1 00:00:00,575 --> 00:00:02,235 V1 rotate. 2 00:00:07,215 --> 00:00:09,735 Just seconds after takeoff from Addis 3 00:00:09,775 --> 00:00:13,095 Ababa. GE up. The pilots of Ethiopian 4 00:00:13,135 --> 00:00:15,607 Airlines Flight 302 are faced with an 5 00:00:15,631 --> 00:00:18,315 emergency masssterauution Anti ice. 6 00:00:20,455 --> 00:00:22,687 You're literally fighting to maintain 7 00:00:22,791 --> 00:00:25,631 control of the jet. Stabm cut out. Yes, 8 00:00:25,663 --> 00:00:29,249 yes do it. But the procedure they've been 9 00:00:29,297 --> 00:00:34,073 taught for the Boeing 737 Max 8 doesn't 10 00:00:34,129 --> 00:00:36,609 work. They know what to do and they tryied 11 00:00:36,657 --> 00:00:39,129 to do it. Investigators are astonished. 12 00:00:39,217 --> 00:00:41,537 If the pilots knew the proper procedure 13 00:00:41,641 --> 00:00:44,369 why didn't it work? Boeing didn't say 14 00:00:44,417 --> 00:00:45,689 anything about the trim wheel being 15 00:00:45,737 --> 00:00:46,725 difficult to move. 16 00:00:49,865 --> 00:00:52,193 Could the pilots have been misled about 17 00:00:52,249 --> 00:00:54,297 how to save their plane? They've still 18 00:00:54,321 --> 00:00:57,577 left the Boeing Max unairworthy and it 19 00:00:57,601 --> 00:01:00,505 caused the life of my daughter and 157 20 00:01:00,545 --> 00:01:01,125 people. 21 00:01:27,085 --> 00:01:30,589 Boarding has commenced for 149 passengers 22 00:01:30,677 --> 00:01:32,685 on a short flight from Addis Ababa, 23 00:01:32,725 --> 00:01:35,885 Ethiopia to Nairobi, Kenya. Perfect. 24 00:01:35,925 --> 00:01:36,665 Thank you. 25 00:01:40,405 --> 00:01:42,357 This was really a UN shuttle flight. 26 00:01:42,501 --> 00:01:44,205 There was a UN environmental conference 27 00:01:44,245 --> 00:01:46,193 happening in Nairobi so the there were 28 00:01:46,209 --> 00:01:47,609 about a couple dozen people on the plane 29 00:01:47,657 --> 00:01:49,485 who were headed to that conference. 30 00:01:52,105 --> 00:01:54,841 Ground equipment is removed and engineer 31 00:01:54,873 --> 00:01:57,617 is clear. The captain on Today's flight is 32 00:01:57,681 --> 00:02:01,305 29 year old yard Getichu. The captain 33 00:02:01,345 --> 00:02:03,273 was considered one of the best pilots in 34 00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:05,241 the airline. He had 8,000 hours which was 35 00:02:05,273 --> 00:02:07,365 unheard of for someone that young. 36 00:02:08,985 --> 00:02:11,001 Before start Checklists complete. Request 37 00:02:11,033 --> 00:02:14,595 pushb back clearance. Ground Ethiopian 302 38 00:02:14,635 --> 00:02:17,563 requesting pushback clearance. 25 year old 39 00:02:17,619 --> 00:02:20,307 Ahmed N. Mohammed is the first officer. 40 00:02:20,491 --> 00:02:22,855 Ethiopian 302 you are clear to push. 41 00:02:24,115 --> 00:02:25,787 Ethiopian Airlines was considered the 42 00:02:25,811 --> 00:02:28,875 model airline in Africa. It had the best 43 00:02:28,915 --> 00:02:31,291 run training school and it had a well 44 00:02:31,323 --> 00:02:33,459 oiled system for bringing new pilots into 45 00:02:33,467 --> 00:02:37,603 the airline. They're on a Boeing 737 46 00:02:37,659 --> 00:02:40,813 Max 8 a brand new passenger jet that's 47 00:02:40,869 --> 00:02:42,565 already at the center of a major 48 00:02:42,645 --> 00:02:44,425 investigation in Indonesia. 49 00:02:49,645 --> 00:02:52,453 Five months earlier a Max 8 crashed into 50 00:02:52,469 --> 00:02:55,909 the Java Sea killing all 189 people on 51 00:02:55,957 --> 00:02:56,545 board. 52 00:02:59,525 --> 00:03:01,325 That accident is still under 53 00:03:01,405 --> 00:03:02,105 investigation. 54 00:03:07,745 --> 00:03:11,281 Just before 8:30am Flight 302 55 00:03:11,353 --> 00:03:13,241 taxis towards the Runway at Addis 56 00:03:13,273 --> 00:03:15,885 Ababa'bole International Airport. 57 00:03:16,505 --> 00:03:19,433 Ethiopian 302 cross Runway is 07 left at 58 00:03:19,449 --> 00:03:22,401 Alpha and hold short of 07 right. Cross 07 59 00:03:22,433 --> 00:03:24,537 left at Alpha and hold short. Ethiopian 60 00:03:24,561 --> 00:03:28,145 302 free. Take off checklist 61 00:03:28,185 --> 00:03:33,985 please. Landing lights on. 62 00:03:39,365 --> 00:03:41,933 Among the passengers on Today's flight is 63 00:03:41,989 --> 00:03:44,945 24 year old Canadian Danielle Moore. 64 00:03:46,925 --> 00:03:49,145 She's traveling to the UN summit. 65 00:03:50,885 --> 00:03:52,397 She really astonished us when she 66 00:03:52,421 --> 00:03:54,853 toldaught us that she would be going to 67 00:03:54,869 --> 00:03:57,385 the United Nations Environmental assembly 68 00:03:57,465 --> 00:04:00,521 in Nairobi and she was selected out of a 69 00:04:00,553 --> 00:04:03,209 number of people. We thought this was so 70 00:04:03,257 --> 00:04:04,085 tremendous. 71 00:04:07,505 --> 00:04:11,081 Flight 302 reaches Runway 7 right, the 72 00:04:11,113 --> 00:04:13,385 longest Runway at the airport. Ethiopian 73 00:04:13,425 --> 00:04:17,033 302 ready for departure. 302 Claire for 74 00:04:17,049 --> 00:04:18,657 takeoff. Runay 7 right. Have a good 75 00:04:18,681 --> 00:04:19,245 flight. 76 00:04:24,565 --> 00:04:26,705 Ready. Ready. 77 00:04:32,485 --> 00:04:33,945 Take offff. Thrust set. 78 00:04:39,085 --> 00:04:40,305 Speed increasing. 79 00:04:52,265 --> 00:04:54,805 Flight 302 departs on time. 80 00:05:00,105 --> 00:05:03,545 The 725 mile flight to Nairobi should 81 00:05:03,585 --> 00:05:05,165 take just over two hours. 82 00:05:07,265 --> 00:05:09,161 The Max 8 was designed for routes like 83 00:05:09,193 --> 00:05:11,177 this. It's a short hop, quick turnaround. 84 00:05:11,241 --> 00:05:14,661 Plane also had much more 85 00:05:14,693 --> 00:05:16,413 fuel efficiency compared to the previous 86 00:05:16,469 --> 00:05:19,180 version of the max, about 20%. 87 00:05:19,530 --> 00:05:37,813 V1 rotate positive 88 00:05:37,869 --> 00:05:40,205 rate. Gear up. 89 00:05:42,505 --> 00:05:45,905 Gear up. Less than 10 seconds after 90 00:05:45,945 --> 00:05:47,905 takeoff, the pilots get a stick shaker 91 00:05:47,945 --> 00:05:50,121 warning indicating that they're in danger 92 00:05:50,153 --> 00:05:53,321 of losing lift and could stall. If you 93 00:05:53,393 --> 00:05:54,945 experience a stall right after departure, 94 00:05:54,985 --> 00:05:57,685 it can be extremely serious. 95 00:05:58,625 --> 00:06:01,041 Captain Getachu reduces his plane's pitch 96 00:06:01,073 --> 00:06:03,713 angle in an effort to prevent a stall. If 97 00:06:03,729 --> 00:06:05,959 you are taking off and you get a stick 98 00:06:06,007 --> 00:06:07,831 shaker, crews are going to be hesitant, 99 00:06:07,903 --> 00:06:09,799 you know, to push their nose over because 100 00:06:09,807 --> 00:06:11,075 they're close to the ground. 101 00:06:15,615 --> 00:06:17,755 Massstiveauution anti ice. 102 00:06:18,535 --> 00:06:19,435 Okay, 103 00:06:22,255 --> 00:06:24,359 when master cautions come on. The first 104 00:06:24,407 --> 00:06:27,543 thing is to diagnose what's occurred and 105 00:06:27,639 --> 00:06:30,391 consider what implications it has on the 106 00:06:30,423 --> 00:06:34,035 flight. What's going. 107 00:06:34,495 --> 00:06:36,703 Captain Getachu doesn't understand what's 108 00:06:36,759 --> 00:06:38,791 behind the multiple warnings. There's a 109 00:06:38,823 --> 00:06:41,407 lot going on here and it's a very 110 00:06:41,471 --> 00:06:44,031 distracting, loud environment with a stick 111 00:06:44,063 --> 00:06:48,399 shaker going. Where do you start to 112 00:06:48,447 --> 00:06:52,231 deal with this complex emergency that you 113 00:06:52,263 --> 00:06:56,159 have? Flight 302 is 114 00:06:56,207 --> 00:06:58,813 only a few hundred feet off the ground as 115 00:06:58,829 --> 00:07:00,637 the pilots struggle to understand the 116 00:07:00,661 --> 00:07:01,225 problem. 117 00:07:04,365 --> 00:07:06,533 As far as passengers are concerned, this 118 00:07:06,549 --> 00:07:08,265 is a routine takeoff. 119 00:07:13,205 --> 00:07:16,293 Okay, Contact radar. Captain Gettu decides 120 00:07:16,349 --> 00:07:18,517 to continue climbing. If you have a 121 00:07:18,541 --> 00:07:20,069 problem, the thing you want to do is get 122 00:07:20,077 --> 00:07:23,325 it away from the ground where you can sort 123 00:07:23,365 --> 00:07:26,897 through your problems. Radar Ethiopian 124 00:07:26,961 --> 00:07:30,937 302. Good morning. Crossing 8,400 125 00:07:31,041 --> 00:07:34,121 and climbing to 320. First Officer 126 00:07:34,153 --> 00:07:37,745 Mohammed reports his altitude 8,400ft 127 00:07:37,785 --> 00:07:41,481 above sea level, which is only 750ft above 128 00:07:41,513 --> 00:07:44,953 the ground. Continue climb to flight level 129 00:07:45,009 --> 00:07:48,473 340. Climb to 340. 130 00:07:48,609 --> 00:07:52,185 Ethiopian 302. Flaps up. 131 00:07:53,925 --> 00:07:57,805 Flaps up. Retracting the flaps should 132 00:07:57,845 --> 00:07:59,505 help the aircraft climb, 133 00:08:02,525 --> 00:08:04,425 but it has the opposite effect. 134 00:08:05,125 --> 00:08:08,061 1500ft from the ground, the jetliner with 135 00:08:08,093 --> 00:08:11,465 157 people on board begins to fall. 136 00:08:11,845 --> 00:08:14,853 We'having flight control problems. Don't 137 00:08:14,909 --> 00:08:18,689 sink. Don't think. You've gone from 138 00:08:18,857 --> 00:08:22,177 a series of cautions, 139 00:08:22,281 --> 00:08:25,297 a series of system malfunctions now into a 140 00:08:25,321 --> 00:08:27,321 flight Control problem where you're 141 00:08:27,353 --> 00:08:29,649 literally fighting to maintain control of 142 00:08:29,657 --> 00:08:30,365 the jet. 143 00:08:34,265 --> 00:08:36,441 Passengers now sense that there is 144 00:08:36,513 --> 00:08:37,445 something wrong. 145 00:08:39,785 --> 00:08:41,409 One woman whose brother was on the 146 00:08:41,457 --> 00:08:43,901 airplane and he called her soon after 147 00:08:43,933 --> 00:08:47,385 takeoff he knew something was wrong. 148 00:08:48,525 --> 00:08:50,229 The plane was not climbing the way 149 00:08:50,277 --> 00:08:53,597 aircraft normally do. The 737's nose 150 00:08:53,701 --> 00:08:57,317 continues to pitch down. Trim TR 151 00:08:57,421 --> 00:08:59,741 Captain Getichu uses the trim switch to 152 00:08:59,773 --> 00:09:03,317 level his plane. The trim switch 153 00:09:03,421 --> 00:09:05,237 controls the position of the horizontal 154 00:09:05,301 --> 00:09:07,709 stabilizer keeping the plane balanced 155 00:09:07,797 --> 00:09:10,561 during flight it can be used to adjust the 156 00:09:10,593 --> 00:09:11,845 pitch of the airplane. 157 00:09:13,625 --> 00:09:16,065 Captain Getachu manages to raise the nose 158 00:09:16,145 --> 00:09:19,485 slightly, but not for long. 159 00:09:21,745 --> 00:09:24,425 The plane dips again, bringing it closer 160 00:09:24,465 --> 00:09:28,457 to the ground. Too low terrain and the 161 00:09:28,481 --> 00:09:32,601 pilots are struggling Too low terrain. 162 00:09:32,793 --> 00:09:34,823 Now you start dealing with how do we rec 163 00:09:34,889 --> 00:09:39,011 gain control and to keep the nose 164 00:09:39,083 --> 00:09:41,083 up while we sort through this. And that's 165 00:09:41,099 --> 00:09:42,935 where the time can become critical. 166 00:09:51,155 --> 00:09:53,899 Less than three minutes after takeoff and 167 00:09:53,947 --> 00:09:56,627 only 1 18, 800ft above the ground, the 168 00:09:56,651 --> 00:09:59,195 pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 169 00:09:59,235 --> 00:10:01,203 are desperately trying to get their plane 170 00:10:01,259 --> 00:10:03,125 to climb. Pull up. 171 00:10:03,785 --> 00:10:07,369 Okay. If as we maintain 6,500 we have 172 00:10:07,377 --> 00:10:10,305 a flight control problem. They're trying 173 00:10:10,345 --> 00:10:12,153 to reach the minimum safe altitude 174 00:10:12,209 --> 00:10:13,605 surrounding the airport. 175 00:10:16,105 --> 00:10:19,825 Ethiopia 302, we'like to maintain 6500. 176 00:10:19,905 --> 00:10:23,001 We have a flight control problem. Say 177 00:10:23,033 --> 00:10:24,849 again. We have a flight control problem 178 00:10:24,897 --> 00:10:26,965 and we'd like to maintain 6500. 179 00:10:28,365 --> 00:10:31,069 Approved and report intion well, are you 180 00:10:31,157 --> 00:10:34,597 Ethiopia 302. First and 181 00:10:34,621 --> 00:10:36,341 foremost they said okay, we have a flight 182 00:10:36,413 --> 00:10:38,413 control problem and that says get other 183 00:10:38,429 --> 00:10:40,037 airplanes away from me. And that was a 184 00:10:40,061 --> 00:10:44,805 very appropriate thing to do. Set 6500. 185 00:10:45,073 --> 00:10:52,325 6500 set the 186 00:10:52,365 --> 00:10:56,577 speed. As they fight to climb to 6500ft, 187 00:10:56,681 --> 00:10:58,849 the plane's speed becomes dangerously 188 00:10:58,897 --> 00:10:59,485 high. 189 00:11:03,185 --> 00:11:06,065 They try to raise the plane's nose further 190 00:11:06,185 --> 00:11:09,245 to decrease speed. P up with me. 191 00:11:12,385 --> 00:11:14,473 Even with both pilots pulling back on 192 00:11:14,489 --> 00:11:17,009 their control columns, the plane refuses 193 00:11:17,057 --> 00:11:19,945 to climb. The forces necessary to hold 194 00:11:19,985 --> 00:11:21,861 that yoke are increasing and they're 195 00:11:21,893 --> 00:11:23,305 increasing quite rapidly. 196 00:11:35,325 --> 00:11:37,541 Less than five minutes into the flight, 197 00:11:37,653 --> 00:11:40,357 Captain Getichu decides to turn around. 198 00:11:40,541 --> 00:11:43,485 Request a return Vector Radar. Ethiopian 199 00:11:43,525 --> 00:11:46,017 302 requesting Vector back to airport. 200 00:11:46,181 --> 00:11:48,001 There was a lot going on in that cockpit. 201 00:11:48,073 --> 00:11:50,113 There were indicators going off showing a 202 00:11:50,129 --> 00:11:51,977 disagreement in altitude, disagreement in 203 00:11:52,001 --> 00:11:54,385 airspeed. The stick shaker was going off 204 00:11:54,465 --> 00:11:55,977 so the best thing for them to do was to 205 00:11:56,001 --> 00:11:57,649 turn around. Confirmed. Do you want to 206 00:11:57,657 --> 00:11:59,897 hold or make an approach? W to commence 207 00:11:59,961 --> 00:12:05,225 approach turn 208 00:12:05,265 --> 00:12:10,273 rights two six zero two 209 00:12:10,289 --> 00:12:11,245 hundred sixty zero. 210 00:12:16,685 --> 00:12:18,669 The pilots have managed to get their plane 211 00:12:18,717 --> 00:12:21,997 to 6,000ft above the ground. Pitch up 212 00:12:22,021 --> 00:12:25,265 with me, I. The pitch, not the pitch. 213 00:12:26,045 --> 00:12:29,385 But now it starts to plummet. Think great. 214 00:12:39,925 --> 00:12:42,925 Good job. Terrain, terrain, 215 00:12:43,005 --> 00:12:43,745 terrain. 216 00:12:55,365 --> 00:12:58,837 Flight 302 slams into the ground just 30 217 00:12:58,901 --> 00:13:00,345 miles from the airport. 218 00:13:03,345 --> 00:13:06,185 It's the second Max 8 to have crashed in 219 00:13:06,225 --> 00:13:09,337 less than five months. In today's world, 220 00:13:09,521 --> 00:13:12,185 even a single accident is an extreme 221 00:13:12,265 --> 00:13:14,845 rarity. To have two within five months, 222 00:13:15,785 --> 00:13:18,361 it is inconsistent with the level of 223 00:13:18,393 --> 00:13:19,965 safety of modern airliners. 224 00:13:23,665 --> 00:13:25,737 Everyone wants an answer to the same 225 00:13:25,801 --> 00:13:29,241 question. Is there something wrong with 226 00:13:29,273 --> 00:13:32,481 Boeing's latest jet? And we begin tonight 227 00:13:32,513 --> 00:13:34,225 with the Myster swirling around a deadly 228 00:13:34,265 --> 00:13:37,425 plane crash overseas. The new Boeing 737 229 00:13:37,505 --> 00:13:39,537 crashing just minutes after takeoff in 230 00:13:39,561 --> 00:13:42,873 Ethiopia. 157 people were on board 231 00:13:42,969 --> 00:13:45,205 the flight and there were no survivors. 232 00:13:46,585 --> 00:13:48,865 News of the Ethiopian Airlines crash 233 00:13:48,945 --> 00:13:51,365 quickly makes headlines around the world. 234 00:13:52,425 --> 00:13:55,165 The phone rang and my wife answered it. 235 00:13:55,585 --> 00:13:58,931 And I recall hearing her scream and 236 00:13:58,963 --> 00:14:00,415 saying, danielle is dead. 237 00:14:04,835 --> 00:14:09,459 My hearing her shriek and 238 00:14:09,507 --> 00:14:13,147 saying those words was the death 239 00:14:13,171 --> 00:14:15,175 of me too. I died. 240 00:14:16,715 --> 00:14:20,575 This is the last thing that any father 241 00:14:20,955 --> 00:14:22,455 wants to experience. 242 00:14:37,455 --> 00:14:39,743 A team from Ethiopia's Accident 243 00:14:39,839 --> 00:14:41,855 Investigation Bureau is tasked with 244 00:14:41,895 --> 00:14:45,327 finding out why Flight 302 crashed just 245 00:14:45,391 --> 00:14:48,327 five minutes after takeoff. To make a 246 00:14:48,351 --> 00:14:51,339 critter like this, the speed must have 247 00:14:51,347 --> 00:14:52,335 been tremendous. 248 00:14:54,475 --> 00:14:56,995 Much of the wreckage is buried in a crater 249 00:14:57,075 --> 00:15:00,379 more than 30ft deep. You can tell that it 250 00:15:00,387 --> 00:15:03,291 was in a high energy state, that just due 251 00:15:03,323 --> 00:15:05,467 to it creating a crater that it had to 252 00:15:05,491 --> 00:15:08,495 have some kind of angle to it. 253 00:15:11,515 --> 00:15:13,979 The plane's two black boxes are quickly 254 00:15:14,027 --> 00:15:14,615 found. 255 00:15:18,215 --> 00:15:20,431 The Ethiopian government decides to send 256 00:15:20,463 --> 00:15:22,927 them to France's investigative agency to 257 00:15:22,951 --> 00:15:24,595 have the data downloaded. 258 00:15:29,975 --> 00:15:32,807 In Indonesia, the investigation into the 259 00:15:32,871 --> 00:15:35,623 previous Max 8 accident is still underway 260 00:15:35,799 --> 00:15:38,111 as investigators get the news about the 261 00:15:38,143 --> 00:15:40,115 Ethiopian Airlines accident. 262 00:15:41,275 --> 00:15:44,635 First time I heard about Ethiopian Flight 263 00:15:44,715 --> 00:15:48,131 302 crash, I was shocked knowing that 264 00:15:48,243 --> 00:15:52,059 another 737 Max has gone down. The 265 00:15:52,107 --> 00:15:54,371 Indonesian accident involves Lion Air 266 00:15:54,443 --> 00:15:57,611 Flight 610, a Max 8 that took off from 267 00:15:57,643 --> 00:16:00,963 Jakarta with 189 people on board five 268 00:16:01,019 --> 00:16:04,707 months earlier. I was afraid that the 269 00:16:04,891 --> 00:16:08,307 accident was caused by similar issue with 270 00:16:08,331 --> 00:16:11,895 the Lion 610 that we were investigating. 271 00:16:13,955 --> 00:16:16,475 The Indonesian pilots also began 272 00:16:16,555 --> 00:16:18,451 experiencing warnings shortly after 273 00:16:18,483 --> 00:16:21,115 takeoff and also reported having flight 274 00:16:21,195 --> 00:16:24,747 control problems. Following a 275 00:16:24,811 --> 00:16:26,707 series of altitude fluctuations, the 276 00:16:26,731 --> 00:16:29,215 pilots attempted to return to the airport. 277 00:16:31,475 --> 00:16:34,991 The 737 plunged into the Java Sea 11 278 00:16:35,023 --> 00:16:38,495 minutes after takeoff. The investigation 279 00:16:38,575 --> 00:16:40,815 into that accident has zeroed in on an 280 00:16:40,855 --> 00:16:44,303 electronic system known as mcas, the 281 00:16:44,319 --> 00:16:46,671 Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation 282 00:16:46,783 --> 00:16:48,783 system. It's a piece of software in the 283 00:16:48,799 --> 00:16:51,663 flight control computer that directs the 284 00:16:51,719 --> 00:16:53,955 stabilizer to push the nose down. 285 00:16:56,135 --> 00:16:58,063 Investigators in Indonesia have learned 286 00:16:58,119 --> 00:17:00,711 that MAS was added to the max 8 to 287 00:17:00,743 --> 00:17:03,999 compensate for a design problem. In order 288 00:17:04,047 --> 00:17:06,055 to achieve the fuel efficiency Boeing 289 00:17:06,095 --> 00:17:07,999 wanted to, it needed to put bigger engines 290 00:17:08,047 --> 00:17:09,695 on the airplane. And in certain flight 291 00:17:09,735 --> 00:17:11,575 conditions, the nose had a tendency to 292 00:17:11,615 --> 00:17:13,599 pitch up and that's why MCAS was 293 00:17:13,647 --> 00:17:16,887 introduced. If the system 294 00:17:16,951 --> 00:17:19,119 sensed the plane's nose was pitched too 295 00:17:19,167 --> 00:17:21,527 high, it would automatically adjust the 296 00:17:21,551 --> 00:17:23,875 plane's stabilizer to lower the nose. 297 00:17:25,335 --> 00:17:27,327 Indonesian investigators have determined 298 00:17:27,351 --> 00:17:29,359 that a faulty sensor on the Lion Air 299 00:17:29,407 --> 00:17:31,855 flight led MCAS to conclude the plane was 300 00:17:31,895 --> 00:17:33,931 climbing more steeply than it was, 301 00:17:34,103 --> 00:17:36,491 causing it to activate repeatedly until 302 00:17:36,523 --> 00:17:40,135 the plane hit the water. We found that 303 00:17:40,755 --> 00:17:42,827 there was some issue with the TC design of 304 00:17:42,851 --> 00:17:46,947 the system. There are 387 305 00:17:47,011 --> 00:17:50,619 Max 8s flying worldwide with another 5,000 306 00:17:50,707 --> 00:17:54,027 on order. It's rapidly becoming one of 307 00:17:54,051 --> 00:17:56,803 Boeing's most successful airliners. The 308 00:17:56,819 --> 00:17:59,083 Max 8 was the fastest selling aircraft in 309 00:17:59,099 --> 00:18:01,099 Boeing's history. Airlines were really 310 00:18:01,147 --> 00:18:04,371 drawn to the fuel efficiency. The pressure 311 00:18:04,403 --> 00:18:06,843 is on investigators to determine if a flaw 312 00:18:06,899 --> 00:18:09,539 with MCAS also caused the Ethiopian 313 00:18:09,587 --> 00:18:11,883 accident. There was worldwide attention to 314 00:18:11,899 --> 00:18:14,355 this investigation. The whole team was 315 00:18:14,395 --> 00:18:16,483 under a lot of pressure to get answers and 316 00:18:16,499 --> 00:18:17,975 to find out what happened. 317 00:18:26,035 --> 00:18:28,347 Ethiopian investigators start with the 318 00:18:28,371 --> 00:18:30,411 last people who spoke to the crew of 319 00:18:30,443 --> 00:18:33,355 Flight 302 air traffic controllers. 320 00:18:33,475 --> 00:18:35,043 Thanks for your time. Can you take me 321 00:18:35,059 --> 00:18:37,187 through the flight? Normal tax can take 322 00:18:37,211 --> 00:18:40,459 offff Nothing unusual until 2 1/2 minutes 323 00:18:40,507 --> 00:18:41,875 later when they reported a flight control 324 00:18:41,915 --> 00:18:42,495 problem. 325 00:18:44,835 --> 00:18:48,579 Ethiopia 302 would like to maintain 6500. 326 00:18:48,627 --> 00:18:50,615 When we have a flight control problem. 327 00:18:52,095 --> 00:18:53,775 They asked to maintain the current headed 328 00:18:53,895 --> 00:18:56,235 requested permission to at 6,500ft. 329 00:18:56,695 --> 00:18:59,487 And you approved the request? I did, yes, 330 00:18:59,511 --> 00:19:02,919 sir. All investigators know 331 00:19:02,967 --> 00:19:04,927 is that the pilots had a flight control 332 00:19:04,991 --> 00:19:07,255 problem that developed early and prevented 333 00:19:07,295 --> 00:19:09,275 the crew from continuing the flight. 334 00:19:09,855 --> 00:19:11,999 They're aware that they were dealing with 335 00:19:12,007 --> 00:19:14,495 a flight control issue. It would have been 336 00:19:14,535 --> 00:19:16,279 helpful if they could have identified 337 00:19:16,447 --> 00:19:18,351 which control surface they'having the 338 00:19:18,383 --> 00:19:19,315 problem with. 339 00:19:25,685 --> 00:19:28,941 The team turns to Flight 302's radar track 340 00:19:29,053 --> 00:19:31,385 to understand the sequence of events. 341 00:19:32,685 --> 00:19:34,145 Slow, shallow, climb out. 342 00:19:37,085 --> 00:19:40,237 Now look here. Instead of climbing, they 343 00:19:40,261 --> 00:19:42,909 lose altitude, regain it, then lose more. 344 00:19:43,077 --> 00:19:46,277 Instead of continuing to climb or to 345 00:19:46,301 --> 00:19:48,605 maintain an altitude, there was actually 346 00:19:48,685 --> 00:19:50,585 dips in the altitude. 347 00:19:51,965 --> 00:19:54,845 The radar data paints a picture of a crew 348 00:19:54,925 --> 00:19:57,157 struggling to keep its plane in a climb. 349 00:19:57,221 --> 00:19:59,225 Don't sink, don't sink. 350 00:20:02,285 --> 00:20:06,341 They're trying to get to 6,500ft 351 00:20:06,493 --> 00:20:09,745 but never get higher than 6,200. 352 00:20:10,685 --> 00:20:12,293 They're starting to make a turn back to 353 00:20:12,309 --> 00:20:15,281 the airport. Now they're in a dive, 354 00:20:15,313 --> 00:20:17,925 descending at 33,000ft per minute. 355 00:20:19,345 --> 00:20:21,057 The speeds were at the maximum for this 356 00:20:21,081 --> 00:20:23,617 aircraft. The intensity inside the plane 357 00:20:23,761 --> 00:20:25,285 must have been terrifying. 358 00:20:27,745 --> 00:20:29,645 Let me see the Lion Air track, please. 359 00:20:39,325 --> 00:20:41,477 A slow climb, a series of altitude 360 00:20:41,501 --> 00:20:45,309 fluctuations. I turn back to 361 00:20:45,317 --> 00:20:48,145 the airport and rapid descent. 362 00:20:48,765 --> 00:20:49,945 They're pretty close. 363 00:20:55,405 --> 00:20:57,797 The fact that this plane crashed almost 364 00:20:57,821 --> 00:21:00,109 immediately after takeoff in very similar 365 00:21:00,157 --> 00:21:02,317 circumstances raised a lot of questions in 366 00:21:02,341 --> 00:21:05,757 everyone's minds. Investigators turned to 367 00:21:05,781 --> 00:21:07,661 a key piece of the wreckage for 368 00:21:07,733 --> 00:21:10,093 confirmation that MCAS played a role in 369 00:21:10,109 --> 00:21:12,523 the accident. Pretty good shape. You got 370 00:21:12,539 --> 00:21:16,027 lucky. A jack screw, the device that 371 00:21:16,091 --> 00:21:17,651 controls the position of the plane's 372 00:21:17,683 --> 00:21:20,095 horizontal stabilizer, is recovered. 373 00:21:22,635 --> 00:21:25,147 A ball nut moves along the jack screw to 374 00:21:25,171 --> 00:21:26,855 help adjust the plane's pitch. 375 00:21:32,075 --> 00:21:37,175 5 inches full 376 00:21:37,215 --> 00:21:40,887 nose downt trim. The evidence shows that 377 00:21:40,911 --> 00:21:43,391 the plane went into its final dive because 378 00:21:43,423 --> 00:21:45,895 the stabilizer had moved to an extreme 379 00:21:45,975 --> 00:21:47,435 nose down position. 380 00:21:49,095 --> 00:21:51,327 Full nose down trim is not something that 381 00:21:51,351 --> 00:21:54,351 you ever see in the normal flight of a 382 00:21:54,383 --> 00:21:57,519 737. In the 15 years that 383 00:21:57,527 --> 00:21:59,719 I flew it, I don't know that we ever got 384 00:21:59,767 --> 00:22:01,515 even close to full nose down. 385 00:22:03,995 --> 00:22:06,355 The Lion Air flight is identical. A pitch 386 00:22:06,395 --> 00:22:08,491 trim of 1.5 degrees resulting in our rapid 387 00:22:08,523 --> 00:22:12,227 descent. The pilots wouldn't 388 00:22:12,251 --> 00:22:15,715 do that. The jack screw all but confirms 389 00:22:15,795 --> 00:22:18,843 that Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and 390 00:22:18,899 --> 00:22:21,923 Lion Air Flight 610 had the same cause. 391 00:22:22,059 --> 00:22:24,283 A malfunction of the plane's electronic 392 00:22:24,339 --> 00:22:27,643 MCAS system that was literally the smoking 393 00:22:27,699 --> 00:22:30,047 gun that def definitively told them what 394 00:22:30,071 --> 00:22:34,007 had happened to the airplane. There's now 395 00:22:34,071 --> 00:22:36,111 enough evidence to convince aviation 396 00:22:36,183 --> 00:22:38,335 authorities around the world that the Max 397 00:22:38,375 --> 00:22:41,287 8 presents a risk to passengers. We're 398 00:22:41,311 --> 00:22:43,575 going to be issuing an emergency order of 399 00:22:43,615 --> 00:22:46,415 prohibition to ground all flights of the 400 00:22:46,495 --> 00:22:49,995 737 Max 8. 401 00:22:51,055 --> 00:22:53,439 The question now facing Ethiopian 402 00:22:53,527 --> 00:22:55,271 investigators is how could this have 403 00:22:55,303 --> 00:22:56,395 happened again? 404 00:23:01,295 --> 00:23:03,795 These documents came out four months ago. 405 00:23:04,575 --> 00:23:06,959 Following the accident in Indonesia. Both 406 00:23:07,007 --> 00:23:09,695 Boeing and the FAA issued bulletins 407 00:23:09,775 --> 00:23:12,415 advising pilots of the steps to take if 408 00:23:12,455 --> 00:23:15,035 MCAS began forcing the nose down. 409 00:23:16,655 --> 00:23:19,151 The documents advise pilots to follow the 410 00:23:19,183 --> 00:23:21,295 existing procedure for a malfunctioning 411 00:23:21,335 --> 00:23:24,325 trim system and disengage the autopilot, 412 00:23:25,505 --> 00:23:28,485 set the stabilizer trim switches to cutout 413 00:23:30,105 --> 00:23:32,521 and to use their manual trim wheel to 414 00:23:32,553 --> 00:23:34,433 counteract the automatic downward 415 00:23:34,489 --> 00:23:37,465 stabilizer movement. BOEING and the FAA 416 00:23:37,505 --> 00:23:39,753 felt that the AirWortthhi directive was 417 00:23:39,889 --> 00:23:41,681 all pilots needed to be able to recover 418 00:23:41,753 --> 00:23:42,993 from what they thought would be an 419 00:23:43,009 --> 00:23:44,325 extremely rare event. 420 00:23:52,365 --> 00:23:54,385 Did the pilots know about this procedure? 421 00:23:55,285 --> 00:23:59,213 You'd hope so. The airline 422 00:23:59,269 --> 00:24:01,805 has an obligation to train the pilots to 423 00:24:01,885 --> 00:24:03,989 ensure that there is a sufficient 424 00:24:04,117 --> 00:24:06,557 understanding of what the information is 425 00:24:06,621 --> 00:24:08,637 trying to tell them so that they act 426 00:24:08,701 --> 00:24:12,029 appropriately. We incorporated the borring 427 00:24:12,077 --> 00:24:13,985 bulletin into our flight manual. 428 00:24:20,865 --> 00:24:22,721 Were you pilots advised of the revision? 429 00:24:22,873 --> 00:24:24,553 All our pilots were fully breathed. Of 430 00:24:24,569 --> 00:24:25,125 course, 431 00:24:33,385 --> 00:24:35,897 the pilots of Flight 302 knew the 432 00:24:35,921 --> 00:24:38,793 procedure for disabling MCAS. The question 433 00:24:38,849 --> 00:24:41,065 is, did they follow it? 434 00:24:47,845 --> 00:24:51,429 Here it is. Let's load it up. The cockpit 435 00:24:51,477 --> 00:24:53,717 voice recording from Ethiopian Airlines 436 00:24:53,781 --> 00:24:55,973 Flight 302 has been successfully 437 00:24:56,029 --> 00:24:58,265 downloaded by technicians in France. 438 00:24:58,605 --> 00:25:00,745 Okay, let's hear it. 439 00:25:03,605 --> 00:25:07,575 The one. Rotate positive rate. 440 00:25:08,395 --> 00:25:11,775 Gear up. Takeoff rol as normal. 441 00:25:12,275 --> 00:25:14,179 Investigators listen for clues that can 442 00:25:14,227 --> 00:25:16,735 explain how MCAS brought down the plane. 443 00:25:17,275 --> 00:25:21,595 Climb to 340. Ethiopian 300 twoaps 444 00:25:21,635 --> 00:25:25,003 up. Flaps up. 445 00:25:25,099 --> 00:25:27,507 The MCAS system is designed to activate 446 00:25:27,571 --> 00:25:29,651 only when it senses that three conditions 447 00:25:29,723 --> 00:25:34,115 are met. Nose up, flaps fully retracted, 448 00:25:34,455 --> 00:25:36,195 and autopilot off. 449 00:25:39,615 --> 00:25:42,279 That's the autopilot disconnecting. O. 450 00:25:42,367 --> 00:25:44,335 Okay. So now they've met the three 451 00:25:44,375 --> 00:25:46,155 conditions for MCAS activation. 452 00:25:48,415 --> 00:25:50,351 Investigators continue listening for 453 00:25:50,383 --> 00:25:53,047 evidence that MCAS activated pitching the 454 00:25:53,071 --> 00:25:55,863 plane downwards. We're having flight 455 00:25:55,919 --> 00:25:58,075 control problems. We right on here. 456 00:26:02,895 --> 00:26:04,355 He's losing altitude. 457 00:26:07,855 --> 00:26:09,875 MCAS is pushing the nose down. 458 00:26:16,935 --> 00:26:17,675 Up. 459 00:26:20,415 --> 00:26:22,463 Investigators hear the pilots struggling 460 00:26:22,519 --> 00:26:25,155 to trim their plane nose up. So you begin 461 00:26:25,195 --> 00:26:28,339 to get this tug of war between the pilot 462 00:26:28,387 --> 00:26:30,939 trimming nose up and MCAS trimming nose 463 00:26:30,987 --> 00:26:34,035 down. But mcksas is relentless. It doesn't 464 00:26:34,075 --> 00:26:36,695 stop. Tr Tr up. 465 00:26:39,595 --> 00:26:41,835 The team then hears an exchange that 466 00:26:41,875 --> 00:26:43,615 transforms the investigation. 467 00:26:46,755 --> 00:26:49,731 Stab. Trim. Cut up. Stabrum. Cutout. Yes. 468 00:26:49,763 --> 00:26:53,477 Yes. Do it. Stabt from cut out. 469 00:26:53,661 --> 00:26:57,185 Can you pause for a second? They did it. 470 00:27:01,045 --> 00:27:02,589 They set the trim switches to cut out 471 00:27:02,637 --> 00:27:05,173 exactly as Boeing advised them to do. I 472 00:27:05,189 --> 00:27:08,105 think that's the surprise. The crew 473 00:27:08,405 --> 00:27:11,933 attempted to do that procedure and it 474 00:27:11,949 --> 00:27:14,261 wasn't successful. The autopilot 475 00:27:14,293 --> 00:27:15,945 disengaged. We heard the alarm. 476 00:27:17,825 --> 00:27:19,593 They set their stabilizer trim switches to 477 00:27:19,609 --> 00:27:22,897 cut out. Now they need 478 00:27:22,921 --> 00:27:25,121 to manually trim to get their nose back 479 00:27:25,153 --> 00:27:28,601 up. Let's hear Gettch up. 480 00:27:28,753 --> 00:27:31,205 Pitch up. Gettch up. Do with me. 481 00:27:33,505 --> 00:27:34,805 Is the TRM engaged? 482 00:27:36,145 --> 00:27:38,685 No. Shall I try manually? Try it. 483 00:27:41,685 --> 00:27:44,597 The 737 has a manual backup about how to 484 00:27:44,621 --> 00:27:48,525 move trim using cables. And the wheel 485 00:27:48,605 --> 00:27:50,277 has actually got a handle in it where you 486 00:27:50,301 --> 00:27:51,705 can manually trim it. 487 00:27:54,285 --> 00:27:58,061 It's not working on the 488 00:27:58,093 --> 00:28:01,197 pitch. Not the pitch. But the pilots are 489 00:28:01,221 --> 00:28:03,665 not able to adjust the pitch manually. 490 00:28:04,085 --> 00:28:06,425 They don't physically have enough strength 491 00:28:06,765 --> 00:28:09,517 to move the horizontal stabilizer via the 492 00:28:09,541 --> 00:28:12,813 manual trim wheel. They're trying to 493 00:28:12,829 --> 00:28:14,973 do this, but it doesn't sound like it's 494 00:28:15,029 --> 00:28:15,625 working. 495 00:28:18,885 --> 00:28:21,253 And then they come up with a solution that 496 00:28:21,309 --> 00:28:24,465 seals their fate. Put them up. 497 00:28:25,525 --> 00:28:29,421 No. Oh, no. No. Unable to 498 00:28:29,453 --> 00:28:31,693 pitch the plane up manually, the pilots 499 00:28:31,749 --> 00:28:35,333 make one final desperate move. They 500 00:28:35,389 --> 00:28:38,109 reengage the automatic trim to help move 501 00:28:38,157 --> 00:28:39,345 the stabilizer. 502 00:28:42,845 --> 00:28:45,453 Unfortunately, that wakes the beast. And 503 00:28:45,469 --> 00:28:46,613 then it's going to sit there and it's 504 00:28:46,629 --> 00:28:48,645 going to trim it down one more time again. 505 00:28:48,725 --> 00:28:50,945 So it works against them. 506 00:28:51,445 --> 00:28:56,213 Cautioninch there 507 00:28:56,229 --> 00:28:57,693 was no way to control the airplane. The 508 00:28:57,709 --> 00:28:59,461 pitch was going to continue to go nose 509 00:28:59,493 --> 00:29:04,095 down. Rian Terrain terrain. 510 00:29:04,175 --> 00:29:15,023 Terrain by they 511 00:29:15,039 --> 00:29:18,035 knew what to do. He tried to do it. 512 00:29:19,495 --> 00:29:23,795 For whatever reason, it didn't work. 513 00:29:25,515 --> 00:29:27,603 The Ethiopians have made a stunning 514 00:29:27,659 --> 00:29:30,547 discovery, one they quickly share with the 515 00:29:30,571 --> 00:29:33,571 world. The crew performed all the 516 00:29:33,603 --> 00:29:36,935 procedures repeatedly 517 00:29:37,235 --> 00:29:40,507 provided by the manufacturer, but was not 518 00:29:40,571 --> 00:29:43,175 able to control their craft. 519 00:29:47,475 --> 00:29:50,451 STABT TRM Cut up ST STATTRUM Cutout yes. 520 00:29:50,483 --> 00:29:52,941 Yes, do it. Investigators are left with a 521 00:29:52,973 --> 00:29:56,541 burning question. STABTRAM Cutout. If the 522 00:29:56,573 --> 00:29:59,845 pilots did what Boeing advised, why 523 00:29:59,885 --> 00:30:01,837 weren't they able to pull out of the dive 524 00:30:01,901 --> 00:30:11,749 that MCAS put them into? P Investigators 525 00:30:11,797 --> 00:30:13,717 turned to the flight data recorder from 526 00:30:13,741 --> 00:30:16,893 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 to better 527 00:30:16,989 --> 00:30:19,301 understand why MCAS was activated, 528 00:30:19,413 --> 00:30:23,005 causing the plane to crash right here. 529 00:30:23,505 --> 00:30:26,041 Ten seconds after takeoff, readings for 530 00:30:26,073 --> 00:30:28,761 angle of attack, airspeed and altitude 531 00:30:28,793 --> 00:30:32,521 begin to diverge. MCAS is only 532 00:30:32,553 --> 00:30:34,553 supposed to activate when the max 8 533 00:30:34,609 --> 00:30:37,633 reaches an extreme angle of attack or high 534 00:30:37,689 --> 00:30:41,041 pitch angle. A sensor on 535 00:30:41,073 --> 00:30:43,113 each side of the airplane calculates the 536 00:30:43,129 --> 00:30:45,097 angle of attack by measuring the plane's 537 00:30:45,121 --> 00:30:47,045 angle into the oncoming air. 538 00:30:51,105 --> 00:30:53,521 Sure looks like a sensor issue. The 539 00:30:53,553 --> 00:30:55,225 captain's side can't be right. 540 00:30:55,385 --> 00:30:59,097 Absolutely. The data shows a steep spike 541 00:30:59,161 --> 00:31:01,605 in the captain's angle of attack reading. 542 00:31:04,745 --> 00:31:07,033 That explains the stick shaker. Yep, 543 00:31:07,089 --> 00:31:10,609 false alarm. The plane 544 00:31:10,657 --> 00:31:13,311 was never in danger of stalling. The 545 00:31:13,343 --> 00:31:15,903 warning was triggered by faulty pitch data 546 00:31:15,999 --> 00:31:18,207 from a malfunction in an angle of attack 547 00:31:18,271 --> 00:31:20,431 sensor. The captain's side shows a pitch 548 00:31:20,463 --> 00:31:23,815 up of as much as 74 degrees. The first 549 00:31:23,895 --> 00:31:26,591 officer s side is correct. A any 15 degree 550 00:31:26,623 --> 00:31:29,847 pitch. Investigators discover the 551 00:31:29,871 --> 00:31:32,095 malfunction was only on the captain's 552 00:31:32,135 --> 00:31:35,135 side. So up until this point, the flight 553 00:31:35,175 --> 00:31:38,735 is actually fine on the Ethiopian 554 00:31:38,775 --> 00:31:41,519 airplane. Something happened to that 555 00:31:41,567 --> 00:31:43,875 sensor just shortly after takeoff. 556 00:31:45,335 --> 00:31:47,823 So one faulty sensor brings down the 557 00:31:47,839 --> 00:31:50,927 plane. A single failure should not be 558 00:31:50,951 --> 00:31:53,223 catastrophic. There should be backup. 559 00:31:53,279 --> 00:31:55,831 There should be redundancy. So if there is 560 00:31:56,023 --> 00:31:57,991 something that occurs within the system, 561 00:31:58,183 --> 00:32:01,367 that the crew should be able to counter 562 00:32:01,391 --> 00:32:04,799 it. The FDR 563 00:32:04,847 --> 00:32:07,315 data can show us when the MCAS activated. 564 00:32:09,365 --> 00:32:12,325 The team studies how MCAS behaved for 565 00:32:12,365 --> 00:32:15,625 Flight 302. Here, 566 00:32:16,445 --> 00:32:20,173 here and here. The plane 567 00:32:20,229 --> 00:32:22,565 pitches down even though the pilots are 568 00:32:22,605 --> 00:32:25,621 pulling up on their control columns. The 569 00:32:25,653 --> 00:32:27,965 faulty sensor led to four separate 570 00:32:28,005 --> 00:32:30,861 activations. Of the MCAS system driving 571 00:32:30,893 --> 00:32:33,365 the planes's nose down as the pilots were 572 00:32:33,405 --> 00:32:37,139 trying to pitch up. The fourth MAS 573 00:32:37,187 --> 00:32:39,227 activation pitched the nose down when the 574 00:32:39,251 --> 00:32:41,975 plane was only 6,000ft above the ground. 575 00:32:42,835 --> 00:32:45,195 It put the plane into a steep and rapid 576 00:32:45,235 --> 00:32:48,891 descent from which the pilots 577 00:32:48,963 --> 00:32:50,175 could not recover. 578 00:32:57,075 --> 00:32:59,307 So why couldn't the pilots disable the 579 00:32:59,331 --> 00:33:01,531 MCAs even though they followed the 580 00:33:01,563 --> 00:33:04,519 recommended procedure? Investigators 581 00:33:04,567 --> 00:33:07,663 examine Flight 302's speed leading up to 582 00:33:07,679 --> 00:33:10,111 the crew's attempt to override the MCAs. 583 00:33:10,263 --> 00:33:13,159 They lift off at 140 knots. Absolutely 584 00:33:13,207 --> 00:33:16,167 perfect. But as they climb, their speed 585 00:33:16,271 --> 00:33:19,759 increases. It reaches 340 586 00:33:19,807 --> 00:33:21,919 knots by the time they try to use manual 587 00:33:21,967 --> 00:33:25,795 trim. The overspeed warning sounds here 588 00:33:26,375 --> 00:33:28,355 and stays on for the rest of the flight. 589 00:33:29,715 --> 00:33:33,026 Normally you would be in the 220, 590 00:33:33,211 --> 00:33:36,371 250 knot range. This was 100 knots 591 00:33:36,443 --> 00:33:39,139 plus faster than that. No wonder they 592 00:33:39,147 --> 00:33:40,455 couldn't move their trim wheel. 593 00:33:42,915 --> 00:33:45,595 The speed increased the air load on the 594 00:33:45,635 --> 00:33:47,947 stabilizer, making it impossible for the 595 00:33:47,971 --> 00:33:50,139 pilots to move it manually with their trim 596 00:33:50,187 --> 00:33:50,815 wheel. 597 00:33:53,795 --> 00:33:54,975 It's not working. 598 00:33:58,275 --> 00:34:00,811 Once you get to high speed, you're no 599 00:34:00,843 --> 00:34:03,027 longer strong enough as a human to move 600 00:34:03,051 --> 00:34:03,615 it. 601 00:34:06,195 --> 00:34:08,427 Why such high speed? Have a look at their 602 00:34:08,451 --> 00:34:11,443 auto throttle setting. They lift off with 603 00:34:11,459 --> 00:34:13,955 the auto throttle in takeoff mode. Right 604 00:34:13,995 --> 00:34:16,427 about here. The auto throttle should be 605 00:34:16,451 --> 00:34:18,995 pulling back from takeoff thrust to climb 606 00:34:19,035 --> 00:34:22,373 thrust. But that never happens. It stays 607 00:34:22,429 --> 00:34:24,305 at max takeoff thrust. 608 00:34:25,685 --> 00:34:28,629 Same sensor I guess. Uh huh. The auto 609 00:34:28,677 --> 00:34:30,693 throttle is also connected to the left 610 00:34:30,749 --> 00:34:33,605 side angle of attack sensor. Once the 611 00:34:33,645 --> 00:34:36,197 sensor failed, that disabled the auto 612 00:34:36,221 --> 00:34:38,517 throttle system, so the power stayed where 613 00:34:38,541 --> 00:34:39,265 it was. 614 00:34:42,085 --> 00:34:44,461 We're having blight control problems. As 615 00:34:44,493 --> 00:34:46,745 they dealt with the escalating crisis, 616 00:34:47,224 --> 00:34:49,312 the pilots didn't notice that their thrust 617 00:34:49,368 --> 00:34:52,204 levers remained at maximum takeoff power. 618 00:34:52,624 --> 00:34:56,264 737s are very powerful jets and they 619 00:34:56,344 --> 00:34:59,432 will continue to accelerate very rapidly 620 00:34:59,528 --> 00:35:01,404 if you don't reduce the power. 621 00:35:03,064 --> 00:35:04,824 Boeing didn't say anything about the trim 622 00:35:04,864 --> 00:35:08,280 wheel being difficult to move or about 623 00:35:08,312 --> 00:35:12,848 air sped. The Ethiopian 624 00:35:12,936 --> 00:35:14,912 investigators now turn their attention to 625 00:35:14,928 --> 00:35:17,456 the advice Boeing gave pilots after the 626 00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,929 Lion Air accident. The Lionair flight 627 00:35:20,977 --> 00:35:22,929 had necessitated this airorthiness 628 00:35:22,977 --> 00:35:25,073 directive. So the question becomes, was 629 00:35:25,089 --> 00:35:28,525 that enough? No mention of M Testss. 630 00:35:29,145 --> 00:35:31,177 No mention of how much force may be needed 631 00:35:31,201 --> 00:35:34,965 to trim manually. No mention of Aireed. 632 00:35:35,305 --> 00:35:38,561 That's a lot to leave out. The 633 00:35:38,633 --> 00:35:40,729 investigation has uncovered shortcomings 634 00:35:40,777 --> 00:35:43,081 in the guidance Boeing provided following 635 00:35:43,113 --> 00:35:47,669 the Lionair accident in 636 00:35:47,717 --> 00:35:49,965 Indonesia. Investigators have discovered 637 00:35:50,005 --> 00:35:51,861 that a maintenance error led to the 638 00:35:51,893 --> 00:35:54,109 failure of the crucial angle of attack, 639 00:35:54,237 --> 00:35:57,365 or AOA sensor in the Lionair accident. 640 00:35:57,525 --> 00:35:59,853 What caused its failure on the Ethiopian 641 00:35:59,909 --> 00:36:04,629 Flight investigators 642 00:36:04,677 --> 00:36:06,757 examine maintenance records for any 643 00:36:06,781 --> 00:36:09,261 evidence of trouble. So the Ethiopian 644 00:36:09,333 --> 00:36:10,493 investigation did look into the 645 00:36:10,509 --> 00:36:13,581 maintenance to the sensor. There was none 646 00:36:13,733 --> 00:36:16,065 its original install to the airplane. 647 00:36:17,125 --> 00:36:19,757 They do uncover several other maintenance 648 00:36:19,821 --> 00:36:21,945 issues on the four month old plane. 649 00:36:27,485 --> 00:36:29,421 It's a lot of electrical faults for a 650 00:36:29,453 --> 00:36:32,005 brand new airplane. The Ethiopian team 651 00:36:32,085 --> 00:36:34,773 suspects the AOA sensor on Flight 302 652 00:36:34,829 --> 00:36:37,185 failed due to an underlying electrical for 653 00:36:37,965 --> 00:36:39,981 the sense of failure is also being 654 00:36:40,013 --> 00:36:43,317 scrutinized by the ntsb. We also looked at 655 00:36:43,381 --> 00:36:46,421 how the AOA could fail and what that 656 00:36:46,453 --> 00:36:49,845 failure would look like. That analysis is 657 00:36:49,885 --> 00:36:51,965 coming to a very different conclusion 658 00:36:52,045 --> 00:36:54,105 about the origins of the failure. 659 00:36:59,845 --> 00:37:02,737 44 seconds after they start to roll, this 660 00:37:02,761 --> 00:37:05,257 happens. Captain's angle of attack, 661 00:37:05,361 --> 00:37:08,481 airspeed and altitude values deviate. The 662 00:37:08,513 --> 00:37:11,737 NTSB travels to Collins'aerospace the 663 00:37:11,761 --> 00:37:14,225 manufacturer of the angle of attack sensor 664 00:37:14,345 --> 00:37:16,481 and asks their engineers to look at the 665 00:37:16,513 --> 00:37:19,441 fault Data for Flight 302. Six seconds 666 00:37:19,513 --> 00:37:21,601 later, the heater on the sensor goes 667 00:37:21,633 --> 00:37:22,365 offline. 668 00:37:25,745 --> 00:37:29,545 Massive caution. Anti ice okay. 669 00:37:31,085 --> 00:37:34,029 These simultaneous failures all point to 670 00:37:34,077 --> 00:37:36,861 one thing. Sensor broke off. It's the only 671 00:37:36,893 --> 00:37:40,125 explanation to determine 672 00:37:40,165 --> 00:37:42,061 what could have caused the sensor to break 673 00:37:42,093 --> 00:37:44,945 off. Have a look at this. 674 00:37:45,965 --> 00:37:49,237 They compare the FDR data to data from 675 00:37:49,261 --> 00:37:52,225 a bird strike. They're almost identical. 676 00:37:53,945 --> 00:37:57,801 The US investigation side 677 00:37:57,953 --> 00:38:01,801 felt that the data supported more of a 678 00:38:01,953 --> 00:38:05,249 in inflight impact with the angle of 679 00:38:05,297 --> 00:38:08,521 attack cesor the 680 00:38:08,553 --> 00:38:11,177 hazard posed by eagles and other large 681 00:38:11,241 --> 00:38:13,337 birds is well known at Addis Ababa's 682 00:38:13,361 --> 00:38:16,073 airport. The airport in Addis Ababa had 683 00:38:16,129 --> 00:38:18,025 had problems with bird strikes. The 684 00:38:18,065 --> 00:38:20,257 airport had several mitigation strategies 685 00:38:20,281 --> 00:38:21,685 in place because of that. 686 00:38:23,665 --> 00:38:25,965 D1 Rotate. 687 00:38:27,305 --> 00:38:30,171 Collins Aerospace concludes that as Flight 688 00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:33,289 302 lifted off the ground, a bird struck 689 00:38:33,337 --> 00:38:36,325 the sensor, tearing the vein from the hub. 690 00:38:37,425 --> 00:38:38,325 GE're up. 691 00:38:42,945 --> 00:38:44,725 We were having flight control problems. 692 00:38:45,125 --> 00:38:46,925 Whether the sensor failed due to 693 00:38:46,965 --> 00:38:49,237 electrical failure or a bird strike, 694 00:38:49,421 --> 00:38:51,925 investigators now know why Ethiopian 695 00:38:51,965 --> 00:38:54,837 Airlines Flight 302 crashed shortly after 696 00:38:54,861 --> 00:38:58,225 takeoff. Here's a chain of events. 697 00:38:59,405 --> 00:39:01,317 The failed sensor triggers a series of 698 00:39:01,341 --> 00:39:02,585 warnings and alarms. 699 00:39:07,085 --> 00:39:07,945 Gear up. 700 00:39:15,465 --> 00:39:17,897 The erroneous angle of attack data causes 701 00:39:17,921 --> 00:39:21,377 MCAS to activate. Pitching the nose down. 702 00:39:21,561 --> 00:39:24,365 Don't think, don't think, 703 00:39:24,905 --> 00:39:26,005 don't think. 704 00:39:29,745 --> 00:39:31,297 They do what Boeing recommends and move 705 00:39:31,321 --> 00:39:33,857 the trim switches to cut out. Stab himim 706 00:39:33,881 --> 00:39:36,759 Cut out. Statab him cutout. Yes. Yes. Do 707 00:39:36,767 --> 00:39:40,195 it. Stattrum cut out. 708 00:39:40,575 --> 00:39:44,119 But they're unable to manually trim the 709 00:39:44,127 --> 00:39:47,071 wheel is almost impossible to move. They 710 00:39:47,103 --> 00:39:47,915 never recover. 711 00:39:54,855 --> 00:39:58,359 On m the pitch. On m the pitch. It was 712 00:39:58,447 --> 00:40:00,727 very obvious to them that they no longer 713 00:40:00,751 --> 00:40:03,067 had control of the airplane and that they 714 00:40:03,091 --> 00:40:05,347 couldn't stop. This recovery was 715 00:40:05,371 --> 00:40:07,975 impossible. Good job. 716 00:40:30,295 --> 00:40:33,895 For the NTSB, the Max 8 accidents provided 717 00:40:33,935 --> 00:40:36,495 a valuable lesson about assumptions made 718 00:40:36,535 --> 00:40:39,359 by aircraft manufacturers regarding how 719 00:40:39,407 --> 00:40:42,327 pilots respond to emergencies. I think 720 00:40:42,351 --> 00:40:43,823 these two accidents are going to be the 721 00:40:43,839 --> 00:40:45,743 watershed events on how we look at the 722 00:40:45,799 --> 00:40:47,407 human factors for design and 723 00:40:47,431 --> 00:40:48,395 certification. 724 00:40:50,215 --> 00:40:53,071 As a result of the two accidents, Boeing 725 00:40:53,183 --> 00:40:57,145 overhauls the Max 8'MCAS system. The MCAS 726 00:40:57,225 --> 00:40:59,761 system now relies on information from two 727 00:40:59,833 --> 00:41:03,657 sensors. It will only activate once and it 728 00:41:03,681 --> 00:41:06,153 will not override pilots? S ability to 729 00:41:06,209 --> 00:41:07,809 control the airplane with the control 730 00:41:07,857 --> 00:41:10,761 column. Boeing also offers pilots enhanced 731 00:41:10,833 --> 00:41:12,725 training on the MCAS system. 732 00:41:16,505 --> 00:41:18,937 Many feel the changes Boeing made to the 733 00:41:18,961 --> 00:41:20,805 max 8 came too late. 734 00:41:24,565 --> 00:41:26,933 Ethiopian 302 should have been prevented. 735 00:41:27,069 --> 00:41:29,405 Boeing should have got to the root causes 736 00:41:29,485 --> 00:41:31,661 of the problems on the Lion Air flight. 737 00:41:31,813 --> 00:41:34,925 Boeing didn't. For the devastated family 738 00:41:34,965 --> 00:41:37,365 of Danielle Moore, Boeing's greater 739 00:41:37,405 --> 00:41:40,021 failure was not advising pilots about the 740 00:41:40,053 --> 00:41:43,821 danger of mcas. The Bolton from Boeing was 741 00:41:43,853 --> 00:41:46,469 not good enough to prevent an accident. 742 00:41:46,597 --> 00:41:51,677 The plane was still unsafe and 743 00:41:51,701 --> 00:41:55,925 it caused a life of my daughter and 157 744 00:41:55,965 --> 00:41:56,545 people. 745 00:42:01,605 --> 00:42:04,797 In November 2020, after a 20 month 746 00:42:04,861 --> 00:42:07,565 grounding, the Max 8 is cleared to fly.