1 00:00:00,695 --> 00:00:03,295 Above the English Channel, a Piper Malibu 2 00:00:03,335 --> 00:00:05,515 suddenly disappears from radar. 3 00:00:07,095 --> 00:00:10,383 Where did you go? November264 Del Bravo, 4 00:00:10,439 --> 00:00:13,647 do you read? Search teams find no trace of 5 00:00:13,671 --> 00:00:16,435 the plane or its high profile passenger. 6 00:00:16,975 --> 00:00:19,855 Tonight Emiliano Sala is missing. 7 00:00:20,015 --> 00:00:22,791 This began as a small general aviation 8 00:00:22,823 --> 00:00:25,231 accident and it very quickly became of 9 00:00:25,263 --> 00:00:28,023 worldwide interest. As recovery crews 10 00:00:28,079 --> 00:00:30,591 search the sea, the pilot's background is 11 00:00:30,663 --> 00:00:32,431 investigated. He didn't have a full 12 00:00:32,463 --> 00:00:34,407 instrument rating and that rang along 13 00:00:34,431 --> 00:00:37,231 bells for me. But when they locate the 14 00:00:37,263 --> 00:00:40,543 plane, theories change. Look at 15 00:00:40,559 --> 00:00:43,095 the bending of the splice joint. The plane 16 00:00:43,175 --> 00:00:45,935 broke up before it hit the water. So now 17 00:00:45,975 --> 00:00:48,263 what we had to establish was why did the 18 00:00:48,279 --> 00:00:50,035 aircraft break up in flight? 19 00:01:13,485 --> 00:01:16,245 A chartered Piper Malibu is moments from 20 00:01:16,285 --> 00:01:19,461 takeoff. Pilot David Ibotson 21 00:01:19,533 --> 00:01:21,725 prepares the plane for departure from Nant 22 00:01:21,765 --> 00:01:25,173 airport in France. November 180064 Del 23 00:01:25,229 --> 00:01:28,757 Bravo ready for take off. Ibtson has 24 00:01:28,781 --> 00:01:32,909 a VIP on board. Argentinian footballer 25 00:01:32,997 --> 00:01:34,625 Emiliano Sala. 26 00:01:36,845 --> 00:01:40,625 Omanitosand down Locito Locoss 27 00:01:42,165 --> 00:01:47,105 Carif Loc see Muos 28 00:01:47,645 --> 00:01:48,865 Knowipo. 29 00:01:51,625 --> 00:01:54,177 The star striker is leaving Nantes for 30 00:01:54,201 --> 00:01:56,417 good. He's moving up to the Premier League 31 00:01:56,481 --> 00:01:59,073 to play for Cardiff City football club for 32 00:01:59,129 --> 00:02:02,553 17 million euros. This was the move up 33 00:02:02,689 --> 00:02:05,505 to one of the world's richest leagues seen 34 00:02:05,585 --> 00:02:07,257 around the globe. It would have propelled 35 00:02:07,321 --> 00:02:09,845 him to absolute superstardom. 36 00:02:13,065 --> 00:02:15,281 It's a two hour flight from Nantes to 37 00:02:15,313 --> 00:02:17,649 Cardiff, Wales crossing over the English 38 00:02:17,697 --> 00:02:21,225 Channel. This is Emilian 39 00:02:21,265 --> 00:02:23,881 O Sala's second flight with Ibbotson. Two 40 00:02:23,913 --> 00:02:26,097 days earlier he flew back from Cardiff 41 00:02:26,161 --> 00:02:28,125 where he signed his new contract. 42 00:02:28,505 --> 00:02:31,497 Emiliano wanted to go back to Nantes to be 43 00:02:31,521 --> 00:02:33,241 able to say proper goodbyes to his 44 00:02:33,273 --> 00:02:35,049 teammates, to his friends. He left in the 45 00:02:35,057 --> 00:02:37,129 middle of the night and hadn't really told 46 00:02:37,177 --> 00:02:38,777 them that he would be signing for Cardiff 47 00:02:38,801 --> 00:02:42,969 City. November 264Delta Bravo requesting 48 00:02:43,017 --> 00:02:45,085 clearance to climb to fly level five five. 49 00:02:45,555 --> 00:02:48,611 November 264Delta Bravo, you are clearly 50 00:02:48,643 --> 00:02:51,563 flight level five five. The Piper Malibu 51 00:02:51,619 --> 00:02:54,219 can carry five passengers. But tonight 52 00:02:54,267 --> 00:02:56,735 Emiliano Sala is traveling alone. 53 00:02:58,355 --> 00:03:01,695 Are you warm enough? Sorry? 54 00:03:02,275 --> 00:03:05,295 Are you warm? Thank go for you. 55 00:03:09,355 --> 00:03:11,211 It's a comfortion of aircraft. It will 56 00:03:11,243 --> 00:03:13,755 cruise at a reasonable speed. It's quite 57 00:03:13,795 --> 00:03:15,251 large, it's quite fast for a light 58 00:03:15,283 --> 00:03:18,347 aircraft. The plane climbs towards a 59 00:03:18,371 --> 00:03:21,055 cruising altitude of 5,500ft. 60 00:03:22,355 --> 00:03:24,171 It would been relatively easy to conduct 61 00:03:24,203 --> 00:03:26,371 this flight back from Nantes to Califf in 62 00:03:26,403 --> 00:03:30,107 clear weather. As they approach the 63 00:03:30,131 --> 00:03:32,415 Channel Islands, the weather changes. 64 00:03:33,995 --> 00:03:36,335 Rain clouds loom on the horizon. 65 00:03:38,375 --> 00:03:40,111 The pilot's visibility would have 66 00:03:40,143 --> 00:03:42,399 deteriorated as he approached the cloud 67 00:03:42,447 --> 00:03:44,315 conditions over the Channel Islands. 68 00:03:45,735 --> 00:03:48,863 November 1800 64delt Bravo with conditions 69 00:03:48,959 --> 00:03:51,375 Worsening. David Ibbotson contacts air 70 00:03:51,415 --> 00:03:54,167 traffic control, requesting clearance to 71 00:03:54,191 --> 00:03:57,479 Descend to maintain VMC. November 20 72 00:03:57,487 --> 00:03:59,607 hundred 64 Delta Bravo, you are cleared to 73 00:03:59,631 --> 00:04:02,835 flight level 5 0. Just buys if you need 74 00:04:02,875 --> 00:04:05,491 further descentT. November 20 hundred 64 75 00:04:05,523 --> 00:04:06,975 Delta Bravo. Thank you, sir. 76 00:04:08,075 --> 00:04:10,723 Ibbertson takes the Piper lower to avoid 77 00:04:10,779 --> 00:04:14,083 the bad weather. The cloud layers would 78 00:04:14,099 --> 00:04:15,667 have obscured what little light was 79 00:04:15,731 --> 00:04:17,571 available from the islands of Jersey and 80 00:04:17,603 --> 00:04:19,803 Guernsey. And the forward visibility would 81 00:04:19,819 --> 00:04:21,843 have been such that the horizon would have 82 00:04:21,859 --> 00:04:24,335 been indistinct and difficult to make out. 83 00:04:26,475 --> 00:04:27,855 Are you good back there? 84 00:04:34,415 --> 00:04:37,591 November 26four Delta Bravo, requesting 85 00:04:37,663 --> 00:04:40,871 further dissent to maintain VMC. But 10 86 00:04:40,903 --> 00:04:43,207 minutes later, Ibtson still hasn't been 87 00:04:43,231 --> 00:04:46,607 able to clear the clouds. Clear to descend 88 00:04:46,631 --> 00:04:49,635 at your discretion. Roger. 89 00:04:53,795 --> 00:04:56,655 The Piper Malibu is one hour from Cardiff, 90 00:04:58,715 --> 00:05:00,883 but as the controller follows the plane's 91 00:05:00,939 --> 00:05:03,935 progress, it disappears from Radar. 92 00:05:06,795 --> 00:05:09,691 November264Delta Bravo, how are you making 93 00:05:09,723 --> 00:05:12,415 out there? Where did you go? 94 00:05:14,955 --> 00:05:18,135 November264delt Bravo, do you read? 95 00:05:25,535 --> 00:05:28,151 Yes, I've got a Hyper Malibu missing from 96 00:05:28,183 --> 00:05:31,415 radar near the Channel Islands north of 97 00:05:31,535 --> 00:05:35,271 Guernsey. Registration number is November 98 00:05:35,423 --> 00:05:38,035 20064, Delta Bravo. 99 00:05:38,535 --> 00:05:41,435 News of the missing Piper spreads quickly. 100 00:05:42,775 --> 00:05:45,351 Word starts to emerge that a Piper Malibu 101 00:05:45,383 --> 00:05:48,725 has gone down in the Channel. And fairly 102 00:05:48,765 --> 00:05:51,173 soon afterwards, sports journalists start 103 00:05:51,229 --> 00:05:53,197 saying, wasn't Emiliano Salad due to 104 00:05:53,221 --> 00:05:55,465 travel to Cardiff? The same night, 105 00:05:56,285 --> 00:05:59,101 an air and sea search gets underway for a 106 00:05:59,133 --> 00:06:00,869 plane that disappeared over the English 107 00:06:00,917 --> 00:06:03,853 Channel. Search and rescue teams launch an 108 00:06:03,909 --> 00:06:06,173 expansive search of the Channel overnight 109 00:06:06,229 --> 00:06:09,061 and into the next morning, but the plane 110 00:06:09,133 --> 00:06:10,305 remains lost. 111 00:06:13,045 --> 00:06:16,435 Good morning. Hello. Meanwhile, 112 00:06:16,555 --> 00:06:19,755 a team from Britain's aib, or Air 113 00:06:19,795 --> 00:06:21,611 Accidents Investigation Branch, is 114 00:06:21,643 --> 00:06:25,259 assigned to the case. Radar data 115 00:06:25,307 --> 00:06:27,895 has come in. Check your inbox. 116 00:06:28,795 --> 00:06:31,523 Great, I'll bring it up. They wonder 117 00:06:31,579 --> 00:06:33,683 exactly where the Piper went down in the 118 00:06:33,699 --> 00:06:37,323 English Channel. We contacted ATC and 119 00:06:37,419 --> 00:06:39,563 we asked for the radar information. And we 120 00:06:39,579 --> 00:06:41,693 used that radar information, were able to 121 00:06:41,709 --> 00:06:44,213 put together to provide a track of the 122 00:06:44,229 --> 00:06:47,965 aircraft. Looks like the last 123 00:06:48,045 --> 00:06:51,385 known radar hit is right here, 124 00:06:52,005 --> 00:06:55,925 so it should be close 125 00:06:55,965 --> 00:06:59,821 to here. Investigators begin to zero 126 00:06:59,853 --> 00:07:02,493 in on a search area north northwest of the 127 00:07:02,509 --> 00:07:06,345 island of Guernsey. These are deep waters, 128 00:07:06,745 --> 00:07:09,685 too deep for divers and strong currents. 129 00:07:10,505 --> 00:07:11,881 I'll get the coordinates to the marine 130 00:07:11,913 --> 00:07:14,713 team. When we first started looking at the 131 00:07:14,729 --> 00:07:18,097 radar information and trying to turn that 132 00:07:18,161 --> 00:07:20,729 into a location in the sea, our marine 133 00:07:20,777 --> 00:07:22,857 advisors looked at tides and that gave us 134 00:07:22,881 --> 00:07:24,625 in a seabed location which we had 135 00:07:24,665 --> 00:07:27,753 reasonably good confidence in. While 136 00:07:27,809 --> 00:07:29,769 search and rescue teams begin more 137 00:07:29,817 --> 00:07:32,433 targeted efforts, the world gets the news 138 00:07:32,529 --> 00:07:36,381 everyone feared. Miliano Sala 139 00:07:36,493 --> 00:07:40,685 was on board. French police 140 00:07:40,805 --> 00:07:43,109 confirmed to news outlets that Emiliano 141 00:07:43,157 --> 00:07:45,825 Sala was on the missing Piper Malibu. 142 00:07:46,805 --> 00:07:48,613 Given the temperature of the water and the 143 00:07:48,629 --> 00:07:50,413 weather conditions, it was very rough last 144 00:07:50,469 --> 00:07:52,965 night. Their chances of survival are very, 145 00:07:53,005 --> 00:07:56,485 very slim. In nunt 146 00:07:56,645 --> 00:07:59,185 more affection for a much loved player. 147 00:08:02,305 --> 00:08:05,081 We ask you to stand with us, to be united 148 00:08:05,193 --> 00:08:07,441 and to respect the family they refuse to 149 00:08:07,473 --> 00:08:09,165 grieve and continue to believe. 150 00:08:11,985 --> 00:08:13,165 Right, that's great. 151 00:08:15,025 --> 00:08:18,929 Everything you can find. Okay, thank you. 152 00:08:19,097 --> 00:08:20,857 I've got a team working on securing any 153 00:08:20,881 --> 00:08:23,089 mobile messages sent by the pilot or 154 00:08:23,137 --> 00:08:26,465 Steller. Good idea. Okay. 155 00:08:27,325 --> 00:08:29,845 As the search continues, investigators 156 00:08:29,885 --> 00:08:32,061 look for any clues as to why the Piper 157 00:08:32,093 --> 00:08:34,797 Malibu went missing. You see, 158 00:08:34,861 --> 00:08:37,813 he deviates a bit to the right as he 159 00:08:37,869 --> 00:08:41,229 approaches Guernsey, but he's pretty much 160 00:08:41,277 --> 00:08:43,813 right back on course not long after. And 161 00:08:43,829 --> 00:08:47,461 the altitude hopeed steady at 5,000ft 162 00:08:47,533 --> 00:08:49,765 during that time. Nothing too unusual. 163 00:08:49,885 --> 00:08:53,177 All right, but zoom in towards the 164 00:08:53,241 --> 00:08:54,805 end of the flight. Right, 165 00:09:01,305 --> 00:09:05,001 Check out those turns. They discover the 166 00:09:05,033 --> 00:09:07,521 plane made a wide turn to the right three 167 00:09:07,553 --> 00:09:10,737 minutes before it disappeared, followed by 168 00:09:10,761 --> 00:09:11,925 a hard left. 169 00:09:14,425 --> 00:09:16,725 Look at that final right turn. 170 00:09:17,655 --> 00:09:21,475 It's almost 180 degrees. 171 00:09:23,055 --> 00:09:25,615 The Piper then made a sharp right turn 172 00:09:25,735 --> 00:09:28,783 seconds before vanishing from radar. So we 173 00:09:28,799 --> 00:09:31,039 could see from the radar track that things 174 00:09:31,127 --> 00:09:33,119 began to go very strangely. There was a 175 00:09:33,127 --> 00:09:35,559 lot of turning both left and right, and it 176 00:09:35,647 --> 00:09:37,423 culminated in a very sharp turn to the 177 00:09:37,439 --> 00:09:40,319 right. What would cause such erratic 178 00:09:40,367 --> 00:09:43,663 deviations, ending in a steep dive? The 179 00:09:43,679 --> 00:09:46,079 behavior that we were seeing, which was an 180 00:09:46,127 --> 00:09:48,079 increasing turn rate and an increasing 181 00:09:48,127 --> 00:09:50,519 rate of descent, looked like the beginning 182 00:09:50,567 --> 00:09:52,835 of a maneuver that we call a spiral dive. 183 00:09:53,655 --> 00:09:57,727 Look at the altitude fluctuations up 184 00:09:57,751 --> 00:10:01,423 and down and then a very rapid descent for 185 00:10:01,439 --> 00:10:03,755 the final few moments of that flight. 186 00:10:04,375 --> 00:10:07,119 This is a plane that is ascending, that is 187 00:10:07,167 --> 00:10:09,371 descending, that is meandering, and 188 00:10:09,503 --> 00:10:12,403 ultimately this plane is going to end up 189 00:10:12,419 --> 00:10:16,355 in the sea. Did the plane suffer a loss of 190 00:10:16,435 --> 00:10:18,403 control before plunging into the English 191 00:10:18,459 --> 00:10:22,067 Channel? But even if 192 00:10:22,091 --> 00:10:24,707 we do find the plane, it's still going to 193 00:10:24,731 --> 00:10:26,495 prove to be quite challenging. 194 00:10:27,995 --> 00:10:31,015 There's no CVR or FDR on the Malibu. 195 00:10:31,755 --> 00:10:33,795 Not having a flight data record or a COPIT 196 00:10:33,875 --> 00:10:35,843 voice recorder makes it incredibly 197 00:10:35,899 --> 00:10:37,443 difficult to establish what happened in 198 00:10:37,459 --> 00:10:39,055 the last few minutes of that flight. 199 00:10:39,535 --> 00:10:42,039 After three days, the search for survivors 200 00:10:42,087 --> 00:10:44,575 is called off. The world mourns the loss 201 00:10:44,615 --> 00:10:47,383 of an up and coming footballer. Messages 202 00:10:47,439 --> 00:10:50,023 of condolence flood in from football clubs 203 00:10:50,079 --> 00:10:52,783 and players who pay tribute to Emiliano 204 00:10:52,839 --> 00:10:56,639 Sala. While families grieve, 205 00:10:56,807 --> 00:10:59,311 recovery teams deploy ships equipped with 206 00:10:59,343 --> 00:11:01,951 side scan sonar hunting for the Piper 207 00:11:01,983 --> 00:11:03,639 Malibu at the bottom of the English 208 00:11:03,687 --> 00:11:06,543 Channel. But finding the wreckage 22 miles 209 00:11:06,599 --> 00:11:09,115 off the coast of Guernsey is slow Going 210 00:11:09,555 --> 00:11:11,963 there were high tidal flows and it was 211 00:11:12,019 --> 00:11:14,051 further complicated by the winter storms 212 00:11:14,083 --> 00:11:16,435 that were coming through. Pressure is on 213 00:11:16,475 --> 00:11:19,055 the AIB to find the wreckage. 214 00:11:19,835 --> 00:11:22,523 This starts as a small story about a plane 215 00:11:22,579 --> 00:11:25,099 going missing. And then suddenly there is 216 00:11:25,147 --> 00:11:27,627 somebody famous on board. And the whole 217 00:11:27,691 --> 00:11:30,267 world wants to find out exactly what's 218 00:11:30,291 --> 00:11:31,215 happened here. 219 00:11:32,875 --> 00:11:36,255 So this sector looks clear. 220 00:11:37,245 --> 00:11:39,385 Okay, let's move on. 221 00:11:40,605 --> 00:11:42,893 Thirteen days into the investigation, 222 00:11:43,029 --> 00:11:45,477 search teams continue to scour the bottom 223 00:11:45,501 --> 00:11:47,653 of the English Channel looking for the 224 00:11:47,669 --> 00:11:50,525 missing Piper Malibu, its pilot and its 225 00:11:50,565 --> 00:11:53,745 sole passenger, footballer Emiliano Sala. 226 00:11:54,725 --> 00:11:56,709 We knew it's going to be very difficult, 227 00:11:56,877 --> 00:11:59,845 and at that stage we didn't expect to 228 00:11:59,885 --> 00:12:00,905 actually find it. 229 00:12:06,065 --> 00:12:08,937 Hey, I've got something. You won't believe 230 00:12:08,961 --> 00:12:11,673 it. What is this? A message. Salah left 231 00:12:11,729 --> 00:12:23,765 before takeo see 232 00:12:26,745 --> 00:12:30,273 and we know aquipo. So in the 233 00:12:30,289 --> 00:12:32,185 few moments before the plane took off, 234 00:12:32,265 --> 00:12:35,201 Emiliano Sala sent a a voice note to his 235 00:12:35,233 --> 00:12:37,485 friends back home in Argentina. 236 00:12:54,285 --> 00:12:56,757 Investigators discover that Emiliano Sala 237 00:12:56,821 --> 00:12:59,265 raised concerns prior to takeoff. 238 00:13:00,165 --> 00:13:03,013 Was there some kind of mechanical problem 239 00:13:03,069 --> 00:13:06,077 with the plane? It's a good point. I'll 240 00:13:06,101 --> 00:13:07,945 check the maintenance s history. 241 00:13:09,285 --> 00:13:10,821 We look to see whether the aircraft was 242 00:13:10,853 --> 00:13:12,181 maintained properly and whether there's 243 00:13:12,213 --> 00:13:13,997 any hint there that there could have been 244 00:13:14,021 --> 00:13:17,445 some form of mechanical failure. Last PAL 245 00:13:17,485 --> 00:13:20,609 check with within November. So two months 246 00:13:20,697 --> 00:13:24,137 before the flight. Well, it's only flown 247 00:13:24,201 --> 00:13:26,617 11 hours since then. As far as general 248 00:13:26,681 --> 00:13:28,481 maintenance is concerned, it plane checks 249 00:13:28,513 --> 00:13:30,977 out. When we looked at those records, we 250 00:13:31,001 --> 00:13:32,793 found they were all in order and it wasn't 251 00:13:32,849 --> 00:13:34,209 suggesting that there should be any sort 252 00:13:34,217 --> 00:13:35,485 of mechanical failure. 253 00:13:37,625 --> 00:13:39,205 Check it out. That looks promising. 254 00:13:40,145 --> 00:13:42,265 Fifteen days into the investigation, 255 00:13:42,385 --> 00:13:44,965 search teams make a critical discovery. 256 00:13:45,845 --> 00:13:49,813 I bet that's our plane. Finding the 257 00:13:49,829 --> 00:13:51,957 aircraft was a big breakthrough for the 258 00:13:52,021 --> 00:13:55,265 investigation. Thanks. No, that's great. 259 00:13:56,045 --> 00:13:59,477 Thanks for the update. Not only did they 260 00:13:59,541 --> 00:14:03,133 locate the plane, but they found one of 261 00:14:03,149 --> 00:14:06,613 the bodies. Emiliano Sala's body 262 00:14:06,709 --> 00:14:09,757 is found inside the plane. His remains are 263 00:14:09,781 --> 00:14:12,811 sent to a pathologist for analysis. The 264 00:14:12,843 --> 00:14:14,615 pilot's body isn't found. 265 00:14:15,755 --> 00:14:18,339 AIB investigators turned their attention 266 00:14:18,387 --> 00:14:20,683 to video footage taken of the debris at 267 00:14:20,699 --> 00:14:25,787 the bottom of the English Channelosit 268 00:14:25,971 --> 00:14:28,375 on the forward section of the fusilot. 269 00:14:29,915 --> 00:14:32,507 Was the plane out of control when it hit 270 00:14:32,531 --> 00:14:35,695 the water? Look at the damage to the roof. 271 00:14:36,595 --> 00:14:38,387 One of the most interesting things about 272 00:14:38,411 --> 00:14:40,805 the wreckage was that all the compression 273 00:14:40,845 --> 00:14:43,693 damage was on the top surfaces, not on the 274 00:14:43,709 --> 00:14:46,693 lower surfaces. So what this showed us was 275 00:14:46,709 --> 00:14:49,029 that the aircraft had hit the sea upside 276 00:14:49,077 --> 00:14:51,705 down, that is in an inverted attitude. 277 00:14:52,005 --> 00:14:55,381 Let's check the tail for damage as well. 278 00:14:55,533 --> 00:14:58,385 I didn't See it in the earlier footage. 279 00:15:06,825 --> 00:15:10,645 It's missing. Hmm. They didn't find it. 280 00:15:11,065 --> 00:15:12,881 The outer section of the left wing has 281 00:15:12,913 --> 00:15:15,405 gone too, actually, for both wings. 282 00:15:16,145 --> 00:15:17,929 We did try and find them. We had. The 283 00:15:17,937 --> 00:15:19,449 Coast Guard was looking for them and we 284 00:15:19,457 --> 00:15:20,905 were hoping that they might be washed up 285 00:15:20,945 --> 00:15:23,673 somewhere, but they never appeared. It's 286 00:15:23,689 --> 00:15:26,725 hard to know when these pieces separated. 287 00:15:27,265 --> 00:15:29,937 Did the tail and outer wings break off 288 00:15:30,041 --> 00:15:33,207 before or on impact? Look at the bending 289 00:15:33,231 --> 00:15:36,751 of the splice joint. Check out the 290 00:15:36,823 --> 00:15:39,303 direction of the bending. A close 291 00:15:39,359 --> 00:15:41,695 examination of the left wing provides a 292 00:15:41,735 --> 00:15:44,135 vital clue. We could see that the left 293 00:15:44,175 --> 00:15:46,735 wing failed as a result of the outer 294 00:15:46,775 --> 00:15:48,875 section being bent downwards. 295 00:15:50,495 --> 00:15:53,175 That can only mean one thing. The plane 296 00:15:53,255 --> 00:15:56,991 broke up before it hit the water. The 297 00:15:57,023 --> 00:16:00,335 finding that the left wing failed bending 298 00:16:00,375 --> 00:16:03,527 downwards was very significant because if 299 00:16:03,551 --> 00:16:06,391 the tail failed in flight, the aircraft 300 00:16:06,423 --> 00:16:09,471 nose would pitch down, causing the wing to 301 00:16:09,503 --> 00:16:12,207 fail bending downwards. Investigators 302 00:16:12,271 --> 00:16:14,631 conclude that the inflight breakup began 303 00:16:14,703 --> 00:16:17,343 when the tail broke off, causing the wings 304 00:16:17,399 --> 00:16:20,191 to bend downwards, ripping off their outer 305 00:16:20,223 --> 00:16:23,167 portion before impact. So now what we had 306 00:16:23,191 --> 00:16:25,601 to establish was why did the aircraft 307 00:16:25,703 --> 00:16:28,677 breakup in flight? Let's try modeling the 308 00:16:28,701 --> 00:16:32,469 radar data. We use 309 00:16:32,517 --> 00:16:36,077 the software simulation where you enter 310 00:16:36,141 --> 00:16:38,541 the radar information that we had, and it 311 00:16:38,573 --> 00:16:41,797 uses aircraft laws of motion to give us 312 00:16:41,861 --> 00:16:43,861 information about the airspeed, the angle 313 00:16:43,893 --> 00:16:46,813 of bank and the chief force on the 314 00:16:46,829 --> 00:16:47,585 aircraft. 315 00:16:49,765 --> 00:16:52,521 Okay, let's take a look. Using the plane's 316 00:16:52,553 --> 00:16:54,965 altitude and coordinates, over time, 317 00:16:55,345 --> 00:16:57,081 investigators are able to plot the 318 00:16:57,113 --> 00:17:00,001 plane'maneuvers okay, so this is the 319 00:17:00,033 --> 00:17:04,805 plane's last turn. Starting at 2016, 320 00:17:05,505 --> 00:17:08,217 they examine the most mystifying maneuver, 321 00:17:08,321 --> 00:17:10,645 the final dive towards the water. 322 00:17:11,305 --> 00:17:13,865 The plane starts at 190 knots and 323 00:17:13,945 --> 00:17:17,603 continues speeding up to almost 280 odds. 324 00:17:17,769 --> 00:17:20,711 That's well beyond the structural limits 325 00:17:20,743 --> 00:17:23,911 of the plane. The team discovers that the 326 00:17:23,943 --> 00:17:26,455 excessive airspeed led to the aircraft's 327 00:17:26,495 --> 00:17:29,831 mid flight breakup. Aircraft have 328 00:17:29,903 --> 00:17:31,975 maximum speeds beyond which you must not 329 00:17:32,015 --> 00:17:33,295 take them because if you take them above 330 00:17:33,335 --> 00:17:35,175 those speeds, then you risk structural 331 00:17:35,215 --> 00:17:37,143 damage to the aircraft. And in this case, 332 00:17:37,279 --> 00:17:39,847 we saw the aircraft go way above those 333 00:17:39,911 --> 00:17:43,275 speeds. Why was the pilot flying so fast? 334 00:17:44,825 --> 00:17:47,529 Why does he make all those turns? My 335 00:17:47,537 --> 00:17:49,313 immediate thoughts on seeing that turn was 336 00:17:49,369 --> 00:17:51,257 it was extreme and there was clearly 337 00:17:51,321 --> 00:17:53,185 something very wrong going on in the 338 00:17:53,685 --> 00:17:56,585 aircraft at the time. Investigators 339 00:17:56,665 --> 00:17:59,685 receive Emiliano Sala's toxicology report. 340 00:18:02,265 --> 00:18:04,521 Could the results shed any light on the 341 00:18:04,553 --> 00:18:07,085 mysterious crash of the Piper Malibu? 342 00:18:09,005 --> 00:18:10,429 When we receive the results of the post 343 00:18:10,477 --> 00:18:13,293 mortem, we rely on the pathologist to 344 00:18:13,309 --> 00:18:15,077 indicate to us if there's anything that's 345 00:18:15,101 --> 00:18:17,941 abnormal. There's nothing unusual in solar 346 00:18:17,973 --> 00:18:21,557 toxicology. All right, then let's bring 347 00:18:21,581 --> 00:18:24,581 up the weather report. Right. The team 348 00:18:24,653 --> 00:18:26,877 turns to the weather data towards the end 349 00:18:26,901 --> 00:18:29,205 of the flight in hopes of explaining why 350 00:18:29,245 --> 00:18:31,265 the Piper Malibu lost control. 351 00:18:32,205 --> 00:18:35,645 That doesn't look good. Rain. 352 00:18:36,625 --> 00:18:39,721 Lots of others. Hmm. It looks like 353 00:18:39,753 --> 00:18:43,073 he's turning as he's approaching those 354 00:18:43,129 --> 00:18:46,713 souls. Maybe he's trying to fly around 355 00:18:46,769 --> 00:18:49,841 the clouds. When you're flying at night 356 00:18:49,953 --> 00:18:51,953 with very little light, there are lots of 357 00:18:52,049 --> 00:18:53,497 ways in which your body can become 358 00:18:53,561 --> 00:18:55,921 confused about where you are in space. 359 00:18:55,953 --> 00:18:57,337 Are you climbing, are descending, are you 360 00:18:57,361 --> 00:18:59,441 turning left or right? And that can quite 361 00:18:59,473 --> 00:19:03,207 easily lead to a loss of control. So tell 362 00:19:03,231 --> 00:19:06,039 me about the flight Investigators speak 363 00:19:06,087 --> 00:19:07,835 with the air traffic controller. 364 00:19:09,495 --> 00:19:12,143 Everything seemed totally normal. Then he 365 00:19:12,159 --> 00:19:16,815 just disappeared off radar. And before 366 00:19:16,895 --> 00:19:19,679 you lost him, did you hear anything 367 00:19:19,847 --> 00:19:22,515 unusual? Not really. 368 00:19:23,295 --> 00:19:26,923 He did ask to descend twice to 369 00:19:27,039 --> 00:19:30,235 stay in visual conditions. November 2064, 370 00:19:30,275 --> 00:19:32,811 Delta Bravo requesting further dissecentt 371 00:19:32,843 --> 00:19:36,043 to maintain VMC. Cleared to descend at 372 00:19:36,059 --> 00:19:39,691 your discretion. Roger. Not only was 373 00:19:39,723 --> 00:19:42,315 the pilot trying to fly around the clouds, 374 00:19:42,435 --> 00:19:44,707 he was trying to descend below them for 375 00:19:44,731 --> 00:19:45,655 better visibility. 376 00:19:49,315 --> 00:19:52,291 You know, here's what I don't get. The 377 00:19:52,323 --> 00:19:54,403 pilot has instruments to help him fly 378 00:19:54,459 --> 00:19:56,839 through poor visibility. Well, he's 379 00:19:56,967 --> 00:20:00,767 clearly not using them. Perhaps he 380 00:20:00,791 --> 00:20:02,315 doesn't know how to use them. 381 00:20:05,815 --> 00:20:09,275 What do we have on this pilot? Let's 382 00:20:09,775 --> 00:20:12,599 figure out exactly who's flying this 383 00:20:12,647 --> 00:20:15,927 plane. We had a pilot that had 384 00:20:15,991 --> 00:20:18,175 manoeuvered, we think, to avoid weather, 385 00:20:18,295 --> 00:20:20,151 but appears to have lost control. So that 386 00:20:20,183 --> 00:20:22,691 raised the question about why did that 387 00:20:22,723 --> 00:20:24,615 happen? Thank you. 388 00:20:26,475 --> 00:20:29,427 And here it is, his current private 389 00:20:29,451 --> 00:20:32,691 license. It has all his ratings. Did the 390 00:20:32,723 --> 00:20:35,219 pilot have the required experience to fly 391 00:20:35,267 --> 00:20:38,667 the plane in bad weather? The family were 392 00:20:38,691 --> 00:20:40,771 able to share his laptop with us and on 393 00:20:40,803 --> 00:20:43,555 there was a photography taken of his 394 00:20:43,595 --> 00:20:46,731 licence. He didn't have a full instrument 395 00:20:46,763 --> 00:20:49,661 rating. He also had what's called an 396 00:20:49,693 --> 00:20:52,277 instrument rating restricted. So that's a 397 00:20:52,301 --> 00:20:53,917 limited instrument rating that allowed him 398 00:20:53,941 --> 00:20:56,029 to operate in some conditions in 399 00:20:56,077 --> 00:20:59,709 instrument flight rules. Plus he hasn't 400 00:20:59,837 --> 00:21:04,085 flown using his instruments in almost two 401 00:21:04,125 --> 00:21:07,589 years. We hadn't had any recent practice 402 00:21:07,717 --> 00:21:10,605 in flying the aircraft in cloud or on 403 00:21:10,645 --> 00:21:12,693 instruments. And instrument flying is a 404 00:21:12,709 --> 00:21:14,381 perishable skill. You forget it quite 405 00:21:14,413 --> 00:21:18,285 quickly. Oh, that's not the worst part. 406 00:21:19,185 --> 00:21:21,137 The flight plan he filed for had a 407 00:21:21,161 --> 00:21:22,913 nighttime departure. He doesn't have a 408 00:21:22,929 --> 00:21:26,457 night rating. From our 409 00:21:26,481 --> 00:21:28,425 evidence of Mr. Rbtson's recent flying, 410 00:21:28,505 --> 00:21:31,121 it was all done in daytime in good 411 00:21:31,153 --> 00:21:34,481 weather. Investigators conclude that 412 00:21:34,513 --> 00:21:37,321 Ibbertson's licensing was inadequate for a 413 00:21:37,353 --> 00:21:39,605 night flight in instrument conditions. 414 00:21:42,525 --> 00:21:44,745 Oh, there's something more. 415 00:21:46,325 --> 00:21:48,741 Every turn we took seemed to open a Lot 416 00:21:48,773 --> 00:21:50,341 more cans of worms that we needed to 417 00:21:50,413 --> 00:21:52,785 investigate. Check this out. 418 00:21:54,045 --> 00:21:56,685 It's a summary of Ibtson's projected 419 00:21:56,765 --> 00:21:58,425 expenses. Exactly. 420 00:22:00,245 --> 00:22:03,185 Look here. Pilot fee. 421 00:22:05,285 --> 00:22:07,077 Thatat rang alarm bells for me because 422 00:22:07,101 --> 00:22:09,761 this guy is only a private pilot license 423 00:22:09,793 --> 00:22:11,765 holder. He's not entitled to be paid. 424 00:22:12,465 --> 00:22:14,737 November 2100 and 64 Delta Bravo ready for 425 00:22:14,761 --> 00:22:18,433 takeoff. He didn't have a night rating and 426 00:22:18,449 --> 00:22:20,529 he didn't have a commercial pilot's 427 00:22:20,617 --> 00:22:23,361 license. Essentially means that this pilot 428 00:22:23,393 --> 00:22:24,561 should not have been operating this 429 00:22:24,593 --> 00:22:29,369 flight. So who 430 00:22:29,417 --> 00:22:33,385 paid him? Who contracted 431 00:22:33,465 --> 00:22:36,113 an inadequately licensed pilot to fly 432 00:22:36,169 --> 00:22:38,325 Emiliano Sala to Cardiff? 433 00:22:39,965 --> 00:22:41,581 Getting to the bottom of who organized 434 00:22:41,613 --> 00:22:44,069 this flight was very difficult. There was 435 00:22:44,117 --> 00:22:46,865 no contract, there were no receipts, 436 00:22:47,365 --> 00:22:49,805 there was no agreements. This was all done 437 00:22:49,845 --> 00:22:53,597 by word of mouth or telephone. S a wall 438 00:22:53,741 --> 00:22:57,661 silence. They get very little 439 00:22:57,733 --> 00:22:59,253 information about the flight from the 440 00:22:59,269 --> 00:23:02,253 owner of the Piper Malibu. Oh, I've got a 441 00:23:02,269 --> 00:23:05,965 tip, H Someone wants to talk 442 00:23:07,145 --> 00:23:08,245 discreetly, 443 00:23:10,025 --> 00:23:13,313 let's talk to them. Is this 444 00:23:13,369 --> 00:23:15,525 the break investigators need? 445 00:23:19,345 --> 00:23:21,937 David Henderson arranged the flight. He 446 00:23:21,961 --> 00:23:24,889 works for the owner. Investigators meet 447 00:23:24,937 --> 00:23:27,065 with a witness who has more information 448 00:23:27,185 --> 00:23:29,257 about Emiliano Sala's flight over the 449 00:23:29,281 --> 00:23:30,545 English Channel. 450 00:23:34,165 --> 00:23:36,277 The witnesses that came forward wanted to 451 00:23:36,301 --> 00:23:38,045 give us information but didn't want to be 452 00:23:38,085 --> 00:23:41,789 identified. The informant provides 453 00:23:41,837 --> 00:23:44,509 insight into the accident aircraft and its 454 00:23:44,557 --> 00:23:45,385 operator. 455 00:23:49,445 --> 00:23:52,373 So Henderson hired the pilot. That's 456 00:23:52,389 --> 00:23:56,809 right. O davt's 457 00:23:56,817 --> 00:23:59,841 in here. They learned that David Henderson 458 00:23:59,913 --> 00:24:02,521 keeps a roster of pilots. Mr. Henderson, 459 00:24:02,553 --> 00:24:05,645 how are you? David Ibtson was one of them. 460 00:24:06,065 --> 00:24:08,017 I Henderson asked Ibtson if he could fly a 461 00:24:08,041 --> 00:24:10,449 passenger from Cardiff to Nant and back 462 00:24:10,497 --> 00:24:12,845 again. I think I can do that. 463 00:24:15,545 --> 00:24:18,177 Mr. Ibtson would have known that he had no 464 00:24:18,201 --> 00:24:20,617 night rating. And he would have known as a 465 00:24:20,681 --> 00:24:22,497 private pilot license holder that he was 466 00:24:22,521 --> 00:24:24,365 not entitled to be paid for the flight. 467 00:24:25,785 --> 00:24:27,925 What is the departure time? From that, 468 00:24:29,305 --> 00:24:31,217 investigators uncover more about the 469 00:24:31,241 --> 00:24:33,865 flight's schedule. So the original plan 470 00:24:33,905 --> 00:24:35,881 for the flight was for Mr. Salah to fly 471 00:24:35,913 --> 00:24:38,825 back on Monday morning. Circumstances 472 00:24:38,865 --> 00:24:40,921 changed. The flight to Cardiff kept 473 00:24:40,953 --> 00:24:41,885 getting delayed. 474 00:24:49,725 --> 00:24:52,741 Mr. Henderson, Ibtson again. There were 475 00:24:52,773 --> 00:24:54,645 numerous changes to the departure time 476 00:24:54,685 --> 00:24:57,109 over the weekend. Uh, sorry to say we have 477 00:24:57,117 --> 00:24:59,757 a further delay. That was pushback at the 478 00:24:59,781 --> 00:25:02,117 request of the passenger. So he was 479 00:25:02,141 --> 00:25:04,037 supposed to be flying in conditions with 480 00:25:04,061 --> 00:25:07,085 good visibility during the day, but that 481 00:25:07,125 --> 00:25:09,437 changed and he doesn't have his night 482 00:25:09,501 --> 00:25:12,773 rating. Have you seen 483 00:25:12,829 --> 00:25:14,851 anything like this before? This is the 484 00:25:14,883 --> 00:25:18,815 first. What we started to see a picture of 485 00:25:19,675 --> 00:25:21,615 was an operation in the shadows. 486 00:25:23,115 --> 00:25:26,179 It was unlicensed. It had no approval to 487 00:25:26,187 --> 00:25:29,283 do commercial work. They were using an 488 00:25:29,299 --> 00:25:32,307 unqualified pilot. We have to figure this 489 00:25:32,331 --> 00:25:34,763 out work your contacts. 490 00:25:34,859 --> 00:25:37,455 Let's see what we can find. 491 00:25:38,275 --> 00:25:40,547 Are chartered flights with unlicensed 492 00:25:40,611 --> 00:25:44,045 pilots common? It was very 493 00:25:44,085 --> 00:25:46,957 challenging to assess the extent that this 494 00:25:46,981 --> 00:25:49,077 was going on. There's no records kept, 495 00:25:49,181 --> 00:25:51,277 there's no flight plans made, and 496 00:25:51,301 --> 00:25:53,493 witnesses are understandably reluctant to 497 00:25:53,509 --> 00:25:56,573 talk about it. Investigators learn about 498 00:25:56,629 --> 00:25:58,517 flights that aren't properly licensed, 499 00:25:58,621 --> 00:26:00,981 called Grey Charters. They offer a 500 00:26:01,013 --> 00:26:03,021 discounted price, which comes with 501 00:26:03,093 --> 00:26:06,445 increased risk. The problem with Greaty 502 00:26:06,485 --> 00:26:08,437 Charters is that the aircraft that are 503 00:26:08,461 --> 00:26:10,545 being used to operate them are often not 504 00:26:10,585 --> 00:26:12,681 maintained to the same safety standard as 505 00:26:12,713 --> 00:26:15,297 commercial airliners. The witnesses came 506 00:26:15,321 --> 00:26:17,865 to us to talk about the prevalence of GRY 507 00:26:17,905 --> 00:26:20,145 Charters. We could see a pattern emerging 508 00:26:20,185 --> 00:26:22,969 of how common this was in aviation in the 509 00:26:23,017 --> 00:26:25,857 uk. Four months after the crash of the 510 00:26:25,881 --> 00:26:28,433 Piper Malibu, investigators are close to 511 00:26:28,489 --> 00:26:31,809 releasing a final report when the case 512 00:26:31,857 --> 00:26:33,645 takes an unexpected turn. 513 00:26:36,085 --> 00:26:39,797 Oh, it'from the pathologist. He did 514 00:26:39,821 --> 00:26:41,365 some additional testing on Solace s blood 515 00:26:41,405 --> 00:26:41,985 work. 516 00:26:44,925 --> 00:26:46,625 He just sent me the analysis. 517 00:26:52,645 --> 00:26:56,077 Salah had carbon monoxide in his system. 518 00:26:56,261 --> 00:26:58,453 The pathologist had ordered toxicology 519 00:26:58,509 --> 00:27:00,397 tests, but that had not included carbon 520 00:27:00,421 --> 00:27:02,789 monioxide. And when he realized he'd 521 00:27:02,837 --> 00:27:05,405 missed that, he put in a request for just 522 00:27:05,445 --> 00:27:08,261 the carbon monoxide to be tested. This had 523 00:27:08,293 --> 00:27:11,357 really been a story about a pilot flying 524 00:27:11,541 --> 00:27:13,893 outside of his competency in weather that 525 00:27:13,909 --> 00:27:17,225 he'd neither practiced nor prepared for. 526 00:27:17,765 --> 00:27:20,501 And it was all down to him. The onus was 527 00:27:20,533 --> 00:27:23,693 being put on him. And then suddenly we get 528 00:27:23,709 --> 00:27:26,637 this finding of carbon monoxide. And that 529 00:27:26,701 --> 00:27:29,265 really made everyone think again. 530 00:27:29,805 --> 00:27:31,557 So those carbon monoxide levels were at 531 00:27:31,581 --> 00:27:35,197 58%. Toxicology testing reveals 532 00:27:35,261 --> 00:27:37,997 that footballer Emiliano Sala had high 533 00:27:38,061 --> 00:27:40,785 levels of carbon monoxide in his system. 534 00:27:41,565 --> 00:27:43,493 I was shocked by the level of carbon 535 00:27:43,509 --> 00:27:46,053 monoxide that was in his blood. What would 536 00:27:46,069 --> 00:27:47,185 that have done to him? 537 00:27:56,065 --> 00:27:58,565 Carbon monoxide over 50%. 538 00:27:59,745 --> 00:28:03,485 Unconsciousness and eventual death. 539 00:28:06,545 --> 00:28:10,153 The Sala was out. Hmm. He wouldn't 540 00:28:10,169 --> 00:28:11,369 have been conscious when the plane 541 00:28:11,417 --> 00:28:15,165 crashed. Are you warm? Than go forio. 542 00:28:18,345 --> 00:28:21,373 Carbon monoxide is a colorless, odorless, 543 00:28:21,509 --> 00:28:24,997 flavorless gas. You don't know it's 544 00:28:25,021 --> 00:28:26,493 there. You don't know you're breathing it 545 00:28:26,509 --> 00:28:28,997 in. And yet it's so dangerous. And it can 546 00:28:29,021 --> 00:28:31,821 kill you quickly. Even low levels of 547 00:28:31,853 --> 00:28:35,117 carbon monoxide are dangerous. Are you 548 00:28:35,141 --> 00:28:37,453 good back there? The first thing that 549 00:28:37,469 --> 00:28:39,101 happens is you get a headache. You might 550 00:28:39,133 --> 00:28:41,813 feel confused, drowsy. You start not being 551 00:28:41,829 --> 00:28:43,845 able to do tasks that you would normally 552 00:28:43,965 --> 00:28:47,161 find easy. The question is, did Sala's 553 00:28:47,193 --> 00:28:49,225 carbon monoxide poisoning come from the 554 00:28:49,265 --> 00:28:51,245 plane or somewhere else? 555 00:28:52,705 --> 00:28:56,137 Right. Did Emiliano Sala 556 00:28:56,201 --> 00:28:58,481 show signs of carbon monoxide poisoning 557 00:28:58,553 --> 00:29:01,045 prior to his Flight on the Piper Malibu. 558 00:29:02,865 --> 00:29:05,673 The AIB seeks help from French 559 00:29:05,769 --> 00:29:08,849 investigators. We had our colleagues in 560 00:29:08,897 --> 00:29:12,329 France talked to people at Nonant Airport 561 00:29:12,497 --> 00:29:14,929 to see what the behavior of the pilot and 562 00:29:14,937 --> 00:29:16,625 the passenger had been as they were going 563 00:29:16,665 --> 00:29:18,833 through the airport on the way to the 564 00:29:18,849 --> 00:29:22,273 aireroplane. Well, how did the 565 00:29:22,329 --> 00:29:26,049 passenger seem? Officials at Nant Airport 566 00:29:26,137 --> 00:29:28,737 scrutinized security footage of Salah to 567 00:29:28,761 --> 00:29:30,657 see if there was anything abnormal about 568 00:29:30,681 --> 00:29:31,565 his actions. 569 00:29:36,925 --> 00:29:38,345 What about the pilot? 570 00:29:40,325 --> 00:29:43,825 Okay. No, but it's great. Thanks. 571 00:29:45,685 --> 00:29:48,933 Negative. Salah seemed fine. 572 00:29:49,029 --> 00:29:52,145 The pilot was alert. He wasn't swaying. 573 00:29:53,845 --> 00:29:55,797 That means the carbon monoxide poisoning 574 00:29:55,821 --> 00:29:58,877 was from the plane. David Ibtson's body 575 00:29:58,941 --> 00:30:00,509 was never recovered from the English 576 00:30:00,557 --> 00:30:03,069 Channel. His carbon monoxide levels 577 00:30:03,117 --> 00:30:04,425 couldn't be determined. 578 00:30:07,205 --> 00:30:11,185 You know, maybe the modeling data 579 00:30:11,965 --> 00:30:13,345 will shed some light. 580 00:30:15,165 --> 00:30:17,277 Investigators return to the flight path 581 00:30:17,341 --> 00:30:19,829 data for further insight. Was the pilot 582 00:30:19,877 --> 00:30:21,945 affected by the poisonous gas? 583 00:30:23,685 --> 00:30:25,825 Straight level. 584 00:30:27,525 --> 00:30:30,865 Looks like it's on autopilot. 585 00:30:31,165 --> 00:30:32,957 It's hard to know if he was conscious or 586 00:30:32,981 --> 00:30:37,397 not. Next, the plane turns right and 587 00:30:37,421 --> 00:30:39,789 then turns left. Look at these bank 588 00:30:39,837 --> 00:30:43,613 angles. 36 degrees to the right and 589 00:30:43,629 --> 00:30:46,661 then 56 degrees to the left. 590 00:30:46,813 --> 00:30:50,637 Those angles are well beyond the limits 591 00:30:50,821 --> 00:30:54,709 of the autopilot. Investigators discovered 592 00:30:54,757 --> 00:30:56,901 that the pilot was conscious enough to be 593 00:30:56,933 --> 00:30:59,035 turning the plane in the final stage of 594 00:30:59,075 --> 00:31:01,427 flight. But was he conscious during the 595 00:31:01,451 --> 00:31:05,227 last minute of flight? Here the plane 596 00:31:05,291 --> 00:31:08,611 is in its dive with its right wing pointed 597 00:31:08,723 --> 00:31:10,947 right down, straight at the water. It's 598 00:31:10,971 --> 00:31:12,507 hard to believe he was fully conscious for 599 00:31:12,531 --> 00:31:13,615 that. Yes. 600 00:31:16,395 --> 00:31:18,455 Oh, I check this out. 601 00:31:19,355 --> 00:31:21,899 Before the plane broke up, the wings 602 00:31:22,027 --> 00:31:25,247 almost level out. Either the pilot could 603 00:31:25,271 --> 00:31:26,935 have applied pressure on the control 604 00:31:26,975 --> 00:31:29,111 column, for example, by slumping over it, 605 00:31:29,223 --> 00:31:30,583 and that could have caused the wings to 606 00:31:30,599 --> 00:31:35,463 roll level. Check out the page of 607 00:31:35,479 --> 00:31:39,311 the slight increase in the final 608 00:31:39,383 --> 00:31:41,567 moments, the pitch of the Piper Malibu 609 00:31:41,631 --> 00:31:44,367 starts to rise. It's evidence that the 610 00:31:44,391 --> 00:31:46,755 pilot must have been partly conscious. 611 00:31:47,215 --> 00:31:49,811 But for the aircraft to start to pitch up, 612 00:31:49,943 --> 00:31:51,667 the pilot would have to be conscious 613 00:31:51,731 --> 00:31:54,051 enough to pull the control column 614 00:31:54,163 --> 00:31:57,035 rearward. His carbon and mon oxide levels 615 00:31:57,075 --> 00:31:59,531 had to be lower than the passengers. He 616 00:31:59,563 --> 00:32:01,595 may have been conscious, but he still 617 00:32:01,635 --> 00:32:04,163 could have been badly impaired. May have 618 00:32:04,179 --> 00:32:05,859 been slipping in and out of consciousness 619 00:32:05,987 --> 00:32:08,043 and may have made a token effort to 620 00:32:08,059 --> 00:32:09,475 recover the aircraft from the steep 621 00:32:09,515 --> 00:32:12,787 descending turn. Without Mr. Ibtson's 622 00:32:12,811 --> 00:32:16,167 body, it's impossible to know how much 623 00:32:16,191 --> 00:32:19,623 he was affected by carbon monoxide. But we 624 00:32:19,639 --> 00:32:20,663 know they were sitting in the same 625 00:32:20,719 --> 00:32:24,127 combined cabin. Okay, we need 626 00:32:24,231 --> 00:32:26,551 everything there is on the Piper Malibu 627 00:32:26,663 --> 00:32:29,415 exhaust and ventilation system. And the 628 00:32:29,455 --> 00:32:32,159 carbon monoxide is carried by the exhaust 629 00:32:32,207 --> 00:32:34,247 gases which are generated by the engine we 630 00:32:34,271 --> 00:32:36,231 needed to understand, how do those exhaust 631 00:32:36,263 --> 00:32:39,595 gases get into the cabin? Are you warm? 632 00:32:40,295 --> 00:32:41,515 Than go, Forio. 633 00:32:46,955 --> 00:32:49,895 I've pulled the schematics, Grace. 634 00:32:50,395 --> 00:32:52,331 Investigators study the exhaust and 635 00:32:52,363 --> 00:32:55,283 ventilation systems of the Piper Malibu to 636 00:32:55,299 --> 00:32:57,739 determine how carbon monoxide could have 637 00:32:57,787 --> 00:33:02,139 entered the cabin. Maybe there 638 00:33:02,187 --> 00:33:05,675 was an exhaust leak that seeped 639 00:33:05,715 --> 00:33:09,519 through the firewall and the pressure 640 00:33:09,567 --> 00:33:13,791 bulkhead. Maybe, but only 641 00:33:13,823 --> 00:33:16,635 if there was a crack or a leak. 642 00:33:17,695 --> 00:33:20,423 Piston engines produce high concentrations 643 00:33:20,479 --> 00:33:22,975 of carbon monoxide that can potentially 644 00:33:23,055 --> 00:33:25,095 enter the cabin as a result of cracks, 645 00:33:25,215 --> 00:33:27,527 holes, or poorly fitted components in the 646 00:33:27,551 --> 00:33:31,239 exhaust system. The team did a 647 00:33:31,247 --> 00:33:34,925 lot of work on potential sources 648 00:33:34,965 --> 00:33:37,277 for the carbon monoxide in the cabin. And 649 00:33:37,301 --> 00:33:38,853 we talked to the manufacturer, and we 650 00:33:38,869 --> 00:33:40,665 talked to the engine manufacturer. 651 00:33:41,525 --> 00:33:44,045 Seals in the firewall and the forward 652 00:33:44,085 --> 00:33:46,077 pressure bulkhead form an airtight 653 00:33:46,141 --> 00:33:48,349 barrier, preventing engine fumes from 654 00:33:48,397 --> 00:33:51,465 entering the cabin. Here's the thing. 655 00:33:51,845 --> 00:33:54,485 Mainidetenance inspected the firewall and 656 00:33:54,525 --> 00:33:56,885 the pressure bulkhead two months ago. 657 00:33:57,005 --> 00:34:00,123 There's no signs of cracking or broken 658 00:34:00,179 --> 00:34:03,515 seals. During the last maintenance 659 00:34:03,635 --> 00:34:06,395 inspections, the engineers found nothing 660 00:34:06,435 --> 00:34:08,571 wrong with the firewall or the pressure 661 00:34:08,603 --> 00:34:11,075 bulkhead. Investigators consider a 662 00:34:11,115 --> 00:34:15,307 different possibility. What if there was 663 00:34:15,451 --> 00:34:19,215 a puncture in the exhaust piping? 664 00:34:20,355 --> 00:34:23,315 Did a breach in the exhaust system allow 665 00:34:23,395 --> 00:34:25,953 poisonous fumes to mix with the fresh air 666 00:34:26,009 --> 00:34:30,113 used to ventilate the cabin? As fresh air 667 00:34:30,209 --> 00:34:32,337 enters the aircraft, it's warmed by the 668 00:34:32,361 --> 00:34:34,857 engine's exhaust pipe inside a chamber 669 00:34:34,921 --> 00:34:37,569 called the heater muff before circulating 670 00:34:37,617 --> 00:34:38,605 into the cabin. 671 00:34:41,105 --> 00:34:44,489 What if the puncture happened after the 672 00:34:44,577 --> 00:34:47,445 last inspection? Let's check the logbox. 673 00:34:48,785 --> 00:34:51,185 They look for any history of an issue near 674 00:34:51,225 --> 00:34:54,425 the tailp ###e no, 675 00:34:54,505 --> 00:34:57,985 nothing here. What about on 676 00:34:58,025 --> 00:35:00,885 the flight over to Nant? 677 00:35:01,665 --> 00:35:04,377 That's a good point. And maybe something 678 00:35:04,401 --> 00:35:07,441 happened there on the way to Nantes. 679 00:35:07,513 --> 00:35:09,337 Mr. Rbtson did encounter a number of 680 00:35:09,401 --> 00:35:10,689 problems with the aircraft that he 681 00:35:10,737 --> 00:35:14,365 reported to various parties. Thank you. 682 00:35:16,505 --> 00:35:17,913 It sounds like there were some issues on 683 00:35:17,929 --> 00:35:19,577 the flight on the way over from Cardiff. 684 00:35:19,681 --> 00:35:22,993 Like what? Oh, there was a small oil 685 00:35:23,049 --> 00:35:26,529 leak, and during the landing, his brakes 686 00:35:26,577 --> 00:35:29,165 gave him problems. Both were checked and 687 00:35:29,505 --> 00:35:32,857 they weren't a safety concern. Okay, this 688 00:35:32,881 --> 00:35:35,569 one is more troublesome. He reported a 689 00:35:35,657 --> 00:35:39,401 bang mid flight. The cabin filled with 690 00:35:39,433 --> 00:35:43,265 mist two days before the fatal flight. 691 00:35:43,385 --> 00:35:45,809 Ibbotson piloted Emiliano Sala from 692 00:35:45,857 --> 00:35:48,485 Cardiff to Noings and say his goodbyes. 693 00:35:53,045 --> 00:35:57,465 What the. He's okay. 694 00:35:58,565 --> 00:36:01,185 Oh, yeah, yeah, it's okay. 695 00:36:03,525 --> 00:36:06,581 The plane is mid channel. He talks about a 696 00:36:06,613 --> 00:36:08,821 bang, something that really kind of 697 00:36:08,853 --> 00:36:11,933 grabbed his attention. He checks to see if 698 00:36:11,989 --> 00:36:13,741 everything is working as it should do. 699 00:36:13,813 --> 00:36:16,081 Plane keeps flying. But in the back of his 700 00:36:16,113 --> 00:36:20,369 mind is, what on earth Was that navy? 701 00:36:20,497 --> 00:36:23,161 The turbocharger failed on the way over to 702 00:36:23,193 --> 00:36:25,845 Noant and puncture the tailpip. 703 00:36:28,505 --> 00:36:30,769 Did a turbine inside an engine 704 00:36:30,817 --> 00:36:33,969 turbocharger break, puncturing the exhaust 705 00:36:34,017 --> 00:36:36,577 pipe, allowing poisonous gas into the 706 00:36:36,601 --> 00:36:39,889 cabin? If you do have 707 00:36:39,937 --> 00:36:42,597 damage to the tailpipe, then there is a 708 00:36:42,621 --> 00:36:45,405 possibility that exhaust fumes and the 709 00:36:45,445 --> 00:36:48,141 carbon monoxide can flow into the fresh 710 00:36:48,173 --> 00:36:50,917 air and into the cabin. Interesting 711 00:36:50,981 --> 00:36:53,745 theory. I've got an idea. 712 00:36:54,925 --> 00:36:56,725 Investigators check with the National 713 00:36:56,805 --> 00:36:58,901 Transportation Safety Board in the United 714 00:36:58,973 --> 00:37:01,117 States where the Piper Malibu is 715 00:37:01,141 --> 00:37:03,665 manufactured. Oh, 716 00:37:04,365 --> 00:37:07,653 really? No, that'that's fine. Thanks. 717 00:37:07,709 --> 00:37:10,389 Thanks so much. We became aware that the 718 00:37:10,397 --> 00:37:12,981 NTSB were investigating events where a 719 00:37:13,053 --> 00:37:15,125 turbine wheel and a turbocharger came 720 00:37:15,165 --> 00:37:19,065 away. O K? It's happened twice before. 721 00:37:21,885 --> 00:37:24,221 Could an engine component on the Piper 722 00:37:24,253 --> 00:37:27,021 Malibu have come apart and punctured the 723 00:37:27,053 --> 00:37:30,173 exhaust system, releasing toxic fumes into 724 00:37:30,189 --> 00:37:32,605 the cabin? We don't know what the cause of 725 00:37:32,685 --> 00:37:34,421 the bang was on the outbound flight from 726 00:37:34,453 --> 00:37:36,483 Cardiff to Nant, and we may never know. 727 00:37:36,629 --> 00:37:38,775 Investigators learn of two similar cases 728 00:37:38,855 --> 00:37:42,435 in the United States. In both cases, 729 00:37:43,135 --> 00:37:46,207 the pieces of the turbocharger only left 730 00:37:46,351 --> 00:37:49,215 score marks. Tailpipes were never 731 00:37:49,255 --> 00:37:53,223 punctured. We considered it unlikely that 732 00:37:53,239 --> 00:37:55,871 a failure of the turbocharger would have 733 00:37:55,903 --> 00:37:58,023 allowed carbon monoxide to enter the 734 00:37:58,039 --> 00:38:01,087 cabin. Well, what if the tailpipe cracked 735 00:38:01,111 --> 00:38:04,595 on its own? But it is a pretty 736 00:38:04,635 --> 00:38:06,787 harsh environment inside the engine. 737 00:38:06,851 --> 00:38:09,675 Exactly. Heat, vibration, prime conditions 738 00:38:09,755 --> 00:38:11,095 for a crack to develop. 739 00:38:14,675 --> 00:38:16,707 You look at all the separate components in 740 00:38:16,731 --> 00:38:18,963 there for signience of failure or wear, 741 00:38:19,019 --> 00:38:21,699 etc. And where necessary, replace 742 00:38:21,747 --> 00:38:24,043 components. A visual inspection of the 743 00:38:24,059 --> 00:38:25,459 tailpipe is part of their maintenance 744 00:38:25,507 --> 00:38:28,859 check in. The plane only 745 00:38:28,907 --> 00:38:31,747 flew for 11 hours after its last 746 00:38:31,811 --> 00:38:34,011 inspection. Mainance found nothing wrong 747 00:38:34,043 --> 00:38:35,795 with the tailpipe or the exhaust system. 748 00:38:35,915 --> 00:38:38,723 Not a lot of time for a cracked belop. Is 749 00:38:38,739 --> 00:38:44,859 it even possible they 750 00:38:44,907 --> 00:38:47,235 study other accidents for instances of 751 00:38:47,275 --> 00:38:48,575 cracked tailpipes. 752 00:38:51,915 --> 00:38:55,231 Oh, look at this one. Investigators find a 753 00:38:55,263 --> 00:38:58,023 disturbing case of carbon monoxide leaking 754 00:38:58,079 --> 00:39:00,567 into the cabin of a small plane. A crack 755 00:39:00,591 --> 00:39:02,343 in the exhaust formed just six flying 756 00:39:02,399 --> 00:39:04,355 hours after a maintenance inspection. 757 00:39:05,615 --> 00:39:07,583 Even if the mechanics had carried out the 758 00:39:07,599 --> 00:39:09,735 inspection, our crack may have developed 759 00:39:09,855 --> 00:39:12,303 sufficient to cause carbon dxide to leak 760 00:39:12,359 --> 00:39:14,295 into the cabin during those 11 flying 761 00:39:14,335 --> 00:39:18,159 hours. They conclude that a sudden crack 762 00:39:18,207 --> 00:39:20,833 in the tailpipe was the likeliest reason 763 00:39:20,929 --> 00:39:23,405 carbon monoxide leaked into the cabin. 764 00:39:24,825 --> 00:39:26,553 The maintenance inspection they did on the 765 00:39:26,569 --> 00:39:29,937 Piper was a visual one. Is a 766 00:39:29,961 --> 00:39:32,433 visual inspection the safest way to 767 00:39:32,489 --> 00:39:34,721 identify early signs of cracking in a 768 00:39:34,753 --> 00:39:35,685 tailpipe? 769 00:39:41,385 --> 00:39:44,977 According to the engine manufacturer, the 770 00:39:45,041 --> 00:39:48,059 best way to test for small cracks is a 771 00:39:48,107 --> 00:39:51,211 pressure test to inspect the tailpipe. 772 00:39:51,323 --> 00:39:53,387 A soapy Solution is applied to the 773 00:39:53,411 --> 00:39:56,403 exterior. If bubbles form, that means 774 00:39:56,459 --> 00:39:59,243 there's a crack. We're easy to a 775 00:39:59,259 --> 00:40:01,135 requirement for a private operator. 776 00:40:06,315 --> 00:40:09,603 The FAA doesn't mandate it. What about 777 00:40:09,619 --> 00:40:10,695 a commercial one? 778 00:40:13,855 --> 00:40:16,663 It looks like pressure test is required 779 00:40:16,799 --> 00:40:20,407 for commercial operators. Had the 780 00:40:20,431 --> 00:40:22,995 aircraft been maintained under regulations 781 00:40:23,535 --> 00:40:25,223 for commercial use, which is the way it 782 00:40:25,239 --> 00:40:27,463 was actually being used, it would have 783 00:40:27,479 --> 00:40:29,447 meant that during the maintenance there 784 00:40:29,471 --> 00:40:33,231 was definitely a documented pressure test 785 00:40:33,263 --> 00:40:37,007 of the exhaust system. If this had been a 786 00:40:37,031 --> 00:40:40,067 very small crack that was missed by a 787 00:40:40,091 --> 00:40:43,483 visual inspection, maintenance may 788 00:40:43,499 --> 00:40:44,415 have caught it. 789 00:40:50,115 --> 00:40:53,067 The AAIIB releases its report on the 790 00:40:53,091 --> 00:40:56,491 crash. It concludes the pilot lost control 791 00:40:56,563 --> 00:40:58,443 while turning the aircraft to regain 792 00:40:58,499 --> 00:41:00,851 visibility, which resulted in an in 793 00:41:00,883 --> 00:41:03,691 inflight breakup. Among the causes, it 794 00:41:03,723 --> 00:41:06,319 points to a leak of carbon monoxide into 795 00:41:06,387 --> 00:41:09,063 cabin. It also cites a lack of safety 796 00:41:09,119 --> 00:41:11,047 standards from the operator of the Piper 797 00:41:11,071 --> 00:41:13,355 Malibu as a contributing factor. 798 00:41:15,295 --> 00:41:18,263 As a result of the AIB's investigation, 799 00:41:18,439 --> 00:41:20,991 the civil Aviation Authority launches a 800 00:41:21,063 --> 00:41:23,239 campaign to raise awareness of the dangers 801 00:41:23,287 --> 00:41:26,839 of Gray Charters. David Henderson 802 00:41:26,887 --> 00:41:29,335 is ultimately jailed for his role in the 803 00:41:29,375 --> 00:41:32,885 accident. This was a real moment for the. 804 00:41:33,015 --> 00:41:35,225 To take a good hard look at itself, to use 805 00:41:35,265 --> 00:41:37,513 that as an opportunity to try to change 806 00:41:37,569 --> 00:41:39,673 things, to try to make sure that something 807 00:41:39,689 --> 00:41:42,313 like this didn't happen again. There were 808 00:41:42,329 --> 00:41:44,745 a lot of sporting organisations for which 809 00:41:44,905 --> 00:41:48,097 Grey Charter might have been part of the 810 00:41:48,121 --> 00:41:50,633 culture of those organisations. And I 811 00:41:50,649 --> 00:41:52,137 think this accident made them sit up and 812 00:41:52,161 --> 00:41:53,993 take notice about the risks that their 813 00:41:54,049 --> 00:41:57,785 members were taking. It was a risk that 814 00:41:57,825 --> 00:42:00,687 ultimately took the life of Emiliano Sala, 815 00:42:00,801 --> 00:42:03,931 a rising football star, on the day he said 816 00:42:03,963 --> 00:42:06,963 goodbye to his teammates in NAND and flew 817 00:42:07,019 --> 00:42:08,235 towards his new future.