1 00:00:01,935 --> 00:00:04,879 Soon after departing Riya, the pilots of 2 00:00:04,927 --> 00:00:08,515 Saudia Flight 163 get terrifying news. 3 00:00:09,575 --> 00:00:13,343 Fire. Fire in the cabin. A fire in 4 00:00:13,359 --> 00:00:16,235 the cabin is spread very very rapidly. 5 00:00:16,935 --> 00:00:18,871 Fire equipment is in standby positions and 6 00:00:18,903 --> 00:00:20,999 ready. The passengers were probably 7 00:00:21,047 --> 00:00:24,583 terrified. They're able to return to the 8 00:00:24,599 --> 00:00:27,303 airport. Okay, we are shutting down the 9 00:00:27,319 --> 00:00:30,145 engines now and evacuating. But Only 10 00:00:30,185 --> 00:00:34,321 minutes later Saudi 163d read everyone 11 00:00:34,393 --> 00:00:37,345 on board is dead. None of it made any 12 00:00:37,385 --> 00:00:40,209 sense. Investigators discover critical 13 00:00:40,257 --> 00:00:42,605 evidence on the cockpit voice recorder. 14 00:00:42,945 --> 00:00:45,817 It's just smoking the aft he continually 15 00:00:45,881 --> 00:00:48,393 downplaying the situation. If he had gone 16 00:00:48,449 --> 00:00:51,969 back to see for himself then 17 00:00:52,017 --> 00:00:53,725 perhaps things would have been different. 18 00:01:17,455 --> 00:01:20,439 It's 20 past nine on a hot evening at 19 00:01:20,487 --> 00:01:22,615 Saudi Arabia's Riyadh International 20 00:01:22,695 --> 00:01:23,475 Airport. 21 00:01:25,495 --> 00:01:28,891 Saudia 1122 line up and hold clear 22 00:01:28,923 --> 00:01:31,451 to leave Riyadh via derma. Climb and 23 00:01:31,483 --> 00:01:35,083 maintain three five zero left turn from 24 00:01:35,099 --> 00:01:38,547 takeoff. In the tower, controllers are 25 00:01:38,571 --> 00:01:41,515 handling a full roster of flights. Most 26 00:01:41,555 --> 00:01:43,867 are scheduled after sunset when the heat 27 00:01:43,931 --> 00:01:44,855 dies down. 28 00:01:47,635 --> 00:01:50,203 Everything is running smoothly. Riyad Saud 29 00:01:50,259 --> 00:01:53,537 163 until. Until a recently departed 30 00:01:53,601 --> 00:01:57,209 Saudia flight calls in. Go ahead 163 31 00:01:57,257 --> 00:01:59,593 we're returning back to Riyadh which 32 00:01:59,649 --> 00:02:01,841 changes everything. Clear to reverse 33 00:02:01,873 --> 00:02:04,485 course back to Riyadh. Request reason 34 00:02:06,065 --> 00:02:08,753 Saudia163 we've got fire in the cabin and 35 00:02:08,769 --> 00:02:11,417 please alert the fire trucks. This is 36 00:02:11,481 --> 00:02:14,081 extremely dangerous. It doesn't get any 37 00:02:14,113 --> 00:02:17,313 more serious than this. This is basically 38 00:02:17,369 --> 00:02:20,055 a pilot's worse case nightmare. 39 00:02:20,795 --> 00:02:22,899 Okay, cleared back. You can descend to any 40 00:02:22,907 --> 00:02:26,107 altitude you'd like. 163 we can descend to 41 00:02:26,131 --> 00:02:30,355 any altitude. When an aircraft reports 42 00:02:30,515 --> 00:02:32,819 to the air traffic control tower that they 43 00:02:32,867 --> 00:02:35,203 have a fire on board, they clear other 44 00:02:35,219 --> 00:02:37,563 airplanes out of the way and that airplane 45 00:02:37,619 --> 00:02:40,547 is given top priority to land and an 46 00:02:40,571 --> 00:02:42,495 evacuation should then ensue. 47 00:02:43,515 --> 00:02:45,643 The flight originated in Karachi, 48 00:02:45,699 --> 00:02:48,861 Pakistan. Before stopping over in Riya it 49 00:02:48,893 --> 00:02:51,253 was heading to Jeddah but now must turn 50 00:02:51,309 --> 00:02:55,105 back. You're number one for landing. 51 00:02:56,045 --> 00:02:57,185 163. 52 00:03:00,765 --> 00:03:05,065 Saudia Flight 163 is a TriStar L1011. 53 00:03:06,565 --> 00:03:10,445 The L10011 is a three engine wide body 54 00:03:10,605 --> 00:03:13,831 long range transport airplane. It was 55 00:03:13,903 --> 00:03:16,591 designed to go very long distances, carry 56 00:03:16,663 --> 00:03:18,519 hundreds of people, had excellent 57 00:03:18,607 --> 00:03:21,475 performance and mechanically reliable. 58 00:03:25,135 --> 00:03:28,423 There are 287 passengers on board 59 00:03:28,599 --> 00:03:30,551 and some at the rear of the cabin are 60 00:03:30,583 --> 00:03:33,951 having difficulty breathing. The smoke is 61 00:03:33,983 --> 00:03:36,495 the first indication of a fire. The pilots 62 00:03:36,575 --> 00:03:38,937 reported to air traffic control. The 63 00:03:38,961 --> 00:03:41,817 passengers were probably terrified and the 64 00:03:41,841 --> 00:03:43,953 aircraft needed to be on the ground as 65 00:03:43,969 --> 00:03:47,609 soon as possible. 38 year old captain 66 00:03:47,657 --> 00:03:50,605 Mohammad Ali Hawaia Is the pilot flying? 67 00:03:50,985 --> 00:03:54,121 He's been with Saudia for 15 years and is 68 00:03:54,153 --> 00:03:56,249 now responsible for getting the plane and 69 00:03:56,297 --> 00:03:58,005 passengers back safely. 70 00:03:59,265 --> 00:04:01,985 26 year old first officer Sami Abdullah 71 00:04:02,025 --> 00:04:05,141 Hassanein is the pilot monitoring how many 72 00:04:05,173 --> 00:04:08,461 passengers on board. You've got a full 73 00:04:08,493 --> 00:04:09,065 load. 74 00:04:12,245 --> 00:04:13,785 I would declare an emergency. 75 00:04:16,165 --> 00:04:20,157 Yeah. American Bradley Curtis is 76 00:04:20,181 --> 00:04:23,685 the flight engineer. You really could 77 00:04:23,725 --> 00:04:27,269 not fly an airplane like the L1011 without 78 00:04:27,317 --> 00:04:29,501 a flight engineer to manage all of the 79 00:04:29,533 --> 00:04:32,363 aircraft systems. That modern day air 80 00:04:32,409 --> 00:04:35,231 aircraft are all done by automation. 81 00:04:35,423 --> 00:04:38,263 Flight 163 is now less than four minutes 82 00:04:38,319 --> 00:04:41,887 from the airport. Ladies and genn please 83 00:04:41,951 --> 00:04:43,315 stay in your seats. 84 00:04:46,655 --> 00:04:49,155 Emergency crews are standing by. 85 00:04:52,535 --> 00:04:56,007 We are at Saudia 16310 miles final Runway 86 00:04:56,031 --> 00:04:58,819 and sight. Are we Cleared to land? 1063 87 00:04:58,867 --> 00:05:02,055 clear to land. Wind three two zero at five 88 00:05:02,875 --> 00:05:04,667 clear to land. Can you confirm you alert 89 00:05:04,691 --> 00:05:07,147 of the fire trucks? Affirmative. Thank 90 00:05:07,171 --> 00:05:11,931 you. Riyadh SAO163 as 91 00:05:11,963 --> 00:05:14,571 the smoke in the cabin increases the 92 00:05:14,603 --> 00:05:16,755 purser does her best to prepare passengers 93 00:05:16,795 --> 00:05:17,695 for landing. 94 00:05:20,395 --> 00:05:23,291 Place your hands behind your head. Head 95 00:05:23,323 --> 00:05:24,555 with on your knees. 96 00:05:28,015 --> 00:05:31,407 Saudia 163 has been on fire for at least 97 00:05:31,511 --> 00:05:32,675 17 minutes. 98 00:05:35,135 --> 00:05:37,847 A fire in the cabin can spread very very 99 00:05:37,911 --> 00:05:38,795 rapidly. 100 00:05:42,015 --> 00:05:46,151 It can be very difficult to contain. So it 101 00:05:46,223 --> 00:05:48,343 becomes a race against time. 102 00:05:48,519 --> 00:05:50,967 Saudia160 fire equipment is in standby 103 00:05:51,031 --> 00:05:53,207 positions and ready. Please advise the 104 00:05:53,231 --> 00:05:54,623 fire truckks to be at the tail of the 105 00:05:54,639 --> 00:05:57,555 airplane after touchdown please. Yes we'do 106 00:06:01,095 --> 00:06:05,275 30 10. 107 00:06:06,255 --> 00:06:09,887 The L1011 touches down 16 minutes after 108 00:06:09,911 --> 00:06:16,477 the crew first called in the fire tower. 109 00:06:16,501 --> 00:06:17,773 Could you advise if there's any fire in 110 00:06:17,789 --> 00:06:20,717 the tail of the aircraft? Stand by guys. 111 00:06:20,741 --> 00:06:23,117 Do you see a fire in the tail? The 112 00:06:23,181 --> 00:06:25,197 controller checks with the fireteam on the 113 00:06:25,221 --> 00:06:27,745 ground. We don't see flames. 114 00:06:28,365 --> 00:06:31,157 No, no fire they say no, nothing they can 115 00:06:31,181 --> 00:06:31,677 see. 116 00:06:31,821 --> 00:06:35,829 163Saudia163 now 117 00:06:35,877 --> 00:06:39,589 turns onto a taxiway and 118 00:06:39,637 --> 00:06:43,369 comes to a stop. Once the aircraft 119 00:06:43,417 --> 00:06:46,737 comes to a full stop it theoretically 120 00:06:46,841 --> 00:06:49,489 should be able to be evacuated in under 90 121 00:06:49,537 --> 00:06:52,881 seconds. Saudia 1:63 do you want to 122 00:06:52,913 --> 00:06:54,633 continue to the ramp or do you want to 123 00:06:54,649 --> 00:06:58,845 shut down? Stand by. 124 00:07:00,225 --> 00:07:01,945 Okay, we are shutting down the engines now 125 00:07:01,985 --> 00:07:03,945 and evacuating. Okay. 126 00:07:03,985 --> 00:07:06,257 Saudia163 understand you are holding and 127 00:07:06,281 --> 00:07:07,903 shutting down? Affirmative. And 128 00:07:07,919 --> 00:07:08,875 evacuating. 129 00:07:11,215 --> 00:07:13,959 When you have a fire in the cabin the 130 00:07:14,087 --> 00:07:16,135 available oxygen is being eaten up very 131 00:07:16,175 --> 00:07:19,035 quickly. Passengers cannot breathe. 132 00:07:20,495 --> 00:07:23,155 They are being overcome by smoke and fumes 133 00:07:25,455 --> 00:07:27,791 and you have to get the doors open and get 134 00:07:27,823 --> 00:07:31,439 people out. The planes'doors 135 00:07:31,527 --> 00:07:34,905 remain closed. The fire is spreading. 136 00:07:36,125 --> 00:07:38,917 There's Fire in the tail. Time to turn the 137 00:07:38,941 --> 00:07:42,373 engines on. Firefighters are unable to 138 00:07:42,429 --> 00:07:44,861 approach the plane with an aircraft of 139 00:07:44,893 --> 00:07:48,077 this size, even with those engines at idle 140 00:07:48,141 --> 00:07:51,061 speed, they can actually still suck 141 00:07:51,173 --> 00:07:54,133 individuals into the engines. Captain said 142 00:07:54,149 --> 00:07:55,301 he's switching off the engines and 143 00:07:55,333 --> 00:07:57,565 evacuating now. Put the fire out, please. 144 00:07:57,725 --> 00:07:59,893 We can't because the engines are still 145 00:07:59,949 --> 00:08:03,013 running. The engines are still running. I 146 00:08:03,029 --> 00:08:04,025 can hear them. 147 00:08:07,005 --> 00:08:10,501 So as these toxic substances continue to 148 00:08:10,533 --> 00:08:13,025 build such as carbon monoxide, 149 00:08:13,965 --> 00:08:16,645 eventually you lose consciousness and you 150 00:08:16,685 --> 00:08:19,901 and you die. Saudi 163, 151 00:08:19,933 --> 00:08:23,157 do you read? Saudi 163, 152 00:08:23,181 --> 00:08:26,797 do you read? Saudia 163, 153 00:08:26,821 --> 00:08:28,339 if you reach, shut down the engines. 154 00:08:28,477 --> 00:08:29,635 Goshall. 155 00:08:31,535 --> 00:08:34,303 There's no response from the cockpit and 156 00:08:34,359 --> 00:08:37,111 no signs of an evacuation. So none of it 157 00:08:37,143 --> 00:08:40,719 made any sense. Three minutes 158 00:08:40,767 --> 00:08:43,127 and 15 seconds after stopping on the 159 00:08:43,151 --> 00:08:46,475 taxiway, flames consume the aircraft. 160 00:08:51,855 --> 00:08:53,995 Not a single person escapes. 161 00:08:56,955 --> 00:08:58,535 My heart breaks for them. 162 00:09:01,155 --> 00:09:03,203 The next morning, the scale of the 163 00:09:03,219 --> 00:09:07,187 devastation is clear. The fire 164 00:09:07,251 --> 00:09:10,003 has obliterated the upper fuselage from 165 00:09:10,059 --> 00:09:11,655 tail fin to cockpit. 166 00:09:14,275 --> 00:09:17,535 All 301 people on board are dead. 167 00:09:18,195 --> 00:09:20,763 It's the second deadliest single aircraft 168 00:09:20,819 --> 00:09:24,253 disaster to date. It was a very 169 00:09:24,309 --> 00:09:26,861 tragic situation. It was just 170 00:09:26,933 --> 00:09:30,685 inconceivable to everyone. It's now 171 00:09:30,725 --> 00:09:33,109 up to investigators to sift through the 172 00:09:33,157 --> 00:09:35,501 smoldering wreckage to find out what 173 00:09:35,533 --> 00:09:38,197 happened. Flight 163 had two main 174 00:09:38,261 --> 00:09:41,237 questions to present to the investigators. 175 00:09:41,421 --> 00:09:44,885 One was why the aircraft came to a stop 176 00:09:44,925 --> 00:09:48,057 and didn't evacuate the passengers. And 177 00:09:48,081 --> 00:09:51,041 the other was why was there a fire on this 178 00:09:51,073 --> 00:09:53,045 aircraft in the first place? 179 00:09:55,625 --> 00:09:57,913 The National Transportation Safety Board, 180 00:09:57,969 --> 00:10:01,073 or NTSB and the aircraft manufacturer 181 00:10:01,129 --> 00:10:04,001 Lockheed send investigators to Riyadh to 182 00:10:04,033 --> 00:10:06,177 help the Saudis determine the cause of the 183 00:10:06,201 --> 00:10:09,285 catastrophic fire on Flight 163. 184 00:10:11,345 --> 00:10:13,717 The Saudis were in charge, but according 185 00:10:13,741 --> 00:10:15,517 to international rules. But they didn't 186 00:10:15,541 --> 00:10:17,925 have a lot of major aircraft accident and 187 00:10:18,005 --> 00:10:21,861 experience. So the US NTSB supported them 188 00:10:21,893 --> 00:10:23,625 and helped them with the investigation. 189 00:10:26,405 --> 00:10:29,025 Just some soot. Black box should be fine. 190 00:10:30,925 --> 00:10:33,733 Crew were found in their seats. But look 191 00:10:33,749 --> 00:10:34,869 at where the passengers and some of the 192 00:10:34,877 --> 00:10:36,065 flight attendants were found. 193 00:10:37,245 --> 00:10:39,429 Investigators discover that passengers had 194 00:10:39,477 --> 00:10:42,105 moved forward and gathered near the doors 195 00:10:43,645 --> 00:10:46,501 after the airplane came to a stop. There 196 00:10:46,533 --> 00:10:48,505 must have been mass confusion. 197 00:10:50,165 --> 00:10:52,701 Did they try to open the doors? It doesn't 198 00:10:52,733 --> 00:10:54,189 look like it. None of the emergency 199 00:10:54,237 --> 00:10:55,305 handles were pulled. 200 00:10:58,445 --> 00:11:00,853 The fact that no one attempted to open the 201 00:11:00,869 --> 00:11:02,905 doors from the inside of the aircraft 202 00:11:03,405 --> 00:11:05,629 leads me to believe that they were already 203 00:11:05,677 --> 00:11:08,993 incapacitated and could not 204 00:11:09,129 --> 00:11:12,481 open their doors. They examined the 205 00:11:12,513 --> 00:11:14,937 devastated cabin to figure out how the 206 00:11:14,961 --> 00:11:17,993 fire started. Looks like someone tried to 207 00:11:18,009 --> 00:11:18,965 put out the fire. 208 00:11:22,865 --> 00:11:26,081 The Roof was totally gone, the sides were 209 00:11:26,113 --> 00:11:29,125 gone. Everything was burned away. 210 00:11:30,705 --> 00:11:34,107 The seat frames with the fabrics were all 211 00:11:34,131 --> 00:11:35,055 burned away. 212 00:11:37,995 --> 00:11:40,375 Total destruction in the cabin area. 213 00:11:43,515 --> 00:11:44,723 There's something at the back you're 214 00:11:44,739 --> 00:11:45,775 goingna want to see. 215 00:11:51,435 --> 00:11:52,175 Well, 216 00:11:55,715 --> 00:11:59,003 what do we have here? When we got to the 217 00:11:59,179 --> 00:12:02,105 back part of the airplane on the left side 218 00:12:02,485 --> 00:12:05,585 in the aisle was a hole in the floor. 219 00:12:06,125 --> 00:12:07,717 Looks like the fire came up through the 220 00:12:07,741 --> 00:12:11,365 floor. The hole is the 221 00:12:11,445 --> 00:12:13,965 investigator's first clue about the origin 222 00:12:14,005 --> 00:12:14,905 of the fire. 223 00:12:24,085 --> 00:12:26,585 Yeah, we need to get down there. 224 00:12:27,385 --> 00:12:29,161 Appeared to me that's where the fire 225 00:12:29,273 --> 00:12:32,577 started, under that hole. Because the 226 00:12:32,601 --> 00:12:35,125 fire burns up, not down. 227 00:12:35,505 --> 00:12:38,345 So that made us want to know what was 228 00:12:38,385 --> 00:12:39,565 beneath that hole. 229 00:12:43,785 --> 00:12:47,385 Be careful there. Investigators examined 230 00:12:47,425 --> 00:12:49,729 the cargo compartment below the rear 231 00:12:49,777 --> 00:12:52,869 cabin. Looks like the fire 232 00:12:52,917 --> 00:12:54,141 burned a hole through the compartment 233 00:12:54,173 --> 00:12:55,385 ceiling right here. 234 00:12:59,565 --> 00:13:02,821 Fuel lines are scorched. The throttle and 235 00:13:02,853 --> 00:13:04,825 flight control cables are damaged too. 236 00:13:06,125 --> 00:13:08,741 On a Tristar, the control cables, 237 00:13:08,853 --> 00:13:11,677 throttle cables and fuel lines run through 238 00:13:11,701 --> 00:13:14,093 an 8 inch space above the rear cargo 239 00:13:14,149 --> 00:13:17,717 compartment. Did a 240 00:13:17,741 --> 00:13:20,045 burst fuel line caused the fire? 241 00:13:24,385 --> 00:13:26,929 When investigating any fire, you're 242 00:13:26,977 --> 00:13:30,049 looking for the causes that may be very 243 00:13:30,097 --> 00:13:32,577 obvious. Engineering things, mechanical 244 00:13:32,641 --> 00:13:35,017 things that you look at to try and see if 245 00:13:35,041 --> 00:13:38,049 you can eliminate those sources of fire 246 00:13:38,097 --> 00:13:39,005 and ignition. 247 00:13:41,865 --> 00:13:44,153 Investigators also discover a burned out 248 00:13:44,209 --> 00:13:46,935 hole on the left side of the compartment. 249 00:13:48,515 --> 00:13:50,707 It's like a burst hydraulic pipe, some 250 00:13:50,731 --> 00:13:53,815 melted wires, maybe an electrical short. 251 00:13:54,755 --> 00:13:57,095 Don, A hydraulic leak caused the fire. 252 00:13:58,195 --> 00:13:59,979 When we looked inside that cargo 253 00:14:00,027 --> 00:14:02,371 compartment, there were all kinds of 254 00:14:02,403 --> 00:14:04,443 possibilities of what could have caused 255 00:14:04,499 --> 00:14:05,255 the fire. 256 00:14:07,755 --> 00:14:09,707 They removed the charred mechanical 257 00:14:09,771 --> 00:14:11,695 components for further testing. 258 00:14:16,335 --> 00:14:18,655 As part of the investigation, there were 259 00:14:18,695 --> 00:14:21,127 several things we wanted to eliminate at 260 00:14:21,151 --> 00:14:23,967 the start, including was it electrical 261 00:14:24,031 --> 00:14:26,999 failure, was it a hydraulic systems 262 00:14:27,047 --> 00:14:30,675 failure or some other mechanical failure? 263 00:14:31,775 --> 00:14:34,063 If there is a fault in one of the systems 264 00:14:34,119 --> 00:14:36,935 on this plane, then the Tristar fleet, 265 00:14:37,015 --> 00:14:39,863 nearly 200 planes flying worldwide, 266 00:14:39,999 --> 00:14:41,715 could be at risk as well. 267 00:14:44,095 --> 00:14:45,355 We've got the results. 268 00:14:47,455 --> 00:14:49,823 Lab tests have been performed on the fuel, 269 00:14:49,919 --> 00:14:52,015 electrical and hydraulic systems from 270 00:14:52,055 --> 00:14:53,995 Saudia Flight 163. 271 00:14:56,935 --> 00:14:58,823 No detectable evidence that the fuel 272 00:14:58,879 --> 00:14:59,755 system leaked. 273 00:15:04,115 --> 00:15:06,019 What about the electrical system? No, 274 00:15:06,067 --> 00:15:09,475 there were no shorts and the hydraulic 275 00:15:09,515 --> 00:15:10,735 systems were also fine. 276 00:15:13,115 --> 00:15:16,211 The tests we conducted indicated that all 277 00:15:16,243 --> 00:15:18,547 the failures that occurred with the 278 00:15:18,611 --> 00:15:21,891 systems were caused by the fire. They did 279 00:15:21,923 --> 00:15:23,255 not cause the fire, 280 00:15:25,915 --> 00:15:29,395 so the fire must have started inside 281 00:15:29,435 --> 00:15:30,255 the cargo. 282 00:15:33,835 --> 00:15:35,735 We need to rule out a bomb. 283 00:15:37,755 --> 00:15:41,155 A bomb expert from the UK was brought in 284 00:15:41,315 --> 00:15:44,971 and his expertise is determine if 285 00:15:45,003 --> 00:15:47,531 there was explosives or incendiary 286 00:15:47,603 --> 00:15:50,835 devices. Nine months 287 00:15:50,915 --> 00:15:53,275 earlier, the Great Mosque in Mecca was 288 00:15:53,315 --> 00:15:55,659 seized by insurgents who called for the 289 00:15:55,707 --> 00:15:57,935 overthrow of Saudi Arabia's rulers. 290 00:15:58,675 --> 00:16:01,627 Hundreds of worshippers were killed. Did 291 00:16:01,691 --> 00:16:04,115 extremists plant a bomb in the luggage 292 00:16:04,155 --> 00:16:06,147 compartment of this flight headed to 293 00:16:06,171 --> 00:16:09,467 Mecca? No evidence of a 294 00:16:09,491 --> 00:16:11,683 timing device. No structural damage 295 00:16:11,739 --> 00:16:14,203 suggesting an explosion. No small 296 00:16:14,259 --> 00:16:15,615 fragments in the structure. 297 00:16:17,835 --> 00:16:18,895 So no bomb. 298 00:16:22,715 --> 00:16:25,925 The bomb experts an exhaustive search and 299 00:16:25,965 --> 00:16:27,989 examination of the wreckage, including 300 00:16:28,157 --> 00:16:30,269 wasn't electrical. His investigation 301 00:16:30,357 --> 00:16:34,277 revealed no explosives, no incendiary 302 00:16:34,341 --> 00:16:35,025 devices. 303 00:16:42,845 --> 00:16:44,637 Let's check previous cargo fires for 304 00:16:44,661 --> 00:16:46,905 patterns. Good idea. 305 00:16:48,485 --> 00:16:51,173 Are there any clues from cases similar to 306 00:16:51,189 --> 00:16:53,465 that of Saudia Flight 163? 307 00:16:55,115 --> 00:16:58,195 We looked at previous in flight fires and 308 00:16:58,355 --> 00:17:01,083 fires on airplanes and cargo compartments 309 00:17:01,179 --> 00:17:03,603 to see what caused those, to see if it 310 00:17:03,619 --> 00:17:06,215 would point us in a direction. 311 00:17:08,235 --> 00:17:11,175 Matches. Matches. Take a look. 312 00:17:12,195 --> 00:17:14,091 Last year, British officials identified 313 00:17:14,163 --> 00:17:15,971 three different incidents in which matches 314 00:17:16,043 --> 00:17:18,187 had started a fire in luggage being loaded 315 00:17:18,211 --> 00:17:21,567 onto a plane. Hard to believe 316 00:17:21,591 --> 00:17:25,407 it's even possible. We had one incident 317 00:17:25,471 --> 00:17:29,095 where the luggage was thrown into the 318 00:17:29,255 --> 00:17:32,351 cargo pit. It started smoking and then 319 00:17:32,383 --> 00:17:36,135 caught fire. And the matches in those days 320 00:17:36,295 --> 00:17:39,031 were not safety matches. Today it will not 321 00:17:39,063 --> 00:17:42,475 ignite unless it's on a special fabric. 322 00:17:43,775 --> 00:17:47,625 You ready? Investigators test how easily 323 00:17:47,705 --> 00:17:49,205 matches could ignite. 324 00:18:06,025 --> 00:18:08,953 Hit it with something hard and poof, it 325 00:18:08,969 --> 00:18:11,405 would catch fire. That was the non safety 326 00:18:11,445 --> 00:18:13,629 matches. It surprised us that the matches 327 00:18:13,677 --> 00:18:16,077 could catch fire so easily. So it was a 328 00:18:16,101 --> 00:18:17,825 serious hazard. 329 00:18:19,325 --> 00:18:21,757 The theory that matches were the source of 330 00:18:21,781 --> 00:18:25,101 the fire seemed possible. Passengers on 331 00:18:25,133 --> 00:18:27,421 this particular flight were likely to pack 332 00:18:27,453 --> 00:18:30,589 them in their luggage. Many of 333 00:18:30,597 --> 00:18:32,645 the passengers on the airplane were 334 00:18:32,685 --> 00:18:35,293 pilgrims heading to Mecca and they would 335 00:18:35,309 --> 00:18:38,213 have had stoves with them to cook when 336 00:18:38,229 --> 00:18:40,165 they were camping out. They would have had 337 00:18:40,245 --> 00:18:42,505 matches to start the stoves. 338 00:18:46,765 --> 00:18:48,861 Matches seemed like the most likely cause. 339 00:18:49,053 --> 00:18:52,765 Mm hmm. We didn't find any 340 00:18:52,805 --> 00:18:55,525 evidence of matches causing the fire, but 341 00:18:55,565 --> 00:18:57,269 obviously that evidence would have been 342 00:18:57,317 --> 00:19:01,277 destroyed. But it was a pretty good hunch 343 00:19:01,301 --> 00:19:04,945 on our part. But if some 344 00:19:04,985 --> 00:19:07,713 luggage actually caught fire, would it be 345 00:19:07,769 --> 00:19:09,801 enough to bring down a sophisticated 346 00:19:09,873 --> 00:19:13,241 jetliner? Fire in a cargo compartment 347 00:19:13,313 --> 00:19:16,593 isn't supposed to be able to spread. The 348 00:19:16,609 --> 00:19:17,881 compartment should have sealed off and 349 00:19:17,913 --> 00:19:19,525 starved the fire of any oxygen. 350 00:19:25,185 --> 00:19:27,361 Maybe the compartment'fire suppression 351 00:19:27,433 --> 00:19:28,405 system failed. 352 00:19:33,925 --> 00:19:36,517 Unlike the airtight cargo holds at the 353 00:19:36,541 --> 00:19:38,381 front of the airplane, which were designed 354 00:19:38,413 --> 00:19:41,853 to hold cargo containers, the aft hold was 355 00:19:41,909 --> 00:19:44,189 designed for passengers, baggage, and any 356 00:19:44,237 --> 00:19:45,945 pets they were traveling with. 357 00:19:47,965 --> 00:19:50,253 The aft cargo compartment was different 358 00:19:50,309 --> 00:19:52,293 than all of the other cargo compartments 359 00:19:52,389 --> 00:19:55,619 on this aircraft because it was designed 360 00:19:55,747 --> 00:19:59,147 to be able to hold live animals. So it was 361 00:19:59,211 --> 00:20:01,859 pressurized and it had a source of fresh 362 00:20:01,907 --> 00:20:02,495 air. 363 00:20:05,155 --> 00:20:08,291 An inlet fan and three valves allow for 364 00:20:08,323 --> 00:20:11,811 airflow. But if smoke sets off one or 365 00:20:11,843 --> 00:20:14,547 both detectors, the fan stops and the 366 00:20:14,571 --> 00:20:17,275 valves close, sealing the compartment and 367 00:20:17,315 --> 00:20:19,375 cutting off the supply of oxygen. 368 00:20:21,935 --> 00:20:25,087 In the case of Flight 163, 369 00:20:25,271 --> 00:20:27,671 obviously something in that self 370 00:20:27,743 --> 00:20:30,715 extinguishing system did not take place 371 00:20:31,015 --> 00:20:32,995 and the fire continued. 372 00:20:34,975 --> 00:20:36,835 Okay, see if they work. 373 00:20:38,535 --> 00:20:40,559 Investigators test both of the cargo 374 00:20:40,607 --> 00:20:43,127 compartment smoke detectors to determine 375 00:20:43,151 --> 00:20:44,795 if they'functioning properly. 376 00:20:52,715 --> 00:20:54,787 Okay, that one's working. What about the 377 00:20:54,811 --> 00:20:55,495 other one? 378 00:21:01,275 --> 00:21:04,267 Smoke detectors were working. There must 379 00:21:04,291 --> 00:21:06,147 be another reason why oxygen continued to 380 00:21:06,171 --> 00:21:09,683 fuel the fire. Maybe there was something 381 00:21:09,699 --> 00:21:12,991 wrong with the compartment itself. Good 382 00:21:13,023 --> 00:21:15,595 point. Let's find out. 383 00:21:16,815 --> 00:21:19,111 Smoke detectors were working correctly, 384 00:21:19,303 --> 00:21:21,911 but the fire spread even though it was 385 00:21:21,943 --> 00:21:24,275 supposed to have been self extinguished. 386 00:21:24,615 --> 00:21:26,635 And we needed to find out why. 387 00:21:27,575 --> 00:21:29,035 Let me check the specs. 388 00:21:30,935 --> 00:21:33,183 Investigators examine the specification of 389 00:21:33,199 --> 00:21:35,759 the rear cargo compartment onard Saudia 390 00:21:35,807 --> 00:21:39,321 Flight 163 to better understand how it's 391 00:21:39,393 --> 00:21:42,073 designed to contain a fire. According to 392 00:21:42,129 --> 00:21:44,585 this, it is considered a class D cargo 393 00:21:44,625 --> 00:21:45,485 compartment. 394 00:21:48,305 --> 00:21:51,393 Designation states that a class domartment 395 00:21:51,449 --> 00:21:54,365 is 500 cubic feet. 396 00:21:55,105 --> 00:21:57,325 The size of the L1011 compartment. 397 00:21:59,025 --> 00:22:03,405 The L1011's cargo compartment is 700 398 00:22:03,445 --> 00:22:07,021 cubic feet. The cargo compartment 399 00:22:07,053 --> 00:22:10,733 on the L1011 is 200 cubic feet bigger than 400 00:22:10,749 --> 00:22:14,333 its original design. We determined 401 00:22:14,429 --> 00:22:17,525 that the original certification of a class 402 00:22:17,565 --> 00:22:21,261 D cargo compartment was based on smaller 403 00:22:21,293 --> 00:22:24,653 airplanes. Over the three decades since 404 00:22:24,709 --> 00:22:27,873 1950, the aircraft design changed. 405 00:22:28,069 --> 00:22:31,017 It grew in size, including the class D 406 00:22:31,081 --> 00:22:34,617 cargo compartments. If the compartment 407 00:22:34,641 --> 00:22:36,097 was larger, that means there's more 408 00:22:36,121 --> 00:22:39,321 oxygen. Maybe that 409 00:22:39,353 --> 00:22:40,721 fueled the fire instead of extinguishing 410 00:22:40,753 --> 00:22:43,817 it. It appears that the bigger 411 00:22:43,841 --> 00:22:45,833 the aircraft got, the bigger compartments 412 00:22:45,889 --> 00:22:49,049 got. There was no modification of the self 413 00:22:49,097 --> 00:22:51,405 extinguishment of the compartments. 414 00:22:53,345 --> 00:22:56,049 Investigators recreate a cargo compartment 415 00:22:56,097 --> 00:22:58,619 that matches the specifications of Saudia 416 00:22:58,667 --> 00:23:02,299 163's aft cargo bay. To test its ability 417 00:23:02,347 --> 00:23:03,735 to self extinguish. 418 00:23:04,795 --> 00:23:07,419 Matches and an igniter are placed inside 419 00:23:07,467 --> 00:23:09,787 the compartment to start the fire from a 420 00:23:09,811 --> 00:23:10,815 safe distance. 421 00:23:14,555 --> 00:23:17,255 Okay, let's see what happens. 422 00:23:32,055 --> 00:23:33,955 Let's see if the fire extinguishes. 423 00:23:36,495 --> 00:23:38,235 It's progressing quickly. 424 00:23:39,935 --> 00:23:42,759 As investigators expected, the fire does 425 00:23:42,807 --> 00:23:47,031 not burn out. A small fire that 426 00:23:47,063 --> 00:23:50,533 in a normal class domartment would 427 00:23:50,669 --> 00:23:53,621 extinguish and burn all its oxygen up. 428 00:23:53,813 --> 00:23:55,797 In a large compartment, it wouldn't do 429 00:23:55,821 --> 00:23:58,837 that. It had too much oxygen. It's burning 430 00:23:58,861 --> 00:24:00,465 through the fire resistant liner. 431 00:24:03,325 --> 00:24:05,821 The L10011 construction of the cargo 432 00:24:05,853 --> 00:24:08,893 compartment included the use of a Nomex 433 00:24:09,029 --> 00:24:11,917 liner that's used for fire suits. And it 434 00:24:11,941 --> 00:24:14,301 was thought that that would protect the 435 00:24:14,333 --> 00:24:17,593 compartment and allow for this self 436 00:24:17,649 --> 00:24:18,685 extinguishment. 437 00:24:28,825 --> 00:24:30,513 Instead of burning out, it burned through 438 00:24:30,529 --> 00:24:34,577 the liner in 2 minutes and 59 439 00:24:34,641 --> 00:24:35,325 seconds. 440 00:24:38,065 --> 00:24:39,481 That explains why the fire wasn't 441 00:24:39,513 --> 00:24:43,053 contained well. We were quite surprised 442 00:24:43,149 --> 00:24:46,065 by the findings of our test of the Nomex. 443 00:24:46,485 --> 00:24:49,453 It failed miserably and permit the fire to 444 00:24:49,509 --> 00:24:52,505 spread much quicker than we had suspected. 445 00:24:53,405 --> 00:24:55,981 The extra oxygen in the larger compartment 446 00:24:56,053 --> 00:24:58,869 fuels the fire intensely and long enough 447 00:24:58,917 --> 00:25:01,773 to penetrate the Nomex liner, progressing 448 00:25:01,829 --> 00:25:04,837 into the side wal ceiling and damaging the 449 00:25:04,861 --> 00:25:08,273 plane's components. At the same time, 450 00:25:08,369 --> 00:25:10,785 smoke escapes the cargo compartment and 451 00:25:10,825 --> 00:25:12,497 seeps through the air vents into the 452 00:25:12,521 --> 00:25:15,953 cabin. Eventually, flames penetrate the 453 00:25:15,969 --> 00:25:17,005 cabin floor. 454 00:25:21,905 --> 00:25:24,313 Why the pilots didn't stop and shut the 455 00:25:24,329 --> 00:25:26,217 engines down sooner, which would have 456 00:25:26,241 --> 00:25:27,913 prevented the fire from spreading 457 00:25:27,969 --> 00:25:30,473 throughout the plane, now remain Saudi 458 00:25:30,529 --> 00:25:33,761 163's biggest mystery. Why there was not 459 00:25:33,793 --> 00:25:36,713 an immediate stop and an attempt to 460 00:25:36,769 --> 00:25:39,721 evacuate the passengers. All these things 461 00:25:39,833 --> 00:25:40,965 make no sense. 462 00:25:43,265 --> 00:25:44,609 What was your first indication that there 463 00:25:44,617 --> 00:25:45,445 was a problem? 464 00:25:47,665 --> 00:25:49,521 Investigators turned to the air traffic 465 00:25:49,593 --> 00:25:52,521 controller for further details. Twelve 466 00:25:52,553 --> 00:25:54,265 minutes into the flight, the crew reported 467 00:25:54,305 --> 00:25:55,841 a fire in the cabin and asked to turn 468 00:25:55,873 --> 00:25:59,725 back. Riyadh Saud 163, 469 00:26:01,605 --> 00:26:04,693 go ahead. 163. We're turning back to 470 00:26:04,709 --> 00:26:07,813 Riyadh. Clear to reverse course back to 471 00:26:07,829 --> 00:26:12,037 Riyadh. Request reason Saudi 472 00:26:12,101 --> 00:26:14,173 163. We've got fire in the cabin and 473 00:26:14,189 --> 00:26:17,585 please alert the fire trucks then. 474 00:26:18,005 --> 00:26:19,853 The approach back was normal. So was the 475 00:26:19,869 --> 00:26:23,221 landing. How did they sound? The 476 00:26:23,253 --> 00:26:26,313 communications seemed normal even after 477 00:26:26,329 --> 00:26:29,849 they stopped on the taxiway. Saudia 1 63, 478 00:26:29,897 --> 00:26:31,809 do you want to continue to the ramp or do 479 00:26:31,817 --> 00:26:32,925 you want to shut down? 480 00:26:35,425 --> 00:26:37,849 Stand by. Okay, we are shutting down the 481 00:26:37,857 --> 00:26:41,273 engines now and evacuating. And you 482 00:26:41,289 --> 00:26:43,473 couldn't see the fire? Not until after 483 00:26:43,489 --> 00:26:45,673 they had stopped. The plane just sat there 484 00:26:45,689 --> 00:26:47,041 with the engines running for another three 485 00:26:47,073 --> 00:26:50,085 minutes. When they finally shut them down, 486 00:26:51,365 --> 00:26:52,705 I guess it was too late. 487 00:26:54,845 --> 00:26:57,581 It's still not clear why the engines were 488 00:26:57,613 --> 00:27:01,341 not shut down sooner or why 489 00:27:01,373 --> 00:27:03,285 the plane wasn't stopped on the Runway 490 00:27:03,365 --> 00:27:06,389 right after touchdown. The Kevtain's 491 00:27:06,437 --> 00:27:08,229 decision not to stop the aircraft 492 00:27:08,277 --> 00:27:10,925 immediately after landing and evacuate was 493 00:27:11,045 --> 00:27:13,941 reckless and irresponsible. In my mind. 494 00:27:14,133 --> 00:27:16,261 It is imperative that you get the 495 00:27:16,293 --> 00:27:19,155 passengers out as quickly as possible. 496 00:27:20,335 --> 00:27:22,791 While investigators will never know why 497 00:27:22,823 --> 00:27:25,151 the engines weren't shut down in time, 498 00:27:25,343 --> 00:27:27,239 could something have prevented the pilots 499 00:27:27,287 --> 00:27:29,167 from stopping the plane earlier on the 500 00:27:29,191 --> 00:27:32,815 Runway? Nothing unusual. 501 00:27:32,855 --> 00:27:36,463 Here they scrutinize the recorded flight 502 00:27:36,519 --> 00:27:39,839 data. Looks like a normal flight. Do we 503 00:27:39,847 --> 00:27:41,511 have the data on the braking system? 504 00:27:41,623 --> 00:27:45,323 Maybe the brakes failed. Here it 505 00:27:45,339 --> 00:27:48,771 is. Did the brake hydraulics fail, 506 00:27:48,883 --> 00:27:50,787 preventing the pilots from stopping the 507 00:27:50,811 --> 00:27:53,295 plane? See for yourself. 508 00:27:54,355 --> 00:27:56,435 Our examination of the airplane revealed 509 00:27:56,475 --> 00:27:58,915 that the braking system was working fine 510 00:27:59,075 --> 00:28:00,931 and the pilot could have easily Stopped 511 00:28:00,963 --> 00:28:03,531 the airplane on the Runway. It'as if the 512 00:28:03,563 --> 00:28:06,283 crew was flying a plane that wasn't even 513 00:28:06,299 --> 00:28:07,095 on fire. 514 00:28:09,815 --> 00:28:12,391 Why did they allow the aircraft to roll to 515 00:28:12,423 --> 00:28:15,503 the end of the Runway and then to taxi 516 00:28:15,599 --> 00:28:19,135 onto a taxiway and then take over three 517 00:28:19,175 --> 00:28:22,543 minutes to shut the engines down? All of 518 00:28:22,559 --> 00:28:25,711 these behaviors are not consistent with 519 00:28:25,743 --> 00:28:29,143 how most crews, if not all crews, would 520 00:28:29,199 --> 00:28:31,395 handle an emergency like that. 521 00:28:33,095 --> 00:28:34,607 We need to find out what went on in that 522 00:28:34,631 --> 00:28:37,479 cockp. I'll check on the progress of the 523 00:28:37,487 --> 00:28:38,715 CBR download. 524 00:28:41,495 --> 00:28:43,847 The investigation now hinges on the 525 00:28:43,871 --> 00:28:47,407 cockpit voice recorder or cvr. Can it 526 00:28:47,471 --> 00:28:49,959 explain why the pilots treated the landing 527 00:28:50,007 --> 00:28:52,191 like a normal flight instead of an 528 00:28:52,223 --> 00:28:52,995 emergency? 529 00:29:00,135 --> 00:29:02,977 You review the recordings? Oh yeah. You 530 00:29:03,001 --> 00:29:04,365 need to hear this for yourself. 531 00:29:06,265 --> 00:29:08,385 Investigators listened to how the crew of 532 00:29:08,425 --> 00:29:11,497 Saudia Flight 163 dealt with the onboard 533 00:29:11,561 --> 00:29:13,993 fire. Let's start from when the smoke 534 00:29:14,009 --> 00:29:16,685 alarms go off seven minutes into takeoff. 535 00:29:26,345 --> 00:29:29,617 Vif cargo smoke 536 00:29:29,641 --> 00:29:38,177 detection be afghard off now 537 00:29:38,201 --> 00:29:40,645 would's a that's both of them. 538 00:29:42,465 --> 00:29:46,313 Hold on. The alarms go off long before 539 00:29:46,329 --> 00:29:47,485 they report a fire. 540 00:29:49,865 --> 00:29:52,113 They got two smoke warnings and then there 541 00:29:52,129 --> 00:29:55,905 was a five minute on 30 second delay 542 00:29:56,065 --> 00:29:58,925 before they turned around. By the way, 543 00:30:03,505 --> 00:30:06,313 we have smoking there. The captain sounds 544 00:30:06,369 --> 00:30:09,525 skeptical. I would say so, yeah. 545 00:30:10,665 --> 00:30:11,849 What's the procedure for it in the 546 00:30:11,857 --> 00:30:12,565 checklist? 547 00:30:18,265 --> 00:30:19,669 There isn't anything about it. The 548 00:30:19,677 --> 00:30:21,105 abnormal procedures. Huh? 549 00:30:24,925 --> 00:30:27,905 Nothing about it. Pause the recording. 550 00:30:30,445 --> 00:30:32,093 They waste time going through the smoke 551 00:30:32,109 --> 00:30:33,461 alarm procedures before deciding to turn 552 00:30:33,493 --> 00:30:35,357 around. And on top of that they're looking 553 00:30:35,381 --> 00:30:37,141 in the wrong place. They should be looking 554 00:30:37,173 --> 00:30:40,725 in the emergency section. There was 555 00:30:40,845 --> 00:30:43,797 obvious confusion between checklists. The 556 00:30:43,821 --> 00:30:46,801 emergency checklist need to be immediate 557 00:30:46,913 --> 00:30:50,193 action and the abnormal checklists are 558 00:30:50,289 --> 00:30:53,521 actions that you take to avoid getting 559 00:30:53,633 --> 00:30:56,445 into some sort of an emergency condition. 560 00:30:57,465 --> 00:30:59,165 There's a lack of urgency here. 561 00:31:04,825 --> 00:31:06,409 Shall I go back there and see if I can 562 00:31:06,457 --> 00:31:09,337 smell something? Okay, 563 00:31:09,441 --> 00:31:12,861 sure. Okay. If I 564 00:31:12,893 --> 00:31:16,037 can see or smell anything, I think we 565 00:31:16,061 --> 00:31:18,985 better go back. Okay, sure. 566 00:31:26,725 --> 00:31:28,425 40 seconds later. 567 00:31:31,045 --> 00:31:34,141 Yeah. We gott fire back there. We do. 568 00:31:34,253 --> 00:31:35,225 Yeah, we do. 569 00:31:38,025 --> 00:31:40,577 It's okay. S sel control, we're heading 570 00:31:40,601 --> 00:31:44,305 back. The captain is surprised to learn 571 00:31:44,345 --> 00:31:47,537 there's a fire. Only then does he turn the 572 00:31:47,561 --> 00:31:50,537 plane back to Riyad. It's been five and a 573 00:31:50,561 --> 00:31:53,273 half minutes since the first alarm. I 574 00:31:53,289 --> 00:31:54,485 would declare an emergency. 575 00:31:57,225 --> 00:31:59,577 Yeah. Clear to reverse course back to 576 00:31:59,601 --> 00:32:03,381 Riyadh. Request reason declare 577 00:32:03,413 --> 00:32:04,145 emergency. 578 00:32:07,165 --> 00:32:09,625 Fire. Fire in the cabin. 579 00:32:13,005 --> 00:32:14,533 The engineer has already told him there's 580 00:32:14,549 --> 00:32:16,181 a fire. And his purser has corrorated 581 00:32:16,213 --> 00:32:16,785 that. 582 00:32:23,485 --> 00:32:26,773 Captain doesn't declare an emergency and 583 00:32:26,789 --> 00:32:31,113 it happens again. Queue it up to 2250. 584 00:32:31,320 --> 00:32:33,445 15 minutes. Into the flight. 585 00:32:36,945 --> 00:32:38,365 Did we declare an emergency? 586 00:32:40,785 --> 00:32:44,657 Negative. Okay. The fire trucks 587 00:32:44,681 --> 00:32:47,085 will be waiting for us though. Yes. 588 00:32:49,265 --> 00:32:52,441 The captain is ignoring his crew. In the 589 00:32:52,473 --> 00:32:56,173 1980s, the captain was God on the 590 00:32:56,189 --> 00:32:59,197 airplane. There was never any discussion 591 00:32:59,341 --> 00:33:02,701 about including any other crew members in 592 00:33:02,733 --> 00:33:07,045 his decision making process. And arrogance 593 00:33:07,085 --> 00:33:09,117 and hubris may very well have played a 594 00:33:09,141 --> 00:33:12,293 large role in this. It gets even 595 00:33:12,309 --> 00:33:13,829 more disturbing. And the captain is asked 596 00:33:13,877 --> 00:33:16,185 about evacuating playist elections. 597 00:33:20,385 --> 00:33:21,805 Shall we evacuate? 598 00:33:23,505 --> 00:33:25,673 It's the purser in the cockpit again. Can 599 00:33:25,689 --> 00:33:28,185 we evacuate all the passengers? Flaps 10, 600 00:33:28,225 --> 00:33:31,985 please. The captain ignores the purser's 601 00:33:32,025 --> 00:33:35,617 question. When we're on the ground. 602 00:33:35,761 --> 00:33:38,965 Yes. Flubend. 603 00:33:39,665 --> 00:33:42,913 The captain was asked a total of seven 604 00:33:42,969 --> 00:33:46,405 times if an evacuation 605 00:33:46,785 --> 00:33:49,937 was going to happen. And each time he 606 00:33:49,961 --> 00:33:52,553 ignored the request. There were two other 607 00:33:52,569 --> 00:33:53,657 people in the cockpit. What were they 608 00:33:53,681 --> 00:33:56,085 doing? First officer? Not much. 609 00:33:57,865 --> 00:33:59,325 I would declare an emergency. 610 00:34:00,585 --> 00:34:03,857 Yeah. Clear to reverse course back to 611 00:34:03,881 --> 00:34:07,725 Riyadh. Request reason. Declare emergency. 612 00:34:12,845 --> 00:34:14,549 He never once challenged the captain s 613 00:34:14,557 --> 00:34:18,581 stubbornness. The first officer was 614 00:34:18,693 --> 00:34:22,461 silent and passive. The captain 615 00:34:22,653 --> 00:34:25,437 just left the first officer completely out 616 00:34:25,461 --> 00:34:28,065 of the picture and continued to fly. 617 00:34:30,605 --> 00:34:32,105 What about the flight engineer? 618 00:34:33,845 --> 00:34:36,109 Reviewing the transcripts, investigators 619 00:34:36,157 --> 00:34:38,997 discover a troubling patent. If anything, 620 00:34:39,021 --> 00:34:41,645 he made the situation worse. How so? By 621 00:34:41,685 --> 00:34:43,541 repeatedly downplaying the situation, 622 00:34:43,693 --> 00:34:45,705 Continually saying things like no problem. 623 00:34:47,285 --> 00:34:49,005 Less than a minute after the flight 624 00:34:49,045 --> 00:34:51,597 engineer reports fire in the cabin, the 625 00:34:51,621 --> 00:34:53,745 captain asks him to do another check. 626 00:34:54,205 --> 00:34:58,317 This time heassment it's 627 00:34:58,341 --> 00:34:59,625 just smokeing the aft. 628 00:35:01,165 --> 00:35:03,953 Okay, we're going back to Rio. Okay. 629 00:35:04,089 --> 00:35:04,965 No problem. 630 00:35:07,545 --> 00:35:09,445 Everybody's panning in the back though. 631 00:35:11,185 --> 00:35:12,925 No problem. No problem. 632 00:35:14,305 --> 00:35:18,025 No problem at all. Downplaying the 633 00:35:18,065 --> 00:35:21,281 severity of the situation can 634 00:35:21,313 --> 00:35:24,121 most certainly affect the captain's 635 00:35:24,233 --> 00:35:28,085 perception of what exactly is going on. 636 00:35:28,765 --> 00:35:31,557 What happens on the ground W It's hard to 637 00:35:31,581 --> 00:35:34,145 know. Play from the 500 foot alert. 638 00:35:37,285 --> 00:35:40,905 500 and 500 hydraulic. 639 00:35:41,725 --> 00:35:43,445 You've got low pressure on number two. 640 00:35:43,565 --> 00:35:47,265 Looking good. Tell them to not evacuate. 641 00:35:51,965 --> 00:35:55,161 Place your head behind your head. Head 642 00:35:55,233 --> 00:35:58,513 between your knees. No need for that. 643 00:35:58,569 --> 00:36:01,417 We're okay. No problems. 644 00:36:01,601 --> 00:36:02,525 No problem. 645 00:36:05,545 --> 00:36:07,325 Minimums. Minimums. 646 00:36:10,345 --> 00:36:13,411 100. 100. 100. 647 00:36:13,623 --> 00:36:16,584 50. 50. 40. 648 00:36:16,795 --> 00:36:18,805 30. 30. 649 00:36:27,765 --> 00:36:29,693 The fire is so severe at this point that 650 00:36:29,709 --> 00:36:33,565 it burns through the CVR's electrical just 651 00:36:33,645 --> 00:36:36,285 before touchdown. The fire destroys the 652 00:36:36,325 --> 00:36:38,245 wiring that powers the cockpit voice 653 00:36:38,325 --> 00:36:40,717 recorder. It's a setback for the 654 00:36:40,781 --> 00:36:44,237 investigation. We have no idea of the 655 00:36:44,381 --> 00:36:48,229 chotic nature of what was going on in 656 00:36:48,277 --> 00:36:52,325 the cockpit at that time. He wasted 657 00:36:52,365 --> 00:36:54,229 five minutes deciding to turn around. He 658 00:36:54,237 --> 00:36:55,661 wouldn't declare an emergency even though 659 00:36:55,693 --> 00:36:57,053 he's been told there's a fire in the 660 00:36:57,069 --> 00:37:00,293 cabin. He failed to evacuate everybody on 661 00:37:00,309 --> 00:37:02,341 that plane. And the other pilots did 662 00:37:02,373 --> 00:37:03,825 nothing to change his thinking. 663 00:37:05,365 --> 00:37:06,901 What kind of emergency training did this 664 00:37:06,933 --> 00:37:10,385 crew have? Let's pull their files and see 665 00:37:16,935 --> 00:37:19,415 investigators examine the pilot records of 666 00:37:19,455 --> 00:37:22,743 Saudia 163's crew members to determine if 667 00:37:22,759 --> 00:37:24,687 they were properly trained to deal with a 668 00:37:24,711 --> 00:37:28,111 fire. Hmm. This does not 669 00:37:28,143 --> 00:37:30,887 look good. The first officers was dropped 670 00:37:30,951 --> 00:37:33,367 from pilot training but reinstated two 671 00:37:33,391 --> 00:37:35,167 years later as a result of committee 672 00:37:35,271 --> 00:37:38,297 action. Committee action? I have a 673 00:37:38,321 --> 00:37:41,353 different term for committee action. Its 674 00:37:41,409 --> 00:37:43,857 friends or family. He wanted to be a 675 00:37:43,881 --> 00:37:47,169 pilot. He was going to be a pilot and 676 00:37:47,257 --> 00:37:49,725 someone helped him become a pilot. 677 00:37:51,385 --> 00:37:52,681 It's nothing compared to the flight 678 00:37:52,713 --> 00:37:55,017 engineer. Listen to this. Failed to 679 00:37:55,041 --> 00:37:57,665 qualify as a captain and first officer was 680 00:37:57,705 --> 00:37:59,481 only hired by the airline as a flight 681 00:37:59,513 --> 00:38:00,761 engineer after paying for his own 682 00:38:00,793 --> 00:38:04,113 training. The flight engineer was also 683 00:38:04,209 --> 00:38:07,005 another incompetent person. He flunked 684 00:38:07,125 --> 00:38:09,117 previous training and he paid for it out 685 00:38:09,141 --> 00:38:12,277 of his pocket to become certified as a 686 00:38:12,301 --> 00:38:15,317 flight engineer. The captain's training 687 00:38:15,381 --> 00:38:18,189 history is no better. The records show 688 00:38:18,237 --> 00:38:20,301 that the captain's qualifications were 689 00:38:20,373 --> 00:38:23,385 also questionable. Slow to learn, 690 00:38:23,725 --> 00:38:25,389 Needed more training than normally 691 00:38:25,437 --> 00:38:27,973 required. Difficulty varying from a set 692 00:38:28,029 --> 00:38:32,523 pattern. The captain's training record 693 00:38:32,709 --> 00:38:35,675 indicated that he was indecisive and slow. 694 00:38:35,975 --> 00:38:38,055 And that was all reflected in the events 695 00:38:38,095 --> 00:38:41,615 of this accident. All three of these guys 696 00:38:41,775 --> 00:38:44,115 were extremely weak. 697 00:38:45,495 --> 00:38:46,871 None of them should have been in the 698 00:38:46,903 --> 00:38:50,167 cockpit and certainly not three 699 00:38:50,191 --> 00:38:53,415 of them together. It was literally a crew 700 00:38:53,455 --> 00:38:56,063 pairing of an accident waiting to happen. 701 00:38:56,239 --> 00:38:59,759 If anything unusual was going to occur 702 00:38:59,927 --> 00:39:03,735 these people were going to descend into 703 00:39:03,775 --> 00:39:06,383 some state of confusion. Which is exactly 704 00:39:06,439 --> 00:39:07,355 what happened. 705 00:39:11,495 --> 00:39:13,863 Because the cockpit voice recorder failed 706 00:39:13,959 --> 00:39:16,471 just before the Tristar landed. The 707 00:39:16,543 --> 00:39:18,695 investigation was unable to determine why 708 00:39:18,735 --> 00:39:20,915 the captain didn't order an evacuation. 709 00:39:21,615 --> 00:39:23,967 But they did point to his actions as 710 00:39:24,031 --> 00:39:25,315 contributing factors. 711 00:39:27,375 --> 00:39:29,527 It is possible that the captain was in 712 00:39:29,551 --> 00:39:32,815 denial about the severity of the fire and 713 00:39:32,855 --> 00:39:36,287 the situation in the cabin. But if 714 00:39:36,311 --> 00:39:40,063 he had gone back to see for himself then 715 00:39:40,119 --> 00:39:41,835 perhaps things would have been different. 716 00:39:42,535 --> 00:39:45,399 The other thing to consider is that air 717 00:39:45,447 --> 00:39:47,671 crews realize that if they shut an 718 00:39:47,703 --> 00:39:51,339 airplane down on a Runway that 719 00:39:51,427 --> 00:39:53,935 that effectively closes the airport. 720 00:39:55,315 --> 00:39:57,523 These are things that could put your job 721 00:39:57,619 --> 00:40:00,659 in jeopardy. So who really knows what his 722 00:40:00,747 --> 00:40:04,475 logic was? But what is certainly clear 723 00:40:04,555 --> 00:40:07,819 was this captain was definitely not in 724 00:40:07,867 --> 00:40:09,575 command of this emergency. 725 00:40:11,635 --> 00:40:13,891 Even though investigators are unable to 726 00:40:13,963 --> 00:40:16,051 confirm that matches with a source of the 727 00:40:16,083 --> 00:40:18,965 fire, they do recommend improvements for 728 00:40:19,005 --> 00:40:20,705 all cargo compartments. 729 00:40:22,685 --> 00:40:25,613 To make the cargo compartment safe you had 730 00:40:25,629 --> 00:40:27,357 to put a fire extinguisher in there. 731 00:40:27,461 --> 00:40:30,397 Detectors and extinguishers. And that's 732 00:40:30,421 --> 00:40:33,813 what we recommended. They do. They also 733 00:40:33,869 --> 00:40:36,465 recommend removing the Nomex liner. 734 00:40:37,085 --> 00:40:39,597 The investigation went back to the 735 00:40:39,621 --> 00:40:42,789 manufacturer. They identified a way to 736 00:40:42,877 --> 00:40:45,325 improve the resistance of the compartment, 737 00:40:45,365 --> 00:40:48,627 to replace the Nomex and return the 738 00:40:48,691 --> 00:40:51,795 compartment to a full idea 739 00:40:51,915 --> 00:40:53,775 of self extinguishment. 740 00:40:55,995 --> 00:40:58,555 The Federal aviation Administration, or 741 00:40:58,595 --> 00:41:02,163 FAA, considers the recommendations. But 742 00:41:02,179 --> 00:41:05,739 it's not until 1998, almost two decades 743 00:41:05,827 --> 00:41:07,867 later, that the FAA changes the 744 00:41:07,891 --> 00:41:11,835 regulation. Now all cargo compartments on 745 00:41:11,875 --> 00:41:14,127 commercial airliners must contain both 746 00:41:14,211 --> 00:41:16,599 fire detection and fire suppression 747 00:41:16,687 --> 00:41:20,151 systems. In the aftermath of the tragedy, 748 00:41:20,263 --> 00:41:23,119 Saudia asks Bob McIntosh to revamp its 749 00:41:23,167 --> 00:41:26,199 safety training and procedures. I was 750 00:41:26,247 --> 00:41:29,207 hired to form a corporate safety 751 00:41:29,271 --> 00:41:32,431 department, and it was my pleasure to do 752 00:41:32,463 --> 00:41:35,355 that for my six years there. 753 00:41:37,215 --> 00:41:39,031 There were numerous lessons that we 754 00:41:39,063 --> 00:41:42,547 learned from how cargo compartments are 755 00:41:42,651 --> 00:41:46,267 designed and much better designed. Flame 756 00:41:46,331 --> 00:41:48,899 retardant materials are now used 757 00:41:49,027 --> 00:41:52,067 throughout the cabin, but our aviation 758 00:41:52,171 --> 00:41:54,655 system is safer because of this accident. 759 00:41:58,675 --> 00:42:01,779 All those things are wonderful takeaways 760 00:42:01,907 --> 00:42:04,255 from a very, very tragic situation.