1 00:00:02,855 --> 00:00:05,415 A massive explosion tears a hole in the 2 00:00:05,455 --> 00:00:08,439 side of a 747. What the hell was that? I 3 00:00:08,447 --> 00:00:12,151 don't know. Center United 811 heavy. 4 00:00:12,183 --> 00:00:14,935 We had a farm or something. Go on. We are 5 00:00:14,975 --> 00:00:17,951 descending rapidly. Everybody's staying 6 00:00:17,983 --> 00:00:20,751 your feet. Everything that wasn't bolted 7 00:00:20,783 --> 00:00:22,955 down just took off out. 8 00:00:24,615 --> 00:00:26,535 People are gone. The seats are gone. 9 00:00:26,695 --> 00:00:28,275 There was Nothing here anymore. 10 00:00:30,095 --> 00:00:33,237 NTSB investigators susp.. A crime. 11 00:00:33,421 --> 00:00:35,405 We were quite convinced that it was 12 00:00:35,445 --> 00:00:38,509 probably terrorism. But the physical 13 00:00:38,557 --> 00:00:41,477 evidence tells a different story. Check 14 00:00:41,501 --> 00:00:44,885 this out. I see it. It was 15 00:00:44,925 --> 00:00:47,165 very perplexing to us why this had 16 00:00:47,205 --> 00:00:49,145 happened and how it could have happened. 17 00:01:14,195 --> 00:01:17,011 United Airlines Flight 811 departs from 18 00:01:17,043 --> 00:01:27,483 Honolulu Airport just before 2:00am you're 19 00:01:27,499 --> 00:01:28,055 up. 20 00:01:30,655 --> 00:01:31,515 GE up. 21 00:01:33,535 --> 00:01:36,207 Captain David Cronin is at the controls of 22 00:01:36,231 --> 00:01:38,743 tonight's flight. It's his penultimate 23 00:01:38,799 --> 00:01:42,423 flight before retiring. I flew 24 00:01:42,559 --> 00:01:45,835 almost 35 years with United El Nav Veav. 25 00:01:46,295 --> 00:01:48,575 I've got over 30,000 hours of flight time 26 00:01:48,615 --> 00:01:51,607 and just about everything, military as 27 00:01:51,631 --> 00:01:56,335 well as civilian. How to pilot on check. 28 00:01:56,955 --> 00:01:59,667 First Officer Al Sladeider is also an 29 00:01:59,771 --> 00:02:01,667 experienced pilot who's flown with United 30 00:02:01,731 --> 00:02:04,855 for 25 years. Climb thrust. 31 00:02:05,715 --> 00:02:08,187 There's a third pilot in the cockpit is 32 00:02:08,251 --> 00:02:11,035 set second officer Randall Thomas, 33 00:02:11,115 --> 00:02:14,015 the flight engineer. APU is off. 34 00:02:15,995 --> 00:02:17,691 When you get to the point where you're 35 00:02:17,723 --> 00:02:21,003 flying an aircraft like a 747, you are 36 00:02:21,059 --> 00:02:23,373 probably among the most exp varian people 37 00:02:23,429 --> 00:02:26,021 on the airline. And that was certainly 38 00:02:26,093 --> 00:02:27,505 true for this crew. 39 00:02:30,245 --> 00:02:33,865 There are 337 passengers on board. 40 00:02:34,445 --> 00:02:36,885 Stuart McClure, his mother and younger 41 00:02:36,925 --> 00:02:39,149 brother are headed to Australia for a 42 00:02:39,197 --> 00:02:42,349 family visit. My stepfather was an 43 00:02:42,397 --> 00:02:45,269 executive for United Airlines so he was 44 00:02:45,317 --> 00:02:48,757 over there on business. My mom decided 45 00:02:48,821 --> 00:02:50,845 to join him but didn't want to fly alone 46 00:02:50,925 --> 00:02:53,145 so brought us two boys with her. 47 00:02:55,025 --> 00:02:57,913 Flight 811's next stop is Auckland, New 48 00:02:57,929 --> 00:03:01,025 Zealand for a stopover before flying on to 49 00:03:01,065 --> 00:03:02,245 Sydney, Australia. 50 00:03:07,785 --> 00:03:11,025 The Boeing 747 is a large, long range, 51 00:03:11,105 --> 00:03:13,601 wide bodydy airliner. Powered by four 52 00:03:13,673 --> 00:03:17,249 turbofan engines. It's just 53 00:03:17,297 --> 00:03:19,185 one of the most amazing airplanes ever 54 00:03:19,225 --> 00:03:22,097 been. Upwards of a million pounds of 55 00:03:22,121 --> 00:03:26,089 takeoff weight can travel 7,500 miles with 56 00:03:26,137 --> 00:03:29,169 reserves. The cruise'speed of the airplane 57 00:03:29,217 --> 00:03:32,689 is Mach 0.85 which is well over 600 miles 58 00:03:32,737 --> 00:03:35,889 an hour. And it will outrun pretty much 59 00:03:35,937 --> 00:03:38,245 any airliner available today. 60 00:03:41,745 --> 00:03:42,953 I don't think we're going to top that. 61 00:03:42,969 --> 00:03:46,089 Son of a gun. There are thunderstorms 62 00:03:46,177 --> 00:03:48,395 ahead. Let's see here. 63 00:03:54,215 --> 00:03:55,783 We did notice that there were 64 00:03:55,839 --> 00:03:58,695 thunderstorms so I left the seatbelt sign 65 00:03:58,735 --> 00:04:02,743 on. There are 66 00:04:02,799 --> 00:04:05,071 16 flight attendants on board tonight's 67 00:04:05,103 --> 00:04:07,783 flight, one of them is Leonard Jenkins 68 00:04:07,879 --> 00:04:11,511 who's off duty. So we get 69 00:04:11,543 --> 00:04:14,655 underway. Everything seemed pretty normal. 70 00:04:15,275 --> 00:04:17,827 I really was just getting ready to take my 71 00:04:17,851 --> 00:04:20,779 eight hour nap. Okay, tell him we're going 72 00:04:20,787 --> 00:04:24,051 to detour over to the left center. 73 00:04:24,123 --> 00:04:25,787 United 811 heavy we're going to be 74 00:04:25,811 --> 00:04:29,179 detouring. There'some weather. We're going 75 00:04:29,187 --> 00:04:31,795 to be going left of course. United 811 76 00:04:31,835 --> 00:04:33,775 deviation is necessary approved. 77 00:04:34,395 --> 00:04:35,295 Roger. 78 00:04:37,515 --> 00:04:40,245 Aliners do not fly through thunderstorms 79 00:04:40,785 --> 00:04:43,325 because it would be insane to do so. 80 00:04:44,385 --> 00:04:47,689 The lightning, the wind, perhaps funnel 81 00:04:47,737 --> 00:04:51,345 clouds. There are a lot of ways that a 82 00:04:51,425 --> 00:04:54,205 thunderstorm can kill you in an airplane. 83 00:04:54,545 --> 00:04:56,361 Looks like that's the end of it right 84 00:04:56,393 --> 00:04:57,605 there to the right. 85 00:05:00,465 --> 00:05:02,889 Almost nine minutes into the flight just 86 00:05:02,937 --> 00:05:04,845 as they get past the storm. 87 00:05:10,375 --> 00:05:12,755 What the hell was that? I don't know. 88 00:05:14,975 --> 00:05:17,983 I'm take it down back to Honolulu Center. 89 00:05:18,039 --> 00:05:20,767 United 811 heavy, we have a mayday. We had 90 00:05:20,791 --> 00:05:25,167 a farmmb or something go on the 91 00:05:25,191 --> 00:05:28,351 engines. We've lost number three engine. 92 00:05:28,543 --> 00:05:31,235 The right inboard engine is inoperative 93 00:05:31,975 --> 00:05:35,535 and we are descending rapidly. Coming back 94 00:05:35,695 --> 00:05:37,667 nine eight eleven heavy Roger. Keep center 95 00:05:37,691 --> 00:05:40,055 advised an emergency situation. 96 00:05:44,395 --> 00:05:47,155 You need to land at the nearest suitable 97 00:05:47,195 --> 00:05:50,139 airport and that would be Honolulu right 98 00:05:50,227 --> 00:05:53,575 behind them. Col flight attend stop 99 00:05:54,675 --> 00:05:57,283 to fly the plane back to safety. Captain 100 00:05:57,339 --> 00:06:02,315 Cronin needs to assess the damage but 101 00:06:02,355 --> 00:06:03,095 cannot. 102 00:06:07,105 --> 00:06:09,817 A huge explosion seemed to rock the whole 103 00:06:09,881 --> 00:06:13,645 plane. Just a huge pop and 104 00:06:13,985 --> 00:06:16,425 everything that wasn't bolted down just 105 00:06:16,585 --> 00:06:17,685 took off out. 106 00:06:21,065 --> 00:06:24,457 I saw this huge cloud of smoke and 107 00:06:24,521 --> 00:06:26,937 thought to myself this is not real. This 108 00:06:26,961 --> 00:06:28,985 is something in my dream. I've got to wake 109 00:06:29,025 --> 00:06:33,037 up. The air is escaping from the cabin. 110 00:06:33,141 --> 00:06:36,317 It's difficult to breathe. Everything just 111 00:06:36,341 --> 00:06:39,597 kind of went crazy. It knocked 112 00:06:39,621 --> 00:06:41,533 the wind out of me and I kept thinking to 113 00:06:41,549 --> 00:06:43,557 myself this is like. It feels like I'm 114 00:06:43,581 --> 00:06:58,737 suffocating. With your mask on dav I'm 115 00:06:58,761 --> 00:07:02,825 not getting any oxygen. The explosion has 116 00:07:02,865 --> 00:07:05,241 damaged the plane's oxygen supply to the 117 00:07:05,273 --> 00:07:06,925 crew and the passengers. 118 00:07:08,465 --> 00:07:11,337 We're not getting oxygen either. The 119 00:07:11,361 --> 00:07:14,185 pilots must get the plane down to 10,000ft 120 00:07:14,265 --> 00:07:16,729 quickly before they run out of breathable 121 00:07:16,777 --> 00:07:17,365 air. 122 00:07:21,385 --> 00:07:24,233 First things first. Get the airplane down 123 00:07:24,289 --> 00:07:26,671 where everybody is safe in terms of being 124 00:07:26,703 --> 00:07:29,159 able to breathe normally. Then work the 125 00:07:29,207 --> 00:07:31,535 other problems. Everybody's stay your 126 00:07:31,575 --> 00:07:32,155 face. 127 00:07:34,935 --> 00:07:37,471 The next thing I remember I was not in my 128 00:07:37,503 --> 00:07:38,475 seat anymore. 129 00:07:40,815 --> 00:07:42,915 I was standing against the bulkhead. 130 00:07:43,415 --> 00:07:44,795 Stand in your seat. 131 00:07:47,735 --> 00:07:49,595 The whole right side of the airplane, 132 00:07:51,185 --> 00:07:53,057 the people are gone, the seats are gone. 133 00:07:53,161 --> 00:07:56,193 There was nothing there anymore. It was 134 00:07:56,209 --> 00:07:57,565 like a picture window. 135 00:07:59,785 --> 00:08:02,281 I could see the white caps of the ocean. 136 00:08:02,393 --> 00:08:03,885 I could See the two engines? 137 00:08:11,505 --> 00:08:13,825 Captain Cronin is having trouble turning 138 00:08:13,865 --> 00:08:16,425 the plane back to Honolulu. We got a 139 00:08:16,465 --> 00:08:20,069 control problem here. With a full 140 00:08:20,117 --> 00:08:22,605 load of fuel on board, it's difficult to 141 00:08:22,645 --> 00:08:26,545 steer. Start dumbing the fuel. I'm dumping 142 00:08:28,005 --> 00:08:31,181 eight heavy when able for the souls on 143 00:08:31,213 --> 00:08:34,037 board and fuel a landing. Okay, 144 00:08:34,101 --> 00:08:35,869 stand by. We'll give you the information 145 00:08:35,917 --> 00:08:37,997 as quickly as possible. Not eight. Eleven 146 00:08:38,021 --> 00:08:41,749 heavy. Roger. And their troubles keep 147 00:08:41,837 --> 00:08:44,597 increasing. We got a problem with them 4 148 00:08:44,621 --> 00:08:47,419 engine. The right outboard engine is 149 00:08:47,467 --> 00:08:51,055 overheating. Can you maintain 240? 150 00:08:52,235 --> 00:08:53,695 Yes, just barely. 151 00:08:55,955 --> 00:08:57,707 You've got all this fuel because you're 152 00:08:57,731 --> 00:09:00,691 going to Auckland. And now you've lost two 153 00:09:00,723 --> 00:09:03,455 engines and you've descended rapidly. 154 00:09:04,675 --> 00:09:06,987 The crew is facing a very serious 155 00:09:07,051 --> 00:09:10,495 situation. We're losing out. I know it. 156 00:09:14,215 --> 00:09:16,831 With that kind of weight, two engines are 157 00:09:16,863 --> 00:09:19,647 not going to keep you in the air. You're 158 00:09:19,671 --> 00:09:20,595 going to come down, 159 00:09:24,815 --> 00:09:27,031 you're helpless. You have no control over 160 00:09:27,063 --> 00:09:30,471 what's about to happen to you. At that 161 00:09:30,503 --> 00:09:32,687 point I realized, okay, this is where we 162 00:09:32,711 --> 00:09:33,275 die. 163 00:09:41,775 --> 00:09:44,031 Watch your heading. Watch your heading. 164 00:09:44,143 --> 00:09:45,663 You want to go direct to. We're going 165 00:09:45,719 --> 00:09:49,115 direct to Honolulu. Yeah. 166 00:09:50,335 --> 00:09:52,775 Eight minutes after an explosion on board 167 00:09:52,855 --> 00:09:55,863 United Flight 811, the pilots struggled to 168 00:09:55,879 --> 00:09:57,887 keep their aircraft from plunging into the 169 00:09:57,911 --> 00:10:00,247 Pacific Ocean. Okay, I'm going downstairs 170 00:10:00,271 --> 00:10:01,675 to see what the hell is going on. 171 00:10:06,755 --> 00:10:08,819 You got a fire up there. There's a fire 172 00:10:08,867 --> 00:10:09,655 out there. 173 00:10:17,515 --> 00:10:21,723 There was an engine on fire with 174 00:10:21,779 --> 00:10:23,935 fuel. There was like a stream of fire. 175 00:10:26,915 --> 00:10:29,083 You just see flames just streaming out the 176 00:10:29,099 --> 00:10:31,831 back of the engines. Looks like a ATT to 177 00:10:31,863 --> 00:10:33,903 number four. Go through the procedure to 178 00:10:33,919 --> 00:10:34,995 shut the engine down. 179 00:10:44,375 --> 00:10:46,823 Second Officer Randall Thomas reaches one 180 00:10:46,839 --> 00:10:48,195 of the flight attendants. 181 00:10:52,775 --> 00:10:54,155 Please get us down. 182 00:11:03,925 --> 00:11:06,293 The right side is gone. We're about the 183 00:11:06,309 --> 00:11:09,061 first row. Right back is just open. 184 00:11:09,253 --> 00:11:11,413 You're just looking outside. What do you 185 00:11:11,429 --> 00:11:14,185 mean? Looks like a bomb? The fuselage is 186 00:11:14,645 --> 00:11:17,957 just open. I mean, the whole right side is 187 00:11:17,981 --> 00:11:20,505 gone. From about row one right back to U. 188 00:11:21,045 --> 00:11:22,145 Is anybody. 189 00:11:24,145 --> 00:11:25,937 Some people are probably gone. I don't 190 00:11:25,961 --> 00:11:26,525 know. 191 00:11:32,385 --> 00:11:34,353 You know, it's a terrible thing when 192 00:11:34,369 --> 00:11:36,001 you're a captain of an airplane and you 193 00:11:36,073 --> 00:11:37,325 lose passengers. 194 00:11:39,625 --> 00:11:42,217 We got a real problem here. Not only have 195 00:11:42,241 --> 00:11:44,329 the pilots lost thrust in the two right 196 00:11:44,377 --> 00:11:46,433 engines, now the instruments aren't 197 00:11:46,489 --> 00:11:48,193 providing direction to the airport. 198 00:11:48,329 --> 00:11:50,097 They'll need the controller to guide them 199 00:11:50,121 --> 00:11:53,127 in Center. United 811 heavy, 200 00:11:53,231 --> 00:11:55,863 we need a vector now. We're losing VOR. 201 00:11:55,919 --> 00:11:59,615 We're down to 6500. We evidently 202 00:11:59,655 --> 00:12:02,447 had a bomb or something. Big section of 203 00:12:02,471 --> 00:12:04,755 the right side of the airplane is missing. 204 00:12:07,135 --> 00:12:09,095 United811 heavy, do you have the airport 205 00:12:09,135 --> 00:12:10,955 and sight clear for a visual approach. 206 00:12:12,455 --> 00:12:14,511 The controller gives the pilot permission 207 00:12:14,583 --> 00:12:17,447 to conduct a visual approach instead. But 208 00:12:17,471 --> 00:12:19,287 they're still too far out to see the 209 00:12:19,311 --> 00:12:22,527 airport. We're still 45PME, so you watch 210 00:12:22,551 --> 00:12:25,875 us'not 8 11, I have you on radar. 211 00:12:29,655 --> 00:12:32,703 We got to get down and wait here. I'd say 212 00:12:32,719 --> 00:12:35,551 we land overweight. We're 652,000 pounds 213 00:12:35,583 --> 00:12:38,839 right now. Even though Flight 214 00:12:38,887 --> 00:12:41,615 811 has been dumping fuel, it's still 215 00:12:41,695 --> 00:12:44,119 90,000 pounds over the safe landing 216 00:12:44,167 --> 00:12:46,675 weight. We've got 45 miles to go. 217 00:12:49,295 --> 00:12:51,807 United 11, you're missing the right side 218 00:12:51,831 --> 00:12:53,791 of the cabin or the right wing, sir. 219 00:12:53,983 --> 00:12:55,407 That's affirmative. We're missing a 220 00:12:55,431 --> 00:12:57,791 section of the right side of the airplane. 221 00:12:57,983 --> 00:13:00,871 Part of the fuselage is missing. We need 222 00:13:00,903 --> 00:13:02,967 all medical equipment we can get and all 223 00:13:03,031 --> 00:13:05,271 equipment standing by. UN United eight 224 00:13:05,303 --> 00:13:06,395 eleven heavy, roger. 225 00:13:09,215 --> 00:13:11,879 Okay, put your harnesses on. Plan for 226 00:13:11,887 --> 00:13:15,463 evacuation. Tell him. Oh you bet. 227 00:13:15,599 --> 00:13:18,399 Honolulu, United 811 heavy, we do plan to 228 00:13:18,447 --> 00:13:22,223 evacuate on the Runway. 811 heavy, 229 00:13:22,239 --> 00:13:22,915 roger. 230 00:13:27,615 --> 00:13:29,159 Okay, let me try to talk to the flight 231 00:13:29,207 --> 00:13:29,875 attendant. 232 00:13:33,415 --> 00:13:35,847 In the cabin. The crew is preparing the 233 00:13:35,871 --> 00:13:37,365 passenger challenges for ditching. 234 00:13:41,545 --> 00:13:45,081 It was loud. We ran around getting life 235 00:13:45,113 --> 00:13:46,085 us on people. 236 00:13:48,665 --> 00:13:50,729 It's a feeling of like I'm not sure this 237 00:13:50,737 --> 00:13:52,505 is really going toa matter at this point. 238 00:13:52,545 --> 00:13:56,089 When we hit the water, I can't 239 00:13:56,097 --> 00:13:57,085 reach him down there. 240 00:14:03,525 --> 00:14:07,093 I say we land with 10 degrees, 10 miles 241 00:14:07,149 --> 00:14:09,101 from the airport. The pilots make the 242 00:14:09,133 --> 00:14:11,741 final preparations for landing. We're 243 00:14:11,773 --> 00:14:15,621 higher than hell, but the airport still 244 00:14:15,653 --> 00:14:19,397 isn't anywhere in sight. 8 11, 245 00:14:19,461 --> 00:14:22,065 turn right heading 070. 246 00:14:24,165 --> 00:14:26,225 It's right there down to your right. 247 00:14:28,335 --> 00:14:32,167 Okay. The pilots 248 00:14:32,231 --> 00:14:34,863 must now make a right turn with no right 249 00:14:34,919 --> 00:14:38,111 side engines. You've got all of the 250 00:14:38,143 --> 00:14:40,383 thrust coming out of these two turbofan 251 00:14:40,439 --> 00:14:45,367 engines on the left hand side and 252 00:14:45,391 --> 00:14:46,887 you've got two of them that aren't 253 00:14:46,951 --> 00:14:50,799 developing any thrust. It's a dangerous 254 00:14:50,847 --> 00:14:53,783 maneuver. If done incorrectly, the thrust 255 00:14:53,839 --> 00:14:55,877 from the left engines could put the plane 256 00:14:55,941 --> 00:14:59,261 into a steep role. We're either going to 257 00:14:59,293 --> 00:15:02,229 land on the airport in the water or 258 00:15:02,277 --> 00:15:04,277 drastically change the topography of 259 00:15:04,301 --> 00:15:08,533 downtown Honolulu. With a massive 260 00:15:08,589 --> 00:15:11,669 hole in the fuselage, more than 45,000 261 00:15:11,757 --> 00:15:14,861 pounds overweight, two dead engines and 262 00:15:14,893 --> 00:15:17,253 unknown damage to the control surfaces, 263 00:15:17,429 --> 00:15:20,301 the pilots of United811 managed to line up 264 00:15:20,333 --> 00:15:22,145 with the Runway in Honolulu. 265 00:15:25,185 --> 00:15:27,209 United 811 is clear to land. 8 left. 266 00:15:27,297 --> 00:15:32,525 Equipment is standing by. Win 05012 267 00:15:33,065 --> 00:15:35,805 cleared to land. 8 left. United 811 heavy. 268 00:15:36,985 --> 00:15:40,925 Okay, well let's try the gear. 269 00:16:13,195 --> 00:16:15,293 That's where it really became very, very 270 00:16:15,349 --> 00:16:18,917 real for us. We Knew that whatever 271 00:16:18,941 --> 00:16:20,269 was going to happen to us, we were going 272 00:16:20,277 --> 00:16:23,677 to do it together. I'm coming up on the 273 00:16:23,701 --> 00:16:26,941 power. Moments from 274 00:16:26,973 --> 00:16:29,677 touchdown, the pilots slow the plane to 275 00:16:29,701 --> 00:16:31,669 make it easier to stop the overweight 276 00:16:31,717 --> 00:16:32,545 aircraft. 277 00:16:39,625 --> 00:16:43,897 50ft. What you trim 30 center 278 00:16:43,921 --> 00:16:55,233 the trim center. The trim 10 is 279 00:16:55,289 --> 00:16:57,445 unbeliev with how fast they're going. 280 00:17:00,225 --> 00:17:02,257 Go reverse number two. Only because 281 00:17:02,281 --> 00:17:05,935 they're still at 170. The pilots hope 282 00:17:05,975 --> 00:17:08,319 reverse engine power will stop the plane 283 00:17:08,407 --> 00:17:25,355 before the Runway endsac 284 00:17:30,175 --> 00:17:32,395 probably the best landing ive ever made. 285 00:17:37,855 --> 00:17:41,755 Shut him down. Shut down the engines. 286 00:17:55,735 --> 00:17:59,343 25 minutes after the explosion, Flight 811 287 00:17:59,399 --> 00:18:01,915 has returned to Honolulu Airport. 288 00:18:13,655 --> 00:18:16,991 Nine of the 337 passengers were blown out 289 00:18:17,023 --> 00:18:20,071 of the airplane over the Pacific. The 290 00:18:20,103 --> 00:18:22,295 search for them and the wreckage begins 291 00:18:22,335 --> 00:18:25,989 immediately. It was a 292 00:18:26,087 --> 00:18:29,153 huge area and very difficult for us to 293 00:18:29,169 --> 00:18:32,001 pinpoint where over the water it actually 294 00:18:32,033 --> 00:18:35,561 occurred. Ron Schled from the National 295 00:18:35,633 --> 00:18:38,281 Transportation Safety Board, or ntsb, 296 00:18:38,393 --> 00:18:41,657 leads the investigation. We flew 297 00:18:41,721 --> 00:18:44,605 out of Washington and went into Honolulu. 298 00:18:46,345 --> 00:18:49,393 An FBI agent went with us, the bomb 299 00:18:49,489 --> 00:18:50,125 expert. 300 00:18:53,525 --> 00:18:56,285 They have jurisdiction to investigate for 301 00:18:56,325 --> 00:18:59,909 criminal activity. That hole has got 302 00:18:59,917 --> 00:19:03,625 to be at least 10ft wide by 15ft high. 303 00:19:05,605 --> 00:19:08,997 Forward cargo door is missing, too. The 304 00:19:09,021 --> 00:19:12,197 Boeing 747 has two cargo doors on the 305 00:19:12,221 --> 00:19:15,165 right side, the aft and the forward cargo 306 00:19:15,205 --> 00:19:19,225 doors. We could see from 307 00:19:19,265 --> 00:19:23,137 the ground cargo and baggage and 308 00:19:23,161 --> 00:19:25,897 we could see the remains of seats and the 309 00:19:25,921 --> 00:19:27,045 cabin area. 310 00:19:29,705 --> 00:19:32,241 Looking at the airframe itself becomes 311 00:19:32,313 --> 00:19:34,405 important. The direction of failures, 312 00:19:35,585 --> 00:19:37,737 whether you have damage from inside the 313 00:19:37,761 --> 00:19:40,945 aircraft to outside or the damages from 314 00:19:41,025 --> 00:19:44,943 outside in the 315 00:19:44,959 --> 00:19:47,111 floor is buckled, some of the seats are 316 00:19:47,143 --> 00:19:49,759 missing. The decompression likely broke 317 00:19:49,807 --> 00:19:52,999 the cabin floor beams. We were quite 318 00:19:53,047 --> 00:19:55,435 convinced that it was probably terrorism. 319 00:19:55,975 --> 00:19:58,247 There'damage on the leading edge and on 320 00:19:58,271 --> 00:20:01,143 the engines. The damage to the wing and 321 00:20:01,159 --> 00:20:02,927 engines is likely caused by debris that 322 00:20:02,951 --> 00:20:03,995 came off the plane. 323 00:20:11,395 --> 00:20:15,195 There'no sign of pitting. Upon closer 324 00:20:15,235 --> 00:20:18,251 examination, investigators find no obvious 325 00:20:18,323 --> 00:20:22,139 signs of a bomb. The NTSB guys 326 00:20:22,307 --> 00:20:23,883 generally have an idea what they're 327 00:20:23,939 --> 00:20:27,615 looking for. A pedding of the metal. 328 00:20:28,515 --> 00:20:32,427 They saw no evidence of that. No signs 329 00:20:32,451 --> 00:20:35,003 of fatigue or corrosion either. Once the 330 00:20:35,019 --> 00:20:38,483 FBI took the swabs for chemical residue 331 00:20:38,619 --> 00:20:40,867 and tested them, they reported they were 332 00:20:40,891 --> 00:20:42,731 all negative. And that was pretty 333 00:20:42,763 --> 00:20:44,507 conclusive evidence that there was not a 334 00:20:44,531 --> 00:20:48,427 bomb. The team now considers 335 00:20:48,491 --> 00:20:50,355 whether there was some kind of structural 336 00:20:50,435 --> 00:20:54,027 failure to the aircraft. All of 337 00:20:54,051 --> 00:20:56,475 the fractures appeared to be fresh 338 00:20:56,635 --> 00:20:59,979 overstress damage, not any pree existing 339 00:21:00,027 --> 00:21:03,357 damage. This made us consider that there 340 00:21:03,381 --> 00:21:05,905 was a problem with the door itself. 341 00:21:08,805 --> 00:21:10,985 We have some wiring from the door here. 342 00:21:11,325 --> 00:21:13,885 NTSB investigators turned their attention 343 00:21:13,925 --> 00:21:16,349 to what Remains of the cargo door system. 344 00:21:16,477 --> 00:21:18,265 Okay, what else we got? 345 00:21:19,765 --> 00:21:22,213 Instead of using a plug door which is 346 00:21:22,269 --> 00:21:24,693 stowed inside the cargo hole and gets 347 00:21:24,749 --> 00:21:26,555 jammed into the frame as the plane 348 00:21:26,645 --> 00:21:30,103 pressurizes. Boeing designed the 747 with 349 00:21:30,119 --> 00:21:32,599 an outward opening door to create more 350 00:21:32,647 --> 00:21:35,511 space for cargo in the holde. Looks like 351 00:21:35,543 --> 00:21:36,875 we at least have the pins. 352 00:21:40,855 --> 00:21:43,183 Investigators find a key component of the 353 00:21:43,199 --> 00:21:46,231 locking mechanism. The latch pins for the 354 00:21:46,263 --> 00:21:47,235 cargo door. 355 00:21:50,055 --> 00:21:53,873 The new 747 cargo door design uses a three 356 00:21:53,929 --> 00:21:57,105 stage locking system. An exterior switch 357 00:21:57,185 --> 00:21:59,217 electrically powers the door to a near 358 00:21:59,281 --> 00:22:02,865 closed position. C shaped latches or cams 359 00:22:02,985 --> 00:22:06,161 then rotate around pins. A handle on the 360 00:22:06,193 --> 00:22:08,705 exterior of the door lowers metal sectors 361 00:22:08,785 --> 00:22:10,805 which secure the latches in place. 362 00:22:12,745 --> 00:22:15,473 There's somewhere in the pins, but hard to 363 00:22:15,489 --> 00:22:18,089 tell for sure what it means. There was 364 00:22:18,137 --> 00:22:20,885 transfer of metal and discoloration. 365 00:22:21,905 --> 00:22:24,169 We couldn't tell for sure what the damage 366 00:22:24,217 --> 00:22:26,761 was so we had to remove the pins and take 367 00:22:26,793 --> 00:22:29,405 them to a laboratory for further analysis. 368 00:22:31,905 --> 00:22:34,097 There's some wear for sure, but it's 369 00:22:34,121 --> 00:22:35,593 likely from the lates rotating around the 370 00:22:35,609 --> 00:22:38,405 pins as the door closes. Makes sense. 371 00:22:42,705 --> 00:22:45,865 Hang on. Have a look. 372 00:22:47,565 --> 00:22:49,517 Investigators find evidence of heat 373 00:22:49,581 --> 00:22:52,589 tinting on the surface of the pin. I see 374 00:22:52,597 --> 00:22:56,117 it. Heat tinting occurs when the surface 375 00:22:56,181 --> 00:22:58,557 oxide layer of stainless steel changes 376 00:22:58,621 --> 00:23:02,357 color due to heating. There's also 377 00:23:02,381 --> 00:23:03,853 some metal transfer from the latches on 378 00:23:03,869 --> 00:23:06,105 the pins. You're right. 379 00:23:07,765 --> 00:23:10,645 The presence of latch material on the pins 380 00:23:10,805 --> 00:23:13,013 suggests the separation of the cargo door 381 00:23:13,069 --> 00:23:15,385 was extremely fast and vient. 382 00:23:18,725 --> 00:23:21,181 The amount of force to cause a transfer of 383 00:23:21,213 --> 00:23:24,109 metal from the latches to the pins had to 384 00:23:24,117 --> 00:23:27,625 be enormous. There's metal from the latch 385 00:23:28,405 --> 00:23:31,945 in the same place on every pin. 386 00:23:32,525 --> 00:23:34,773 The location of the latch metal on the 387 00:23:34,789 --> 00:23:37,477 pins gives investigators their first big 388 00:23:37,541 --> 00:23:40,845 break. Latches were open when the door 389 00:23:40,885 --> 00:23:44,991 came. The locking mechanism of the cargo 390 00:23:45,023 --> 00:23:48,623 door was designed to be fail safe. So 391 00:23:48,639 --> 00:23:51,559 it'very perplexing to us why this had 392 00:23:51,607 --> 00:23:53,555 happened and how it could have happened. 393 00:23:58,095 --> 00:24:00,527 I'm checking the FAA records. I'll go 394 00:24:00,551 --> 00:24:04,159 through the Boeing ones has 395 00:24:04,207 --> 00:24:07,431 the locking system on the 747 cargo door 396 00:24:07,543 --> 00:24:11,603 failed before. I've got 397 00:24:11,699 --> 00:24:15,619 something. Two years ago there 398 00:24:15,627 --> 00:24:18,135 was an incident on another 747. 399 00:24:18,555 --> 00:24:21,803 Look at that. March 1987, Pan American 400 00:24:21,859 --> 00:24:24,987 Flight 125 was en route from London to New 401 00:24:25,011 --> 00:24:27,323 York when there was a pressurization 402 00:24:27,419 --> 00:24:31,403 problem. The door was open 403 00:24:31,419 --> 00:24:34,671 an inch and a half. The Pan 404 00:24:34,703 --> 00:24:37,687 Am agent used a wrench to close the door 405 00:24:37,751 --> 00:24:41,239 manually. And once he got it closed, he in 406 00:24:41,247 --> 00:24:43,567 invertently backed the wrench up and 407 00:24:43,671 --> 00:24:45,315 opened the door slightly. 408 00:24:47,695 --> 00:24:50,423 The Pan Am latches Were manually turned to 409 00:24:50,439 --> 00:24:52,839 the open position and the lock sectors 410 00:24:52,887 --> 00:24:56,031 were broken. How can the force of a 411 00:24:56,063 --> 00:24:59,455 socket wrench break the sectors? Well, 412 00:24:59,615 --> 00:25:02,575 look, get this. The lock sectors, 413 00:25:04,155 --> 00:25:05,895 they were made of a weak material. 414 00:25:08,275 --> 00:25:10,907 The locking sectors were made of aluminum, 415 00:25:11,051 --> 00:25:14,055 so they would bend and break. 416 00:25:14,875 --> 00:25:16,491 What action was taken after the Pan Am 417 00:25:16,523 --> 00:25:20,731 incident, the FAA issued an 418 00:25:20,763 --> 00:25:24,035 airworthiness directive requiring that 419 00:25:24,075 --> 00:25:26,683 each lock sector be reinforced with a 420 00:25:26,699 --> 00:25:29,955 steel doubler. See United airlines. 421 00:25:30,035 --> 00:25:33,043 They had 18 to 24 months to do it. Maybe 422 00:25:33,059 --> 00:25:35,307 they hadn't got the work done yet. I'll 423 00:25:35,331 --> 00:25:36,855 check United's maintenance records. 424 00:25:38,995 --> 00:25:42,295 Did Flight 811 have weak lock sectors? 425 00:25:43,995 --> 00:25:45,403 Looks like the lock sections hadn't been 426 00:25:45,419 --> 00:25:46,335 replaced yet. 427 00:25:49,675 --> 00:25:52,451 At the time of the accident, the accident, 428 00:25:52,483 --> 00:25:54,943 airplane still had the aluminum sectors 429 00:25:55,099 --> 00:25:57,239 because it wasn't scheduled to be replaced 430 00:25:57,407 --> 00:26:00,575 for two months. Did you have any issues 431 00:26:00,615 --> 00:26:03,615 closing the door? Not at all. Close. 432 00:26:03,655 --> 00:26:06,415 Fine. Investigators consider how the door 433 00:26:06,455 --> 00:26:08,511 was closed and if the latches were over 434 00:26:08,543 --> 00:26:11,715 rotated like the ones on Pan Am125. 435 00:26:12,375 --> 00:26:13,911 Did you close the door electrically or 436 00:26:13,943 --> 00:26:15,955 manually? I closed it electrically. 437 00:26:17,655 --> 00:26:19,687 I wouldn't have closed it manually. Takes 438 00:26:19,711 --> 00:26:22,283 too much effort. What do you mean? You 439 00:26:22,299 --> 00:26:24,295 have to crank the wrench 95 times. 440 00:26:25,755 --> 00:26:28,819 The ramp agent on 811 did not use a power 441 00:26:28,867 --> 00:26:31,255 tool as was used on Pan Am. 442 00:26:32,155 --> 00:26:35,691 This left us without any explanation for 443 00:26:35,803 --> 00:26:36,775 what happened. 444 00:26:40,795 --> 00:26:43,075 What did you find out? Well, the ramp 445 00:26:43,115 --> 00:26:44,627 agent closed the door electrically 446 00:26:44,731 --> 00:26:47,477 properly using the switch. And the 447 00:26:47,501 --> 00:26:50,413 dispatch mechanics said he did a circle 448 00:26:50,469 --> 00:26:53,305 check of the plane prior to departure. 449 00:26:54,085 --> 00:26:56,237 He checked the forward cargo door with a 450 00:26:56,261 --> 00:26:59,213 flashlight and it was flushed to the 451 00:26:59,229 --> 00:27:00,025 aircraft. 452 00:27:04,125 --> 00:27:06,941 What about the cargo door indicator light 453 00:27:06,973 --> 00:27:08,025 in the cockpit? 454 00:27:12,075 --> 00:27:13,547 Second officer said that the light went 455 00:27:13,571 --> 00:27:14,135 out. 456 00:27:16,835 --> 00:27:18,771 Investigators confirmed that the second 457 00:27:18,843 --> 00:27:21,027 officer saw the cargo door light in the 458 00:27:21,051 --> 00:27:23,419 cockpit go off, indicating that the door 459 00:27:23,467 --> 00:27:24,415 was closed. 460 00:27:27,555 --> 00:27:30,211 While NTSB investigators consider other 461 00:27:30,243 --> 00:27:33,027 reasons why the cargo door opened, they 462 00:27:33,051 --> 00:27:35,175 get an update on recovery efforts. 463 00:27:38,655 --> 00:27:40,063 They mapped the currents and narrowed the 464 00:27:40,079 --> 00:27:42,435 debris field to 12 square miles. 465 00:27:45,015 --> 00:27:47,487 Finding the lost cargo door might be the 466 00:27:47,511 --> 00:27:50,703 key to the investigation. Let's take a 467 00:27:50,719 --> 00:27:53,995 look at the depth. 14,000ft. 468 00:27:55,695 --> 00:27:58,271 Recovery teams aren't able to search for 469 00:27:58,303 --> 00:28:01,775 wreckage at a depth of 14,000ft. At that 470 00:28:01,815 --> 00:28:03,855 point, the deepest we had ever searched 471 00:28:03,895 --> 00:28:06,883 and recovered wreckage was 6,000ft under 472 00:28:06,899 --> 00:28:07,615 the water. 473 00:28:10,035 --> 00:28:13,035 If the door was properly closed, then 474 00:28:13,075 --> 00:28:16,395 maybe it's subsequently opened due to an 475 00:28:16,435 --> 00:28:17,495 electrical problem. 476 00:28:20,075 --> 00:28:22,795 Did the electrical system accidentally 477 00:28:22,875 --> 00:28:24,495 open the door in flight? 478 00:28:25,995 --> 00:28:27,851 According to the manual, when the plane 479 00:28:27,883 --> 00:28:30,003 lifts off the ground, all powers to the 480 00:28:30,019 --> 00:28:31,255 door is disconnected. 481 00:28:34,255 --> 00:28:36,543 Electrical operation of the door to open 482 00:28:36,559 --> 00:28:38,835 it in flight was impossible. 483 00:28:39,895 --> 00:28:47,767 If not in the air, then maybe 484 00:28:47,791 --> 00:28:52,871 on the Ground we 485 00:28:52,943 --> 00:28:54,927 considered that there possibly could have 486 00:28:54,951 --> 00:28:57,437 been as short in the electrical system 487 00:28:57,591 --> 00:29:00,537 that caused the door to unlatch on the 488 00:29:00,561 --> 00:29:01,125 ground. 489 00:29:03,305 --> 00:29:07,033 This everything? Almost. We have all 490 00:29:07,049 --> 00:29:08,725 the electrical switches except one. 491 00:29:09,665 --> 00:29:11,993 Investigators perform continuity testing 492 00:29:12,049 --> 00:29:14,289 on the cargo door switches and relays 493 00:29:14,377 --> 00:29:17,201 recovered from the aircraft. This one's 494 00:29:17,233 --> 00:29:21,353 good, as is 495 00:29:21,449 --> 00:29:22,325 this one. 496 00:29:25,645 --> 00:29:26,785 Check this out. 497 00:29:31,765 --> 00:29:33,025 That's a burn mark. 498 00:29:35,165 --> 00:29:37,429 They also noticed that some of the wiring 499 00:29:37,477 --> 00:29:39,545 insulation has stripped off. 500 00:29:43,885 --> 00:29:46,229 That switch is a closed circuit. It has s 501 00:29:46,237 --> 00:29:47,705 nothing to do with opening the door. 502 00:29:50,585 --> 00:29:53,041 The exposed wire on the switch could not 503 00:29:53,073 --> 00:29:55,405 have caused the cargo door to open. 504 00:29:57,225 --> 00:29:59,769 We had ruled out most electrical system 505 00:29:59,817 --> 00:30:02,657 failures as a cause of the accident. So 506 00:30:02,681 --> 00:30:04,765 that had us look at other options. 507 00:30:09,425 --> 00:30:10,405 Here you go. 508 00:30:14,165 --> 00:30:16,077 The team now considers whether a 509 00:30:16,101 --> 00:30:18,429 mechanical failure caused the cargo door 510 00:30:18,477 --> 00:30:19,385 to open. 511 00:30:22,045 --> 00:30:23,585 Maybe there's something here. 512 00:30:24,525 --> 00:30:26,741 Investigators review the operations of the 513 00:30:26,773 --> 00:30:30,341 cargo door on four United 747s at Honolulu 514 00:30:30,373 --> 00:30:34,265 Airport. This is strange. 515 00:30:35,045 --> 00:30:36,893 Says here that one of the ramp agents 516 00:30:36,949 --> 00:30:39,145 kicked on a cargo door to get it open. 517 00:30:40,505 --> 00:30:43,121 They discover an instance of a cargo door 518 00:30:43,193 --> 00:30:45,485 opening only with the use of force. 519 00:30:48,105 --> 00:30:50,097 When we heard that the ramp agents had to 520 00:30:50,121 --> 00:30:52,705 kick the door, we figured that there was 521 00:30:52,745 --> 00:30:55,561 some type of misalignment mis rigging of 522 00:30:55,593 --> 00:30:58,445 the cargo door and its locking mechanisms. 523 00:30:59,345 --> 00:31:00,977 Maybe the door kicking was just an 524 00:31:01,001 --> 00:31:02,045 isolated case. 525 00:31:04,745 --> 00:31:07,047 Investigators to the maintenance report of 526 00:31:07,071 --> 00:31:09,807 the Flight 811 aircraft to determine if 527 00:31:09,831 --> 00:31:11,703 there was ever a fit issue with the 528 00:31:11,759 --> 00:31:15,199 forward cargo door. No fit or alignment 529 00:31:15,247 --> 00:31:17,863 issues were ever reported. Right. But 530 00:31:17,959 --> 00:31:19,595 check out when the plane was inspected. 531 00:31:23,935 --> 00:31:25,195 When it was empty. 532 00:31:29,375 --> 00:31:32,447 A 747 fully loaded with people, 533 00:31:32,551 --> 00:31:36,663 fuel and cargo can add upwards of £300,000 534 00:31:36,719 --> 00:31:39,511 to the aircraft, causing the fuselage to 535 00:31:39,543 --> 00:31:41,035 bend and distort. 536 00:31:42,935 --> 00:31:46,863 Get this. In December 1988, there were 537 00:31:46,919 --> 00:31:49,915 eight write ups about door misalignment. 538 00:31:50,375 --> 00:31:52,687 Two months before the accident, the 539 00:31:52,751 --> 00:31:55,143 forward cargo door failed to close fully 540 00:31:55,239 --> 00:31:56,795 under electrical operation. 541 00:31:59,595 --> 00:32:02,403 An ill fitting door could cause the 542 00:32:02,539 --> 00:32:05,627 latching motors to not drive 543 00:32:05,691 --> 00:32:09,483 the latches fully closed. Did United fix 544 00:32:09,539 --> 00:32:10,295 the problem? 545 00:32:15,595 --> 00:32:17,531 Investigators learned that an electrical 546 00:32:17,603 --> 00:32:20,019 switch on United Flight 811 couldn't 547 00:32:20,067 --> 00:32:22,975 properly close the misaligned cargo door. 548 00:32:23,335 --> 00:32:26,319 But was it ever repaired? The maintenance 549 00:32:26,367 --> 00:32:29,183 was deferred because they would close the 550 00:32:29,199 --> 00:32:32,727 door manually if there was a 551 00:32:32,751 --> 00:32:34,111 fit issue and they would close it 552 00:32:34,143 --> 00:32:37,047 manually. That would explain the wear 553 00:32:37,071 --> 00:32:38,395 marks we found on the pins. 554 00:32:40,015 --> 00:32:42,559 The wear on the door indicated a long 555 00:32:42,647 --> 00:32:46,015 history of manual operation and m 556 00:32:46,055 --> 00:32:50,323 rigging of the door. Even worse, 557 00:32:50,459 --> 00:32:52,979 with repeated manual opening and closing 558 00:32:53,027 --> 00:32:55,659 of a misaligned door, the lock sectors 559 00:32:55,707 --> 00:32:57,667 could easily have been damaged if the 560 00:32:57,691 --> 00:32:59,455 latches were being over rotated. 561 00:33:05,755 --> 00:33:08,123 With the latches and lock sectors still at 562 00:33:08,139 --> 00:33:11,075 the bottom of the sea. The NTSB is forced 563 00:33:11,115 --> 00:33:13,051 to conclude that the cargo door was 564 00:33:13,083 --> 00:33:15,585 sufficiently misaligned to prevent it from 565 00:33:15,625 --> 00:33:19,481 closing properly. When we 566 00:33:19,513 --> 00:33:22,185 write the final report of an accident, we 567 00:33:22,225 --> 00:33:24,665 present the evidence that we have and make 568 00:33:24,705 --> 00:33:27,185 our best conclusions based on that 569 00:33:27,225 --> 00:33:30,113 evidence. We knew there was mechanical 570 00:33:30,169 --> 00:33:33,281 damage to the door. We suspected that was 571 00:33:33,313 --> 00:33:36,073 the cause and that's the way we wrote the 572 00:33:36,129 --> 00:33:40,343 report. In April of 1990, 573 00:33:40,489 --> 00:33:43,015 the NTSB published its findings. 574 00:33:43,635 --> 00:33:46,299 The report recommends the FAA issue a 575 00:33:46,347 --> 00:33:48,851 directive requiring the installation of a 576 00:33:48,883 --> 00:33:51,027 device to prevent the latches from over 577 00:33:51,051 --> 00:33:51,935 rotating. 578 00:33:54,595 --> 00:33:57,323 But we wanted to get the door. We really 579 00:33:57,379 --> 00:33:59,555 wanted to find the door to prove our 580 00:33:59,595 --> 00:34:01,215 theory. Yeah. 581 00:34:09,295 --> 00:34:12,007 Hello. Three months after the NTSB 582 00:34:12,071 --> 00:34:14,743 publishes its report on United Flight 811, 583 00:34:14,839 --> 00:34:17,615 the US Navy offers to assist the recovery 584 00:34:17,655 --> 00:34:22,527 efforts. Site scan sonar U 585 00:34:22,551 --> 00:34:26,367 huh? The navy came to me and said we've 586 00:34:26,391 --> 00:34:29,155 got a system that we're testing. 587 00:34:30,575 --> 00:34:34,395 It was experimental, a new sonar system 588 00:34:34,855 --> 00:34:37,395 and it was at the time classified. 589 00:34:40,095 --> 00:34:43,295 A side scan sonar device towed from a ship 590 00:34:43,415 --> 00:34:46,055 emits high frequency sound pulses that 591 00:34:46,095 --> 00:34:48,751 bounce off the sealooor to create an image 592 00:34:48,783 --> 00:34:51,047 of the seabed and any debris that might be 593 00:34:51,071 --> 00:34:51,995 lying on it. 594 00:34:54,335 --> 00:34:57,935 14,000ft. Really? With the ability to scan 595 00:34:58,015 --> 00:35:00,731 deeper than previously possible, the navy 596 00:35:00,803 --> 00:35:02,811 offers to test the device in the Pacific 597 00:35:02,843 --> 00:35:06,603 Ocean. All right, let's do it. They said 598 00:35:06,659 --> 00:35:08,691 we would like to try and test it on that 599 00:35:08,723 --> 00:35:11,195 door and they would do it for no cost to 600 00:35:11,695 --> 00:35:13,255 us. We said sure. 601 00:35:26,115 --> 00:35:27,415 Nothing in this sector. 602 00:35:29,075 --> 00:35:32,195 NTSB investigator Frank Hildrop is on 603 00:35:32,235 --> 00:35:34,139 board the vessel searching for the cargo 604 00:35:34,187 --> 00:35:37,363 door. I felt a lot of 605 00:35:37,379 --> 00:35:40,899 pressure. This accident represented one 606 00:35:40,907 --> 00:35:43,219 of the deepest recoverage that was going 607 00:35:43,227 --> 00:35:46,467 to be attempted. They search an 608 00:35:46,531 --> 00:35:50,187 area of 12 square miles divided into 57 609 00:35:50,251 --> 00:35:50,975 sectors. 610 00:35:55,535 --> 00:35:56,435 Hang on, 611 00:35:58,935 --> 00:36:01,839 I think we got something. The team finds 612 00:36:01,887 --> 00:36:05,663 evidence of a debris field. There was 613 00:36:05,719 --> 00:36:07,279 pretty high confidence that they were in 614 00:36:07,287 --> 00:36:09,983 the right area. And the experts can tell 615 00:36:10,159 --> 00:36:11,823 roughly what they're looking at. Is it 616 00:36:11,879 --> 00:36:14,595 metallic in nature? Is it a good return? 617 00:36:15,695 --> 00:36:18,369 A three person submersible vehicle called 618 00:36:18,447 --> 00:36:21,861 the Sea cliff is deployed. The expedition 619 00:36:21,973 --> 00:36:24,957 confirms the debris is from Flight 811. 620 00:36:25,141 --> 00:36:27,301 But finding the cargo door proves 621 00:36:27,373 --> 00:36:30,693 difficult. We had some problems 622 00:36:30,749 --> 00:36:32,349 with weather, with the hurricane, with 623 00:36:32,397 --> 00:36:34,197 equipment failure. So there's a lot of 624 00:36:34,341 --> 00:36:38,357 stops and starts se cliff to 625 00:36:38,461 --> 00:36:39,105 chew. 626 00:36:45,025 --> 00:36:47,085 After two months of searching, 627 00:36:48,145 --> 00:36:51,737 we have the door. The missing piece is 628 00:36:51,801 --> 00:36:52,405 found. 629 00:36:56,105 --> 00:36:58,233 The door was in two pieces on the bottom 630 00:36:58,249 --> 00:37:00,289 of the ocean. We had to recover both 631 00:37:00,337 --> 00:37:02,497 pieces, get them on the ship and take them 632 00:37:02,521 --> 00:37:03,565 downolulu. 633 00:37:06,465 --> 00:37:08,257 With the complete locking system 634 00:37:08,321 --> 00:37:10,929 recovered, investigators tried to confirm 635 00:37:10,977 --> 00:37:13,571 their theory that A misaligned cargo door 636 00:37:13,643 --> 00:37:16,627 caused the lock sectors to break, just 637 00:37:16,651 --> 00:37:19,491 like we thought. The latshes were in the 638 00:37:19,523 --> 00:37:23,235 open position. Check this out. But then 639 00:37:23,275 --> 00:37:25,731 they discover something unexpected and 640 00:37:25,763 --> 00:37:29,335 critical. These sectors aren't broken, 641 00:37:30,075 --> 00:37:33,763 they're just bent. The lock sectors 642 00:37:33,819 --> 00:37:36,635 were largely intact. They weren't damaged 643 00:37:36,675 --> 00:37:39,567 like we expected them to be. So that led 644 00:37:39,591 --> 00:37:41,175 us in a little bit more of another 645 00:37:41,215 --> 00:37:44,879 direction. No visible 646 00:37:44,927 --> 00:37:46,835 evidence of any burning or arcing. 647 00:37:47,855 --> 00:37:50,695 Investigators now reconsider a theory they 648 00:37:50,775 --> 00:37:53,159 previously rejected, that there was an 649 00:37:53,207 --> 00:37:56,159 electrical issue with the door. No signs 650 00:37:56,207 --> 00:37:59,703 of heat toress either. One of 651 00:37:59,719 --> 00:38:01,951 the things you can do is look inside the 652 00:38:01,983 --> 00:38:05,371 switches and see their cond condition. We 653 00:38:05,403 --> 00:38:08,323 always examine the wiring. We look for 654 00:38:08,379 --> 00:38:10,691 nicks or cuts when the wires are bundled 655 00:38:10,763 --> 00:38:13,135 together. Check this out. 656 00:38:14,195 --> 00:38:16,187 Investigators find a crucial piece of 657 00:38:16,211 --> 00:38:19,619 evidence. There's chafing on some of 658 00:38:19,627 --> 00:38:22,307 the wires in this bundle. It's proof that 659 00:38:22,331 --> 00:38:24,243 the conditions for a short circuit 660 00:38:24,299 --> 00:38:27,747 existed. All it takes for a 661 00:38:27,771 --> 00:38:29,929 short circuit to happen is for that 662 00:38:29,977 --> 00:38:32,641 conductor that's inside that insulation to 663 00:38:32,673 --> 00:38:34,393 touch another wire or touch a piece of 664 00:38:34,409 --> 00:38:37,441 metal. So we're always concerned about 665 00:38:37,513 --> 00:38:40,645 wiring in airplanes. All set. 666 00:38:41,025 --> 00:38:44,033 Can a short circuit open a locked door on 667 00:38:44,049 --> 00:38:46,817 a 747? Looks good. 668 00:38:47,001 --> 00:38:48,085 Give it a try. 669 00:38:59,885 --> 00:39:02,745 Well, there you have it. 670 00:39:04,085 --> 00:39:06,845 We determined that probably the short 671 00:39:06,885 --> 00:39:10,117 circuit could have caused the motors to 672 00:39:10,181 --> 00:39:13,265 engage the latch cams and open the door. 673 00:39:14,525 --> 00:39:16,197 So we know there's no power to the door 674 00:39:16,261 --> 00:39:18,453 once the wheels lift off the ground. And 675 00:39:18,469 --> 00:39:22,325 the door was closed and locked here. So 676 00:39:22,825 --> 00:39:26,165 the short happened somewhere here. 677 00:39:27,465 --> 00:39:31,201 During taxi, the short circuit causes the 678 00:39:31,233 --> 00:39:33,465 latch to partially open when the plane is 679 00:39:33,505 --> 00:39:36,033 still on the ground. Then when the plane 680 00:39:36,089 --> 00:39:38,245 approaches 23,000ft, 681 00:39:40,545 --> 00:39:42,713 the significant pressure differential 682 00:39:42,809 --> 00:39:45,353 between the inside and the outside forces 683 00:39:45,409 --> 00:39:47,719 the door open and causes a massive 684 00:39:47,767 --> 00:39:49,275 decompression on board. 685 00:39:53,455 --> 00:39:55,155 Nine people are lost. 686 00:40:10,895 --> 00:40:14,755 Hello. Nine months after recovering 687 00:40:14,795 --> 00:40:17,083 the cargo door, investigators get 688 00:40:17,139 --> 00:40:18,335 disturbing news. 689 00:40:20,035 --> 00:40:20,935 Thank you. 690 00:40:27,035 --> 00:40:28,295 It happened again. 691 00:40:32,875 --> 00:40:36,315 Another United 747 cargo door opened 692 00:40:36,435 --> 00:40:38,535 while on the tarmac in New York. 693 00:40:40,505 --> 00:40:42,753 Despite these incidents, the fleet is 694 00:40:42,809 --> 00:40:43,885 never grounded. 695 00:40:47,785 --> 00:40:50,777 I felt anger, you know, 696 00:40:50,921 --> 00:40:54,121 rage. My heart 697 00:40:54,153 --> 00:40:56,445 just goes out to the victims. 698 00:41:00,065 --> 00:41:02,937 Two years after the accident, the NTSB 699 00:41:03,001 --> 00:41:05,821 publishes a second report updating the 700 00:41:05,853 --> 00:41:09,397 cause. Opening of a cargo door on 701 00:41:09,421 --> 00:41:12,825 a large aircraft is a catastrophic event. 702 00:41:13,365 --> 00:41:16,373 It's unacceptable event. It's like a wing 703 00:41:16,429 --> 00:41:17,385 falling off. 704 00:41:20,325 --> 00:41:23,341 The FAA and Boeing took more than two 705 00:41:23,373 --> 00:41:25,705 years to require changes. 706 00:41:28,965 --> 00:41:31,165 I remember it like it was yesterday. 707 00:41:32,305 --> 00:41:35,769 It just doesn't hurt so much. And you 708 00:41:35,777 --> 00:41:37,605 don't think about it 24. 7. 709 00:41:41,105 --> 00:41:43,525 The experience and the event that night, 710 00:41:44,225 --> 00:41:46,065 it told me I needed to make my life 711 00:41:46,105 --> 00:41:49,777 matter, whether it be with the people that 712 00:41:49,801 --> 00:41:53,177 I share it with every single day or with 713 00:41:53,281 --> 00:41:55,361 what I put my energy towards every single 714 00:41:55,393 --> 00:41:59,105 day. The nine that didn't make it 715 00:41:59,845 --> 00:42:02,085 would expect that of us and of me.