16:41,267
Okay.
1424
01:16:46,351 --> 01:16:47,934
Okay.
1425
01:16:55,567 --> 01:16:56,267
Yeah.
1426
01:16:58,218 --> 01:16:59,692
Okay, that... That's great.
1427
01:16:59,717 --> 01:17:01,193
Uh, is it okay if I
bring equipment?
1428
01:17:01,218 --> 01:17:02,659
'Cause I'm just
kind of going, uh,
1429
01:17:02,684 --> 01:17:04,692
so I can leave in any
direction at any time
1430
01:17:04,717 --> 01:17:07,317
and not come back if necessary.
1431
01:17:09,768 --> 01:17:11,017
Okay.
1432
01:17:17,235 --> 01:17:19,360
Okay, that sounds good.
1433
01:17:19,385 --> 01:17:21,684
Thank you, uh,
thank you so much for helping me.
1434
01:17:41,652 --> 01:17:43,017
Ahem.
1435
01:17:47,402 --> 01:17:49,317
Okay.
1436
01:18:02,735 --> 01:18:04,160
Yeah, so,
1437
01:18:04,185 --> 01:18:06,460
and so is there
a precedent for this,
1438
01:18:06,485 --> 01:18:10,517
where Hong Kong would extradite
someone for political speech?
1439
01:18:25,219 --> 01:18:27,151
Mm-hmm.
1440
01:19:17,870 --> 01:19:19,950
The President certainly
does not welcome the way that
1441
01:19:19,975 --> 01:19:22,328
this debate has earned greater
attention in the last week.
1442
01:19:22,353 --> 01:19:25,361
The leak of classified information
about sensitive programs
1443
01:19:25,386 --> 01:19:27,861
that are important in our fight
against terrorists who would
1444
01:19:27,886 --> 01:19:30,828
do harm to Americans,
uh, is a problem,
1445
01:19:30,853 --> 01:19:34,568
but the debate itself is
legitimate and should be engaged.
1446
01:23:25,139 --> 01:23:28,054
All right, so which
ones do we want here, then?
1447
01:23:28,072 --> 01:23:30,797
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this.
1448
01:23:30,822 --> 01:23:32,297
So redact that.
1449
01:23:32,322 --> 01:23:33,863
Go to the top.
1450
01:23:33,888 --> 01:23:35,388
What about the Alexander quote?
1451
01:23:35,406 --> 01:23:37,054
Yeah, that's in TARMAC.
1452
01:23:37,072 --> 01:23:40,297
"Why can't we collect all
the signals all the time?
1453
01:23:40,322 --> 01:23:43,364
Sounds like a good summer
homework project for Menwith."
1454
01:23:43,389 --> 01:23:46,697
Keith Alexander,
the head of the NSA, on a visit to U.K.
1455
01:23:46,722 --> 01:23:48,030
- This one.
- Yeah.
1456
01:23:48,055 --> 01:23:51,314
It's a Secret document, isn't it?
Secret document.
1457
01:23:51,339 --> 01:23:55,697
We've got a stick here which should
just have 3 single... slides on them.
1458
01:23:55,722 --> 01:23:57,697
If it's got more
than 3 single slides,
1459
01:23:57,722 --> 01:23:59,938
we have to be extremely careful.
1460
01:24:02,072 --> 01:24:04,097
- Yeah?
- Yeah, that's it.
1461
01:24:04,122 --> 01:24:08,054
This is really dangerous stuff
for us at Guardian.
1462
01:24:08,072 --> 01:24:11,392
If you make mistakes at the very end, where
we kept it all under lock and key and...
1463
01:24:11,417 --> 01:24:13,998
And no one knows...
You know, I'm not saying that...
1464
01:24:14,023 --> 01:24:19,031
they will come in and smack the front door
down if we... If we elaborate on that.
1465
01:24:19,056 --> 01:24:22,697
And he said the Prime Minister's
extremely concerned about this.
1466
01:24:22,722 --> 01:24:26,022
And they kept saying,
"And this is from the very top."
1467
01:25:35,890 --> 01:25:39,498
As you can see on this map, the flight
that reportedly has Snowden aboard
1468
01:25:39,523 --> 01:25:42,515
has almost reached its destination
here in Moscow, scheduled
1469
01:25:42,540 --> 01:25:44,722
to land in the Russian capital
within minutes.
1470
01:25:44,740 --> 01:25:50,222
As you may have heard,
there is a CIA, uh, agent
1471
01:25:50,240 --> 01:25:53,056
who has revealed a lot
of information,
1472
01:25:53,074 --> 01:25:56,082
and he is now trapped in the,
um,
1473
01:25:56,107 --> 01:25:58,265
the airport in Moscow.
1474
01:25:58,290 --> 01:26:02,315
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
but when he landed in the Moscow airport,
1475
01:26:02,340 --> 01:26:06,749
the American government had cancelled,
uh, his passport.
1476
01:26:06,774 --> 01:26:09,916
So formally,
he hasn't entered into Russian territory.
1477
01:26:09,941 --> 01:26:12,916
He's in the transit area
of the airport,
1478
01:26:12,941 --> 01:26:16,199
and one of our people is
accompanying him.
1479
01:26:16,224 --> 01:26:19,698
We are trying to arrange
a private jet,
1480
01:26:19,723 --> 01:26:23,223
uh, to, um, take him
1481
01:26:23,241 --> 01:26:28,056
from, uh, Moscow to, uh, Ecuador
1482
01:26:28,074 --> 01:26:30,999
or perhaps maybe Venezuela
1483
01:26:31,024 --> 01:26:35,273
or maybe Iceland, um,
countries where he would be safe.
1484
01:30:04,610 --> 01:30:08,158
May I collect all phones,
please?
1485
01:30:10,559 --> 01:30:12,659
Okay.
1486
01:30:13,726 --> 01:30:15,201
Ahem.
1487
01:30:15,226 --> 01:30:18,325
I have everything here, so...
1488
01:30:19,660 --> 01:30:22,709
Put them in the refrigerator.
Heh heh!
1489
01:30:25,076 --> 01:30:27,676
So...
1490
01:30:32,226 --> 01:30:35,725
So, as you know, in June,
1491
01:30:35,743 --> 01:30:40,701
Snowden was charged
with 3 legal violations,
1492
01:30:40,726 --> 01:30:43,201
felonies, principally under
1493
01:30:43,226 --> 01:30:45,892
a World War I-era criminal law
1494
01:30:45,910 --> 01:30:48,201
called the Espionage Act.
1495
01:30:48,226 --> 01:30:51,701
Uh, the Espionage Act is
an extremely broad
1496
01:30:51,726 --> 01:30:55,035
criminal prohibition
against the sharing
1497
01:30:55,060 --> 01:30:58,501
or dissemination of what's called
national defence information.
1498
01:30:58,526 --> 01:31:02,468
It was only used to, uh,
prosecute people
1499
01:31:02,493 --> 01:31:05,501
who had been accused of
acting with a foreign power.
1500
01:31:05,526 --> 01:31:07,226
Uh, spies, not whistle-blowers.
1501
01:31:07,244 --> 01:31:10,252
And it's a very unusual legal
representation, I think,
1502
01:31:10,277 --> 01:31:13,252
not just for all of you,
but for me as well.
1503
01:31:13,277 --> 01:31:16,252
Um, the Espionage Act
does not distinguish
1504
01:31:16,277 --> 01:31:19,725
between leaks to the press
in the public interest, um,
1505
01:31:19,743 --> 01:31:23,585
and selling secrets to foreign
enemies for personal profit.
1506
01:31:23,610 --> 01:31:27,085
So, under the Espionage Act,
it's not a defence
1507
01:31:27,110 --> 01:31:29,226
if the information
that was disclosed
1508
01:31:29,244 --> 01:31:31,586
should not have been
withheld in the first place,
1509
01:31:31,611 --> 01:31:33,419
that it was
improperly classified.
1510
01:31:33,444 --> 01:31:36,419
It's not a defence
if the dissemination was
1511
01:31:36,444 --> 01:31:38,502
in the public interest,
that it led to reforms.
1512
01:31:38,527 --> 01:31:41,035
Um, even if a court determines
1513
01:31:41,060 --> 01:31:42,669
that the programs
that were revealed
1514
01:31:42,694 --> 01:31:44,502
were illegal
or unconstitutional,
1515
01:31:44,527 --> 01:31:46,969
that's still not a defence
under the Espionage Act.
1516
01:31:46,994 --> 01:31:50,135
The government doesn't have
to defend the classification,
1517
01:31:50,160 --> 01:31:53,336
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release.
1518
01:31:53,361 --> 01:31:55,636
Um, all of this is irrelevant,
1519
01:31:55,661 --> 01:31:58,559
so when we say that
the trial wouldn't be fair,
1520
01:31:58,577 --> 01:32:01,869
we're not talking about
what human rights lawyers
1521
01:32:01,894 --> 01:32:03,369
think of as fair
trial practices.
1522
01:32:03,394 --> 01:32:05,869
We're saying the law...
The statute itself...
1523
01:32:05,894 --> 01:32:09,252
Um, eliminates
any kind of defence
1524
01:32:09,277 --> 01:32:11,252
that Snowden might
be able to make,
1525
01:32:11,277 --> 01:32:14,086
and essentially would
equate him with a spy.
1526
01:32:14,111 --> 01:32:16,586
And of course,
those 3 counts could be
1527
01:32:16,611 --> 01:32:19,086
increased to a 100
or 200 or 300.
1528
01:32:19,111 --> 01:32:21,086
They could charge him
separately for each document
1529
01:32:21,111 --> 01:32:24,336
that has been published
by a journalist.
1530
01:32:24,361 --> 01:32:26,469
And I think that...
That we all recognize,
1531
01:32:26,494 --> 01:32:29,669
even though we sit here as
lawyers in a lawyers' meeting,
1532
01:32:29,694 --> 01:32:33,336
that...
That it's probably 95% politics
1533
01:32:33,361 --> 01:32:37,443
and 5% law
how this will be resolved.
1534
01:33:09,228 --> 01:33:12,203
Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes,
1535
01:33:12,228 --> 01:33:14,670
and he should be returned
to the United States,
1536
01:33:14,695 --> 01:33:18,170
where he will be granted
full due process and every right
1537
01:33:18,195 --> 01:33:20,703
available to him
as a United States citizen,
1538
01:33:20,728 --> 01:33:23,711
uh, facing our justice system
under the Constitution.
1539
01:34:14,495 --> 01:34:17,470
No, I don't
think Mr. Snowden was a patriot.
1540
01:34:17,495 --> 01:34:23,421
I called for a thorough review
of our surveillance operations
1541
01:34:23,446 --> 01:34:26,536
before Mr. Snowden made
these leaks.
1542
01:34:26,561 --> 01:34:30,004
My preference, and I think...
1543
01:34:30,029 --> 01:34:33,171
the American people's preference,
would have been for
1544
01:34:33,196 --> 01:34:37,504
a lawful, orderly
examination of these laws;
1545
01:34:37,529 --> 01:34:42,504
A, uh, thoughtful,
fact-based debate
1546
01:34:42,529 --> 01:34:46,995
uh, that would then lead us
to a better place.
1547
01:35:24,446 --> 01:35:26,471
Oh, my God.
1548
01:35:26,496 --> 01:35:28,922
David.
1549
01:35:28,947 --> 01:35:31,421
Hello, my baby, how you doing?
1550
01:35:31,446 --> 01:35:33,638
- I'm okay.
- You okay?
1551
01:35:33,663 --> 01:35:35,196
- Mm-hmm.
- Let's go.
1552
01:35:38,080 --> 01:35:40,062
I just want to go home.
1553
01:35:40,080 --> 01:35:41,561
Okay, okay, okay.
1554
01:35:41,579 --> 01:35:43,079
You just have to walk in.
1555
01:35:49,197 --> 01:35:52,704
- How are you?
- Good, good. I'm totally fine.
1556
01:35:52,729 --> 01:35:55,029
- I didn't sleep at all. I couldn't sleep.
- I know.
1557
01:36:17,422 --> 01:36:19,562
Recent reports
have revealed that the NSA
1558
01:36:19,580 --> 01:36:23,396
have access to encryption keys,
and they paid tech companies
1559
01:36:23,414 --> 01:36:26,229
to introduce back doors
in encryption protocols.
1560
01:36:26,247 --> 01:36:29,229
So we're going to talk
about ways in which we can
1561
01:36:29,247 --> 01:36:32,895
defend ourselves against
governments spying on us.
1562
01:36:32,913 --> 01:36:35,538
So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum
is an encryption
1563
01:36:35,563 --> 01:36:38,396
and security software
developer and journalist.
1564
01:36:38,414 --> 01:36:40,562
Ladar Levinson is the founder
1565
01:36:40,580 --> 01:36:43,589
of the encrypted
email service Lavabit,
1566
01:36:43,614 --> 01:36:46,062
used by Edward Snowden.
You have the floor.
1567
01:36:46,080 --> 01:36:47,589
Thank you.
1568
01:36:47,614 --> 01:36:49,172
Lavabit is an email service
1569
01:36:49,197 --> 01:36:52,422
that hopefully one day
will be able to, um,
1570
01:36:52,447 --> 01:36:55,422
stand on its own without
any references to Snowden.
1571
01:36:55,447 --> 01:36:59,006
My service was designed
to remove me
1572
01:36:59,031 --> 01:37:02,505
from the possibility
of being forced
1573
01:37:02,530 --> 01:37:04,889
to violate a person's privacy.
1574
01:37:04,914 --> 01:37:07,372
Quite simply,
Lavabit was designed to remove
1575
01:37:07,397 --> 01:37:09,729
the service provider
from the equation.
1576
01:37:09,747 --> 01:37:12,230
By not having logs on my server
1577
01:37:12,248 --> 01:37:15,705
and not having access to
a person's emails on disk,
1578
01:37:15,730 --> 01:37:18,896
I wasn't eliminating the
possibility of surveillance,
1579
01:37:18,914 --> 01:37:22,872
I was simply removing
myself from that equation,
1580
01:37:22,897 --> 01:37:26,397
in that surveillance would have
to be conducted on the target...
1581
01:37:26,414 --> 01:37:29,839
Either the sender or the
receiver of the messages.
1582
01:37:29,864 --> 01:37:34,106
But I was approached
by the FBI quite recently
1583
01:37:34,131 --> 01:37:38,173
and told that because I couldn't
turn over the information
1584
01:37:38,198 --> 01:37:40,839
from that one particular user,
I would be forced
1585
01:37:40,864 --> 01:37:43,672
to give up those SSL keys
and let the FBI collect
1586
01:37:43,697 --> 01:37:47,806
every communication on my network
without any kind of transparency.
1587
01:37:47,831 --> 01:37:50,256
And, of course...
1588
01:37:50,281 --> 01:37:54,256
I wasn't... comfortable with that,
to say the least.
1589
01:37:54,281 --> 01:37:56,705
Um, more disturbing was
the fact that I couldn't
1590
01:37:56,730 --> 01:37:59,173
even tell anybody
that it was going on.
1591
01:37:59,198 --> 01:38:04,340
So I decided if I didn't win
the fight to unseal my case,
1592
01:38:04,365 --> 01:38:08,706
if I didn't win the battle to be able
to tell people what was going on,
1593
01:38:08,731 --> 01:38:13,197
then my only ethical choice
left was to shut down.
1594
01:38:14,581 --> 01:38:17,039
Think about that.
1595
01:38:17,064 --> 01:38:19,706
I believe in the rule of law,
I believe
1596
01:38:19,731 --> 01:38:22,640
in the need to conduct
investigations,
1597
01:38:22,665 --> 01:38:26,640
but those investigations are supposed
to be difficult for a reason.
1598
01:38:26,665 --> 01:38:30,673
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy
1599
01:38:30,698 --> 01:38:33,673
because of how intrusive it is,
1600
01:38:33,698 --> 01:38:36,673
because of how disruptive it is.
1601
01:38:36,698 --> 01:38:39,173
If we can't...
If we don't have our right to privacy,
1602
01:38:39,198 --> 01:38:42,174
how do we have a free
and open discussion?
1603
01:38:42,199 --> 01:38:46,706
What good is the right
to free speech...
1604
01:38:46,731 --> 01:38:49,640
if it's not protected,
1605
01:38:49,665 --> 01:38:52,590
in the sense that you can't
have a private discussion
1606
01:38:52,615 --> 01:38:55,506
with somebody else about
something you disagree with.
1607
01:38:55,531 --> 01:38:58,174
Think about the chilling
effect that that has.
1608
01:38:58,199 --> 01:39:00,673
Think about the chilling
effect it does have
1609
01:39:00,698 --> 01:39:03,730
on countries that don't
have a right to privacy.
1610
01:39:03,748 --> 01:39:06,207
I've noticed a really
interesting discussion point, which is
1611
01:39:06,232 --> 01:39:11,231
that what people used to call liberty
and freedom, we now call privacy.
1612
01:39:11,249 --> 01:39:15,207
And we say, in the same breath,
that privacy is dead.
1613
01:39:15,232 --> 01:39:18,723
This is something that really
concerns me about my generation,
1614
01:39:18,748 --> 01:39:21,564
especially when we talk about how
we're not surprised by anything.
1615
01:39:21,582 --> 01:39:24,591
I think that we should consider
that when we lose privacy,
1616
01:39:24,616 --> 01:39:27,090
we lose agency,
we lose liberty itself
1617
01:39:27,115 --> 01:39:30,064
because we no longer feel free
to express what we think.
1618
01:39:30,082 --> 01:39:32,564
There's this myth of the
passive surveillance machine.
1619
01:39:32,582 --> 01:39:35,207
But actually,
what is surveillance except control?
1620
01:39:35,232 --> 01:39:38,398
This notion that the NSA are passive?
This is nonsense.
1621
01:39:38,416 --> 01:39:40,398
What we see is that
they actively attack
1622
01:39:40,416 --> 01:39:42,897
European citizens,
American citizens, and,
1623
01:39:42,915 --> 01:39:46,198
in fact, anyone that they can
if they perceive an advantage.
1624
01:41:21,283 --> 01:41:23,809
Okay.
1625
01:41:23,834 --> 01:41:25,916
Right?
1626
01:41:29,250 --> 01:41:31,842
Um, I'll have to give
that in testimony.
1627
01:41:31,867 --> 01:41:33,842
What are you going to tell?
1628
01:41:33,867 --> 01:41:36,499
Uh, everything I can,
truthfully.
1629
01:41:37,867 --> 01:41:39,809
What...
What will you talk about?
1630
01:41:39,834 --> 01:41:42,809
Uh, whatever the
questions they ask me.
1631
01:41:42,834 --> 01:41:45,232
- Yeah, I think it's over there.
- Okay, all right.
1632
01:41:45,250 --> 01:41:47,232
Thank you.
1633
01:41:52,784 --> 01:41:55,708
- Hey. How are you?
- Good.
1634
01:41:55,733 --> 01:41:58,173
- How are you? Good to see you again.
- Nice to meet you, yes.
1635
01:43:29,668 --> 01:43:32,643
What do you think they're
doing to reporters, those of us
1636
01:43:32,668 --> 01:43:36,309
that are working directly with,
uh, the Snowden documents?
1637
01:43:36,334 --> 01:43:38,894
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
1638
01:43:38,919 --> 01:43:42,177
Uh, you're...
You're on the cast-iron cover list,
1639
01:43:42,202 --> 01:43:45,900
which means any...
Any electronic, uh, device you use
1640
01:43:45,918 --> 01:43:49,760
that they can attach to you,
they'll record and capture all that data.
1641
01:43:49,785 --> 01:43:51,234
And what do they do
with that data?
1642
01:43:51,252 --> 01:43:53,252
They're just trying to
figure out what we're doing?
1643
01:43:53,277 --> 01:43:55,234
Uh, well, they're trying...
That's part of it,
1644
01:43:55,252 --> 01:43:58,067
but the other part...
Primarily, the part for them, I think, is
1645
01:43:58,085 --> 01:44:00,045
to find the sources of
information you're getting.
1646
01:44:00,070 --> 01:44:02,543
So if I have a confidential
source who's giving me
1647
01:44:02,568 --> 01:44:04,510
information as a whistle-blower,
1648
01:44:04,535 --> 01:44:07,010
and he works within the U.S. government,
and he's concerned
1649
01:44:07,035 --> 01:44:10,543
about what he perceives as
violations of the Constitution,
1650
01:44:10,568 --> 01:44:13,543
um, and he gets
in touch with me, they...
1651
01:44:13,568 --> 01:44:15,043
- Yep.
- Go ahead, yeah.
1652
01:44:15,068 --> 01:44:17,010
Yeah, from there on,
they would nail him
1653
01:44:17,035 --> 01:44:19,510
and start watching everything he did,
and if he started
1654
01:44:19,535 --> 01:44:22,043
passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.
1655
01:44:22,068 --> 01:44:24,043
I mean,
the way you'd have to do it is
1656
01:44:24,068 --> 01:44:28,010
like Deep Throat did,
right, in the Nixon years...
1657
01:44:28,035 --> 01:44:32,234
Meet in the basement of a parking garage,
physically.
1658
01:45:11,568 --> 01:45:15,044
"Let's disassociate
our metadata one last time
1659
01:45:15,069 --> 01:45:19,877
"so we don't have a clear record of your
true name in our final communication chain.
1660
01:45:19,902 --> 01:45:22,761
"This is obviously not to say you
can't claim your involvement,
1661
01:45:22,786 --> 01:45:26,710
"but as every trick in the book is
likely to be used in looking into this,
1662
01:45:26,735 --> 01:45:31,734
"I believe it's better that that particular
disclosure come on your own terms.
1663
01:45:31,752 --> 01:45:34,178
"Thank you again
for all you've done.
1664
01:45:34,203 --> 01:45:36,710
"So sorry again for
the multiple delays,
1665
01:45:36,735 --> 01:45:41,211
"but we've been in uncharted territory,
with no model to benefit from.
1666
01:45:41,236 --> 01:45:45,568
"If all ends well, perhaps the
demonstration that our methods worked
1667
01:45:45,586 --> 01:45:48,428
"will embolden more
to come forward.
1668
01:45:48,453 --> 01:45:50,535
Citizen."
1669
01:45:54,336 --> 01:45:56,844
So the update
that I want to give you is
1670
01:45:56,869 --> 01:46:00,811
about the new, um...
1671
01:46:00,836 --> 01:46:03,812
The new source that...
That we...
1672
01:46:03,837 --> 01:46:06,812
- Okay.
- Um, that,
1673
01:46:06,837 --> 01:46:11,261
Um, this is what...
This is the per...
1674
01:46:11,286 --> 01:46:13,762
You know, this is the person
who's doing the most...
1675
01:46:13,787 --> 01:46:16,311
- Mm-hmm, right, right.
- The work on it.
1676
01:46:16,336 --> 01:46:18,812
Um...
1677
01:46:18,837 --> 01:46:23,502
and now... And now, like,
basically what's happened is...
1678
01:46:25,370 --> 01:46:27,812
- And...
- That's actually...
1679
01:46:27,837 --> 01:46:32,345
That's really dangerous, um...
On the source's side.
1680
01:46:32,370 --> 01:46:34,345
Do they know how to take
care of themselves?
1681
01:46:34,370 --> 01:46:36,511
Well, you know, I mean he...
I mean, it's, um...
1682
01:46:36,536 --> 01:46:40,045
It's... It's all being done...
1683
01:46:40,070 --> 01:46:43,179
- Through this.
- Okay.
1684
01:46:43,204 --> 01:46:46,179
And they're all talking...
1685
01:46:46,204 --> 01:46:47,711
- This way.
- Okay.
1686
01:46:47,736 --> 01:46:49,378
- And...
- I was gonna say,
1687
01:46:49,403 --> 01:46:51,262
one of the big
questions there is,
1688
01:46:51,287 --> 01:46:53,262
can they handle it, you know,
do they have the...
1689
01:46:53,287 --> 01:46:56,262
No, they're very careful,
um, even there, through that.
1690
01:46:56,287 --> 01:46:58,452
- Okay, okay.
- Yeah.
1691
01:47:02,404 --> 01:47:04,502
And...
1692
01:47:10,903 --> 01:47:13,003
That's where that is.
1693
01:47:14,537 --> 01:47:16,836
Wow, that's really something.
1694
01:47:28,120 --> 01:47:30,786
Did you know that?
1695
01:47:36,704 --> 01:47:40,145
- It's not the actual planes.
- Right, right, right.
1696
01:47:40,170 --> 01:47:41,512
You mean the control.
1697
01:47:41,537 --> 01:47:42,979
It's the process...
1698
01:47:43,004 --> 01:47:44,403
- Ah.
- Who's sending the... Yeah.
1699
01:47:44,421 --> 01:47:46,879
There's a...
There's a chart, you know?
1700
01:47:46,904 --> 01:47:49,569
There's, like, a whole layout and it...
For every one...
1701
01:47:49,587 --> 01:47:52,045
That is really bold,
it's really risky,
1702
01:47:52,070 --> 01:47:54,030
- but, you know, that's the thing.
- There's more.
1703
01:47:54,037 --> 01:47:55,597
If they understand
what they're doing...
1704
01:47:55,622 --> 01:47:57,512
I mean, there's this chart.
It goes like this.
1705
01:47:57,537 --> 01:47:59,145
It shows the
decision-making chart.
1706
01:47:59,170 --> 01:48:02,837
It's a chart that goes... It's...
It's shaped like this.
1707
01:48:07,671 --> 01:48:10,679
- So up here, it says...
- Mm-hmm.
1708
01:48:10,704 --> 01:48:13,545
That's the decision-making
chart for each...
1709
01:48:13,570 --> 01:48:15,536
one.
1710
01:48:18,570 --> 01:48:20,846
It's so political!
1711
01:48:20,871 --> 01:48:23,670
This is... This part's amazing.
1712
01:48:29,088 --> 01:48:30,213
That's...
1713
01:48:30,238 --> 01:48:32,213
That's fucking ridiculous.
1714
01:48:32,238 --> 01:48:34,870
It's... This is...
It's so shocking.
1715
01:48:39,738 --> 01:48:41,736
That's... No, I know.
1716
01:48:41,754 --> 01:48:43,903
That's the population
of an entire country.
1717
01:48:43,921 --> 01:48:45,537
I know.
1718
01:48:47,255 --> 01:48:50,371
That's what we're working on.
1719
01:49:04,038 --> 01:49:07,013
That person is incredibly bold,
but, um...
1720
01:49:07,038 --> 01:49:09,380
But also very well aware.
1721
01:49:09,405 --> 01:49:12,237
Right. I... You know,
I just hope... I mean...
1722
01:49:12,255 --> 01:49:14,570
No, I mean, the boldness
of it is shocking, but,
1723
01:49:14,588 --> 01:49:17,404
I mean, it was obviously
motivated by what you did.
1724
01:49:17,422 --> 01:49:19,404
- I mean, it...
- This is going to...
1725
01:49:19,422 --> 01:49:23,880
This is going to...
That could raise the profile
1726
01:49:23,905 --> 01:49:27,180
of this whole political
situation with whistle-blowing
1727
01:49:27,205 --> 01:49:28,680
to a whole new level because...
1728
01:49:28,705 --> 01:49:30,814
- Exactly.
- It's gonna...
1729
01:49:30,839 --> 01:49:33,313
Yeah. I mean,
I actually think that's a great thing.
1730
01:49:33,338 --> 01:49:36,513
And I think people are gonna
see what's being hidden again,
1731
01:49:36,538 --> 01:49:41,704
again, by a totally different
part of the government.