1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,520 Hey, man, we're going down. We can't keep going down. 2 00:00:03,520 --> 00:00:07,080 Above the Pacific Ocean, the pilots of Transair Flight 810 3 00:00:07,080 --> 00:00:09,440 can't get their cargo plane to climb. 4 00:00:09,440 --> 00:00:11,840 Just hitting the water is going to tear the airplane apart. 5 00:00:13,870 --> 00:00:16,128 We're in the water! We're in the water! 6 00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:22,200 Remarkably, they survive the crash and are rescued by the Coast Guard. 7 00:00:22,200 --> 00:00:25,960 They're covered in gasoline and hydraulic fluid, so it wasn't pretty. 8 00:00:25,960 --> 00:00:28,680 Investigators are eager to interview the crew. 9 00:00:28,680 --> 00:00:31,720 Did both engines fail at the same time? 10 00:00:31,720 --> 00:00:34,800 Most likely. That's my conclusion. 11 00:00:34,800 --> 00:00:38,520 The evidence does not support the pilots' assessment. 12 00:00:38,520 --> 00:00:42,400 It looks fine. No internal damage. 13 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:45,800 So, it was critical for us to get more information 14 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:48,513 to better understand what had happened there. 15 00:01:12,249 --> 00:01:16,380 It's the middle of the night at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport 16 00:01:16,380 --> 00:01:18,465 in Honolulu, Hawaii. 17 00:01:20,260 --> 00:01:23,700 OK. Let's see. 18 00:01:23,700 --> 00:01:28,300 Crews have just finished loading cargo for Transair Flight 810. 19 00:01:28,300 --> 00:01:30,660 OK, thank you. See you. 20 00:01:30,660 --> 00:01:33,380 The captain of tonight's flight is Henry Okai. 21 00:01:33,380 --> 00:01:36,860 He has almost 16,000 flying hours. 22 00:01:36,860 --> 00:01:39,300 So, this captain is highly experienced in the aircraft 23 00:01:39,300 --> 00:01:42,020 and doing it for a while. 24 00:01:42,020 --> 00:01:44,420 Engine start checklist. 25 00:01:44,420 --> 00:01:46,340 Engine start checklist. 26 00:01:46,340 --> 00:01:48,860 Tail stand removed. 27 00:01:49,060 --> 00:01:50,060 Cargo. 28 00:01:50,060 --> 00:01:52,540 First Officer Gregory Ryan is a lawyer 29 00:01:52,540 --> 00:01:56,100 who recently returned to flying part-time for Transair. 30 00:01:56,100 --> 00:01:59,060 It's not necessarily the best pilot career straight up, 31 00:01:59,060 --> 00:02:03,660 but you do get to be in Hawaii, you get to fly an airplane. 32 00:02:03,660 --> 00:02:05,660 Engine start checklist complete. 33 00:02:05,660 --> 00:02:06,660 And... 34 00:02:08,260 --> 00:02:11,060 Clear right. Clear right. 35 00:02:11,060 --> 00:02:14,660 Transair flights use Rhoades Express as a call sign. 36 00:02:16,382 --> 00:02:18,128 Tower, Rhoades Express 810 37 00:02:18,153 --> 00:02:19,095 Taxi Kilo 38 00:02:20,595 --> 00:02:23,195 Rhoades Express 810, Honolulu Tower. 39 00:02:23,220 --> 00:02:28,740 Runway 8 right. Taxi via Charlie, Romeo, Tango, Romeo, Alpha. 40 00:02:34,480 --> 00:02:38,080 Transair is owned and operated by Rhoades Aviation, 41 00:02:38,080 --> 00:02:41,240 which transports cargo between the Hawaiian islands. 42 00:02:41,240 --> 00:02:44,360 They had the postal contract, which was quite lucrative. 43 00:02:44,360 --> 00:02:46,680 Their focus was on keeping their costs down 44 00:02:46,680 --> 00:02:51,159 to maintain their advantage over more and well-established competitors. 45 00:02:52,966 --> 00:02:56,246 The plane is a Boeing 737-200, 46 00:02:56,480 --> 00:03:00,765 built in the 1960s and 70s for passenger travel. 47 00:03:01,149 --> 00:03:05,000 Today, they're workhorses for transporting cargo. 48 00:03:05,000 --> 00:03:06,400 Between engines, small aircraft, 49 00:03:06,400 --> 00:03:08,360 it was designed for short-haul operations. 50 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:10,280 It wasn't very sophisticated, no automation. 51 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:11,815 I love flying that airplane. 52 00:03:13,063 --> 00:03:16,155 The pilots prepare for take-off. 53 00:03:16,783 --> 00:03:18,743 Runway 8 right confirmed. 54 00:03:18,843 --> 00:03:21,163 Before take-off checklist complete. 55 00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:23,755 Rhoades 810 cleared for takeoff 56 00:03:25,306 --> 00:03:29,306 Runway 8 right, cleared for take-off. Rhoades 810. 57 00:03:34,372 --> 00:03:37,372 Tonight's flight is a short hop to Kahului, 58 00:03:37,397 --> 00:03:41,397 on the neighbouring island of Maui, only 100 miles away. 59 00:03:42,173 --> 00:03:44,173 OK, you have control. 60 00:03:44,456 --> 00:03:46,456 OK, I have control. 61 00:03:48,005 --> 00:03:54,048 At 1.33am, Captain Okai hands over the plane to First Officer Ryan. 62 00:03:59,532 --> 00:04:00,765 Engine stable. 63 00:04:03,976 --> 00:04:04,976 80 knots. 64 00:04:05,093 --> 00:04:06,093 Check. 65 00:04:07,343 --> 00:04:08,343 V1. 66 00:04:09,259 --> 00:04:10,259 Rotate. 67 00:04:12,143 --> 00:04:13,143 V2. 68 00:04:14,126 --> 00:04:15,126 Positive rate. 69 00:04:17,776 --> 00:04:18,776 Gear up. 70 00:04:19,659 --> 00:04:21,659 Within seconds of lifting off... 71 00:04:26,822 --> 00:04:27,853 Damn! 72 00:04:27,878 --> 00:04:28,878 Lost an engine. 73 00:04:29,186 --> 00:04:30,186 You got it? 74 00:04:30,492 --> 00:04:31,492 Yeah, I got it. 75 00:04:32,734 --> 00:04:35,442 The pilots have lost thrust in one of their engines, 76 00:04:35,684 --> 00:04:38,426 only 390 feet off the ground. 77 00:04:38,451 --> 00:04:41,726 Losing an engine after take-off is one of the most critical events 78 00:04:41,751 --> 00:04:43,036 that can happen in a flight. 79 00:04:43,061 --> 00:04:44,306 You're close to the ground, you're slow. 80 00:04:44,331 --> 00:04:46,642 However, we also know from our training 81 00:04:46,667 --> 00:04:49,667 that the aircraft will fly perfectly well on one engine. 82 00:04:50,136 --> 00:04:52,136 The First Officer levels the plane 83 00:04:52,161 --> 00:04:55,161 and continues to climb away from the airport. 84 00:04:55,186 --> 00:04:56,186 Flaps. 85 00:04:57,086 --> 00:04:59,086 Turn 220, heading. 86 00:04:59,111 --> 00:05:00,584 I'll give you the flaps. 87 00:05:00,609 --> 00:05:01,609 OK. 88 00:05:03,721 --> 00:05:05,997 Rhoades, 810, we have an emergency. 89 00:05:06,022 --> 00:05:07,145 Stand by. 90 00:05:07,170 --> 00:05:09,170 We're on 220, heading. 91 00:05:09,570 --> 00:05:11,570 You can inch up to 2,000. 92 00:05:11,972 --> 00:05:15,570 The captain wants to put more distance between the plane and the ocean 93 00:05:15,570 --> 00:05:18,570 so they have space to address the problem. 94 00:05:18,570 --> 00:05:20,570 Any time you have an emergency situation, 95 00:05:20,570 --> 00:05:22,570 maintain aircraft control, you fail to do that, 96 00:05:22,570 --> 00:05:24,570 nothing else you do matters. 97 00:05:25,251 --> 00:05:26,709 OK, Rhoades, 810, we've lost an engine. 98 00:05:26,734 --> 00:05:29,570 We're on a 220, heading, maintaining 2,000. 99 00:05:29,570 --> 00:05:31,570 Declaring an emergency. How do you read? 100 00:05:31,570 --> 00:05:35,570 Rhoades Express, 810, you are cleared visual approach. 101 00:05:35,570 --> 00:05:37,570 Runway four right. 102 00:05:37,570 --> 00:05:39,570 You can turn in towards the airport. 103 00:05:40,570 --> 00:05:44,570 The controller clears flight 810 to return to the airport. 104 00:05:44,570 --> 00:05:47,570 OK, Rhoades, 810, we're going to run a checklist. 105 00:05:47,570 --> 00:05:50,570 I'll let you know when we're ready to come to the airport. 106 00:05:50,570 --> 00:05:54,245 Captain Okai wants to assess the situation further 107 00:05:54,270 --> 00:05:56,270 before returning to the airport. 108 00:05:57,286 --> 00:06:00,286 Flight 810 has been in the air less than three minutes, 109 00:06:00,311 --> 00:06:04,311 flying over the Pacific Ocean on a very dark night. 110 00:06:05,070 --> 00:06:06,070 OK, I have control. 111 00:06:06,545 --> 00:06:07,545 Roger. 112 00:06:07,855 --> 00:06:10,361 OK, let's see what's the problem. 113 00:06:10,386 --> 00:06:12,386 What's going on with the gauges? 114 00:06:13,086 --> 00:06:15,407 The pilots troubleshoot the situation. 115 00:06:16,240 --> 00:06:17,570 So it looks like the number one. 116 00:06:18,028 --> 00:06:19,028 Number one's gone? 117 00:06:19,053 --> 00:06:20,053 Gone, yeah. 118 00:06:20,570 --> 00:06:22,570 We still have the number two. 119 00:06:22,570 --> 00:06:24,570 So we have number two. OK. 120 00:06:26,570 --> 00:06:30,570 They confirm they've lost their number one, or left, engine. 121 00:06:30,570 --> 00:06:34,570 They now must rely on their right engine to return to the airport. 122 00:06:34,570 --> 00:06:36,888 Let's do the engine failure shutdown checklist, 123 00:06:36,913 --> 00:06:38,570 and I have the radios now. 124 00:06:38,570 --> 00:06:39,570 OK. 125 00:06:40,403 --> 00:06:42,403 There's a number of things this checklist is going to do for you. 126 00:06:42,428 --> 00:06:44,828 It's going to confirm the failed engine, 127 00:06:44,853 --> 00:06:46,853 and you're going to want to secure that engine. 128 00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:49,120 OK. 129 00:06:49,145 --> 00:06:50,145 Engine failure or shutdown. 130 00:06:50,170 --> 00:06:52,553 When one of these occurs, an engine failure, 131 00:06:52,578 --> 00:06:53,595 an engine flame-out, 132 00:06:53,620 --> 00:06:55,845 another checklist directs an engine shutdown. 133 00:06:56,570 --> 00:06:59,412 As the pilots zero in on the problem engine, 134 00:06:59,437 --> 00:07:01,437 the situation intensifies. 135 00:07:02,053 --> 00:07:03,415 We're redline here. 136 00:07:04,245 --> 00:07:06,245 The right engine is now overheating, 137 00:07:06,270 --> 00:07:08,270 and they're losing altitude. 138 00:07:08,769 --> 00:07:10,769 We should pull back on the right one a little bit. 139 00:07:11,570 --> 00:07:12,570 OK. 140 00:07:14,128 --> 00:07:16,040 We should head back to the airport. 141 00:07:16,065 --> 00:07:17,153 Yeah, we should. Yeah. 142 00:07:18,069 --> 00:07:22,409 The pilots now face the possibility of losing both engines. 143 00:07:22,915 --> 00:07:26,545 Problems on your second engine is going to significantly change your outlook, 144 00:07:26,570 --> 00:07:28,570 because you've got the dark water below you, 145 00:07:28,570 --> 00:07:30,874 and you know you're running out of options. 146 00:07:30,899 --> 00:07:32,545 OK, Rhoades 810. 147 00:07:33,149 --> 00:07:34,694 We'd like to come to the airport now. 148 00:07:34,719 --> 00:07:36,315 We might lose the other engine. 149 00:07:37,103 --> 00:07:39,103 Rhoades Express 810, Roger. 150 00:07:39,370 --> 00:07:42,370 Confirm you still have the airport in sight? 151 00:07:42,570 --> 00:07:44,110 Negative. 152 00:07:45,570 --> 00:07:48,744 The pilots have descended too low to see the airport. 153 00:07:48,769 --> 00:07:51,161 Only the lights on the shoreline are visible. 154 00:07:52,634 --> 00:07:54,152 Hey, man, we're going down. 155 00:07:54,177 --> 00:07:55,884 We can't keep going down. 156 00:07:55,909 --> 00:07:57,017 We're descending. 157 00:07:57,417 --> 00:08:02,111 The captain has no other option but to increase power to the overheating engine, 158 00:08:02,136 --> 00:08:04,136 risking a double engine failure. 159 00:08:05,288 --> 00:08:06,722 How's the EGT? 160 00:08:07,895 --> 00:08:09,895 It's max. It's beyond max. 161 00:08:10,157 --> 00:08:13,920 The temperature of the right engine is now dangerously high, 162 00:08:13,945 --> 00:08:16,945 and the pilots suspect it could fail at any moment. 163 00:08:16,970 --> 00:08:18,970 Here we go, flaps. Flaps one. 164 00:08:19,559 --> 00:08:22,197 Fearing the worst, the first officer suggests 165 00:08:22,221 --> 00:08:24,859 configuring the plane for a water landing. 166 00:08:24,936 --> 00:08:27,626 No, no, not yet. 167 00:08:27,936 --> 00:08:29,936 OK, we're very slow, though. 168 00:08:30,570 --> 00:08:34,511 The captain's efforts to reduce the loss in altitude aren't working. 169 00:08:35,020 --> 00:08:37,445 Shoot. OK, flaps one. 170 00:08:39,570 --> 00:08:41,570 Just hitting the water is going to tear the airplane apart, 171 00:08:41,570 --> 00:08:44,678 so you want to be at the lowest possible airspeed. 172 00:08:44,703 --> 00:08:46,703 The flaps will facilitate that. 173 00:08:50,832 --> 00:08:53,765 Rhoades Express 810, low altitude alert. 174 00:08:54,300 --> 00:08:58,300 As Transair Flight 8-10 descends below 400 feet, 175 00:08:58,300 --> 00:09:03,300 the controller is automatically alerted to the aircraft's dangerously low altitude. 176 00:09:03,300 --> 00:09:04,300 Are you able to climb at all? 177 00:09:05,684 --> 00:09:06,609 Negative. 178 00:09:06,635 --> 00:09:08,184 Can you let the coast guard know? 179 00:09:09,076 --> 00:09:10,076 We will. 180 00:09:13,567 --> 00:09:15,567 Watchdesk, please call the Coast Guard. 181 00:09:15,592 --> 00:09:19,592 Flight 810, 737 is probably going to be in the water. 182 00:09:20,093 --> 00:09:21,093 How's the EGT? 183 00:09:21,676 --> 00:09:25,786 If the engine temperature has improved, they might be able to climb. 184 00:09:25,943 --> 00:09:27,186 Hot. Way over. 185 00:09:30,709 --> 00:09:34,340 The chances of reaching the airport six miles away deteriorate 186 00:09:34,365 --> 00:09:36,707 as the plane descends even further. 187 00:09:37,057 --> 00:09:39,076 The controller has an idea. 188 00:09:40,276 --> 00:09:43,190 Express 8-10, do you want Kaleiloa? 189 00:09:43,725 --> 00:09:47,725 There's a closer airport. It might be the pilot's last hope. 190 00:09:47,993 --> 00:09:50,684 We want the closest runway available, please. 191 00:09:50,709 --> 00:09:52,709 Anything we can land on. 192 00:09:54,409 --> 00:09:57,067 If they can't make it to the closer airport, 193 00:09:57,092 --> 00:10:00,500 there might be no other option than to ditch the 737 194 00:10:00,525 --> 00:10:03,525 into the Pacific Ocean and hope for rescue. 195 00:10:05,568 --> 00:10:06,568 Too low. Gear. 196 00:10:06,593 --> 00:10:08,067 OK, give me a heading. 197 00:10:10,075 --> 00:10:15,420 The pilots of Transair Flight 810 have one last chance to reach land. 198 00:10:16,143 --> 00:10:20,936 Rhoades Express 810, the airport is about a 310 heading from you. 199 00:10:21,876 --> 00:10:23,335 But it's too late. 200 00:10:33,890 --> 00:10:38,636 Twelve minutes after takeoff, Transair Flight 810 hits the ocean 201 00:10:38,661 --> 00:10:41,661 just two miles from the Kaleiloa airport. 202 00:10:47,046 --> 00:10:51,046 Watchdesk, 810's in the water two miles south-east of Kaleiloa. 203 00:10:51,746 --> 00:10:56,506 Coast Guard air rescue is immediately dispatched. 204 00:10:56,897 --> 00:11:00,407 Hearing that there's a 737 that crashed, I didn't believe it. 205 00:11:00,432 --> 00:11:03,574 But if there is, and there's 200 people in the water, 206 00:11:03,599 --> 00:11:05,332 What am I going to do? 207 00:11:05,357 --> 00:11:07,890 They told me two souls on board, and we're like, 208 00:11:07,915 --> 00:11:10,915 all right, two's a lot more manageable than, like, 200. 209 00:11:10,940 --> 00:11:15,940 45 minutes later, there's still no sign of the plane or the pilots. 210 00:11:15,940 --> 00:11:18,940 Rescuers fear the worst, until... 211 00:11:18,940 --> 00:11:21,940 There were a bunch of boxes now floating by us. 212 00:11:21,940 --> 00:11:24,940 I figured, all right, this might be the start of a debris field. 213 00:11:24,940 --> 00:11:26,940 So we started our second pass, 214 00:11:26,940 --> 00:11:31,940 and grabbing onto the vertical fin of the tail was one of our pilots. 215 00:11:32,923 --> 00:11:34,923 It's Captain Okai. 216 00:11:35,940 --> 00:11:38,940 I was like, all right, he is still OK, great. 217 00:11:38,940 --> 00:11:41,242 Still want to find the second pilot. 218 00:11:41,267 --> 00:11:44,940 They soon spot the first officer on a cargo pallet, 219 00:11:44,940 --> 00:11:46,940 bleeding from the head. 220 00:11:46,940 --> 00:11:48,940 Right before we started to make the moves 221 00:11:48,940 --> 00:11:52,940 to put me in the water to go up to him, the plane moved. 222 00:11:52,940 --> 00:11:55,940 The tail section the captain had been clinging to 223 00:11:55,940 --> 00:11:57,940 sinks beneath the waves. 224 00:11:57,940 --> 00:11:59,940 The captain's drowning right now. 225 00:12:02,940 --> 00:12:05,940 They race back and deploy the rescue swimmer. 226 00:12:07,940 --> 00:12:09,940 As soon as I grabbed his hand, 227 00:12:09,940 --> 00:12:12,940 it's like his eyes rolled back and he went limp. 228 00:12:13,934 --> 00:12:17,940 They're dripping wet, covered in gasoline and hydraulic fluid, 229 00:12:17,940 --> 00:12:19,940 so it wasn't pretty. 230 00:12:19,940 --> 00:12:23,940 The first officer is soon rescued by a fire department vessel 231 00:12:23,940 --> 00:12:26,940 as the captain is rushed to a local hospital. 232 00:12:26,940 --> 00:12:28,940 Both pilots survive. 233 00:12:28,940 --> 00:12:31,940 Good planning, good crew, good decision-making, 234 00:12:31,940 --> 00:12:36,940 and then implementing those decisions is how we came out on top. 235 00:12:36,940 --> 00:12:39,940 While the pilots recover from their injuries, 236 00:12:39,940 --> 00:12:42,940 investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, 237 00:12:42,940 --> 00:12:45,940 or NTSB, arrive on the scene. 238 00:12:45,940 --> 00:12:48,940 Right now we're in the fact-gathering phase. 239 00:12:48,940 --> 00:12:50,940 Once we finish the fact-gathering, 240 00:12:50,940 --> 00:12:52,940 we'll switch into the analytical side, 241 00:12:52,940 --> 00:12:54,940 and then that's when we'll go into determining 242 00:12:54,940 --> 00:12:56,940 the probable cause and contributing factors. 243 00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:02,480 What can you tell me about last night? 244 00:13:02,480 --> 00:13:05,480 It was a normal night, slow. 245 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:09,480 There was another Transair flight inbound around the same time. 246 00:13:10,480 --> 00:13:14,480 And when did Flight 810 alert you that there was a problem? 247 00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:16,480 Investigators turn to the controller 248 00:13:16,480 --> 00:13:20,480 to determine what might have caused Transair Flight 810 249 00:13:20,480 --> 00:13:22,480 to ditch into the Pacific. 250 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:25,332 It was about two minutes into the flight. 251 00:13:25,357 --> 00:13:26,882 They reported they'd lost an engine. 252 00:13:27,049 --> 00:13:29,149 OK, Rhoades 810, we've lost an engine. 253 00:13:29,174 --> 00:13:31,480 We're on a 220 heading, maintaining 2,000. 254 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:33,949 Declaring an emergency. How do you read? 255 00:13:33,974 --> 00:13:37,480 They wanted to work on the problem before turning back. 256 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:39,480 Did they say which engine? 257 00:13:39,480 --> 00:13:41,480 No, but not long after they said 258 00:13:41,480 --> 00:13:44,480 that they might lose the other engine as well. 259 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:46,480 Really? 260 00:13:47,196 --> 00:13:51,196 OK, Rhoades 810, we'd like to come to the airport now. 261 00:13:51,221 --> 00:13:53,221 We might lose the other engine. 262 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:57,480 Could Transair 810 have really lost both engines? 263 00:13:57,480 --> 00:13:59,480 The only information we had to go on initially 264 00:13:59,480 --> 00:14:02,480 was the communications between the airplane and the controller, 265 00:14:02,480 --> 00:14:04,480 but the airplane and its recorders 266 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:06,480 were at the bottom of the ocean. 267 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:07,480 Thank you. 268 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:14,146 Another NTSB team is tasked with recovering the airplane 269 00:14:14,171 --> 00:14:18,755 and its engines lying 350 feet deep on the ocean floor. 270 00:14:19,088 --> 00:14:21,480 At the depth that the airplane was at, 271 00:14:21,480 --> 00:14:23,480 it's difficult to get divers down there. 272 00:14:23,480 --> 00:14:27,480 So in order to actually hook all of our equipment 273 00:14:27,480 --> 00:14:29,480 up to the aircraft and pull it up, 274 00:14:29,480 --> 00:14:31,480 we needed to use ROVs. 275 00:14:31,738 --> 00:14:33,154 It will take time for the investigation 276 00:14:33,179 --> 00:14:35,480 to secure the necessary equipment 277 00:14:35,480 --> 00:14:38,480 from a salvage company on the mainland. 278 00:14:41,740 --> 00:14:42,740 Good morning. 279 00:14:42,806 --> 00:14:43,806 Good morning. 280 00:14:44,036 --> 00:14:45,740 I'm glad to see you here. 281 00:14:45,740 --> 00:14:46,740 So am I. 282 00:14:46,740 --> 00:14:48,740 Very glad. Yeah. 283 00:14:49,219 --> 00:14:51,714 Investigators meet with Captain Okai 284 00:14:51,739 --> 00:14:56,739 to determine if Transair Flight 810 did lose both engines. 285 00:14:57,733 --> 00:14:59,302 The purpose of this investigation 286 00:14:59,327 --> 00:15:02,152 is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. 287 00:15:02,177 --> 00:15:04,369 Our role is not to assign fault. 288 00:15:04,394 --> 00:15:05,807 I understand. 289 00:15:07,202 --> 00:15:08,922 It's critical to speak to pilots as soon as we can 290 00:15:08,947 --> 00:15:11,947 because we want to get those fresh memories. 291 00:15:11,972 --> 00:15:13,972 Walk me through what happened. 292 00:15:14,531 --> 00:15:17,904 Everything was normal up to about 400 feet. 293 00:15:20,089 --> 00:15:21,175 Gear up. 294 00:15:29,444 --> 00:15:30,170 Damn! 295 00:15:31,077 --> 00:15:33,170 There was a whoosh sort of a sound, not a pow. 296 00:15:34,527 --> 00:15:36,094 It was a whoosh. 297 00:15:36,119 --> 00:15:37,977 Then it wasn't a roll. 298 00:15:38,002 --> 00:15:40,311 My first officer was able to counteract that. 299 00:15:42,054 --> 00:15:43,413 Lost an engine. 300 00:15:43,521 --> 00:15:44,677 You got it? 301 00:15:44,836 --> 00:15:45,854 Yeah, I got it. 302 00:15:49,227 --> 00:15:51,711 Eventually, we leveled off at 2,000 feet, 303 00:15:51,736 --> 00:15:54,736 and I go, Greg, what do we have? 304 00:15:55,427 --> 00:15:57,161 So it looks like the number one. 305 00:15:57,186 --> 00:15:58,194 Number one's gone? 306 00:15:58,219 --> 00:15:59,377 Gone, yeah. 307 00:15:59,876 --> 00:16:01,561 We still have the number two. 308 00:16:01,644 --> 00:16:03,901 So we have number two, OK. 309 00:16:06,477 --> 00:16:08,852 I'm looking at number one EPR. 310 00:16:08,877 --> 00:16:10,594 There's no power. 311 00:16:10,619 --> 00:16:13,852 I'm looking at number two in EPR. 312 00:16:13,877 --> 00:16:15,577 It's coming down. 313 00:16:16,811 --> 00:16:20,877 The captain explains he first lost power in the left engine 314 00:16:20,902 --> 00:16:23,902 and was losing power in the right. 315 00:16:24,944 --> 00:16:26,602 How's the EGT? 316 00:16:27,369 --> 00:16:29,369 It's max. It's beyond max. 317 00:16:30,319 --> 00:16:33,319 Did both engines fail at the same time? 318 00:16:33,661 --> 00:16:35,886 Most likely. That's my conclusion. 319 00:16:37,623 --> 00:16:38,611 Thank you. 320 00:16:38,636 --> 00:16:39,636 Thanks. 321 00:16:39,661 --> 00:16:41,007 We'll be in touch. 322 00:16:41,032 --> 00:16:45,686 What could have caused both engines to fail so soon after takeoff? 323 00:16:46,059 --> 00:16:48,284 The purpose of this investigation... 324 00:16:48,309 --> 00:16:50,865 A dual-engine failure seemed improbable, 325 00:16:50,890 --> 00:16:56,002 but both the crew seemed to agree that that is what had occurred. 326 00:16:56,027 --> 00:16:58,027 We couldn't confirm or deny it 327 00:16:58,052 --> 00:17:02,052 unless we could actually look at the wreckage and get the recorders. 328 00:17:02,727 --> 00:17:05,727 But those vital clues remain out of reach, 329 00:17:05,752 --> 00:17:08,752 deep on the bottom of the sea. 330 00:17:10,936 --> 00:17:15,936 Could contaminated fuel have brought down Transair Flight 810? 331 00:17:16,653 --> 00:17:19,142 You're looking for an item that's common to both engines 332 00:17:19,167 --> 00:17:21,492 would cause them both to shut down at the same time. 333 00:17:21,517 --> 00:17:24,517 For that would be most likely the fuel. 334 00:17:28,373 --> 00:17:31,656 So one thing that we did do at the airport 335 00:17:31,681 --> 00:17:33,681 was take samples from the fuel truck 336 00:17:33,706 --> 00:17:37,157 that had been used to fuel the airplane before it departed. 337 00:17:37,940 --> 00:17:40,940 The U.S. Navy conducts the testing. 338 00:17:41,690 --> 00:17:43,690 If you have water in your fuel, 339 00:17:43,838 --> 00:17:47,940 that was most likely to be the cause of fuel contamination. 340 00:17:49,173 --> 00:17:54,173 When the fuel samples are analyzed, the results are conclusive. 341 00:17:54,940 --> 00:17:57,940 We actually found that the fuel that was in the aircraft 342 00:17:57,940 --> 00:18:00,940 conformed to standards as we would expect. 343 00:18:02,479 --> 00:18:05,473 So according to the pilots, 344 00:18:05,498 --> 00:18:09,498 they lose the left engine first and then the right. 345 00:18:17,398 --> 00:18:21,065 All the samples from the fuel truck tested clean. 346 00:18:24,338 --> 00:18:26,179 What was the weather like on that night? 347 00:18:26,204 --> 00:18:28,204 Any volcanic activity? 348 00:18:29,223 --> 00:18:32,223 Hawaii is in an active volcano zone. 349 00:18:32,434 --> 00:18:36,434 Could volcanic ash have caused the engines to fail? 350 00:18:36,709 --> 00:18:39,042 Volcanic ash is very bad for jet engines. 351 00:18:39,067 --> 00:18:41,067 It's like throwing sand in the gears. 352 00:18:41,092 --> 00:18:43,106 Jet engines will shut down. 353 00:18:44,008 --> 00:18:47,219 In 1982, a British Airways 747 354 00:18:47,244 --> 00:18:49,450 traveling from England to New Zealand 355 00:18:49,475 --> 00:18:52,265 flew through an ash cloud over Indonesia. 356 00:18:52,290 --> 00:18:54,290 All four engines failed. 357 00:18:54,615 --> 00:18:56,615 The plane was high enough for pilots 358 00:18:56,640 --> 00:18:58,640 to be able to restart the engines, 359 00:18:58,665 --> 00:19:01,315 find an airport, and land safely. 360 00:19:03,811 --> 00:19:05,290 Nothing here. 361 00:19:05,744 --> 00:19:06,844 Clear night. 362 00:19:13,913 --> 00:19:15,913 So that leaves maintenance. 363 00:19:16,442 --> 00:19:18,663 There were no reports of volcanic ash on that night. 364 00:19:18,688 --> 00:19:20,442 The only information that we have to work on 365 00:19:20,467 --> 00:19:21,575 is what the crew is telling us, 366 00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:23,247 that they had a dual engine failure. 367 00:19:23,272 --> 00:19:25,425 So we're going to look at the maintenance on the engines. 368 00:19:25,930 --> 00:19:28,930 In the meantime, recovery crews pinpoint 369 00:19:28,930 --> 00:19:30,930 the exact location of the plane. 370 00:19:30,930 --> 00:19:34,930 It has settled on the ocean floor in two large pieces. 371 00:19:35,730 --> 00:19:37,730 Often with water recoveries, 372 00:19:37,755 --> 00:19:40,755 we have an airplane that's in multiple different pieces. 373 00:19:40,780 --> 00:19:42,780 They're smaller pieces and they're less heavy. 374 00:19:42,805 --> 00:19:48,705 So to bring them up intact was a bigger engineering problem. 375 00:19:49,246 --> 00:19:52,246 It means another delay for investigators. 376 00:19:54,379 --> 00:19:57,379 The plane is what, like 40-something years old? 377 00:19:58,930 --> 00:20:01,469 The team digs into the engine history 378 00:20:01,494 --> 00:20:02,744 of the accident aircraft 379 00:20:02,769 --> 00:20:05,769 to determine why both engines might have failed. 380 00:20:06,930 --> 00:20:08,930 Forty-six. 381 00:20:08,930 --> 00:20:11,930 Flown over 69,000 cycles. 382 00:20:12,763 --> 00:20:15,300 The engines have been around, too. 383 00:20:15,325 --> 00:20:17,950 Left engine, 32,000 flyings. 384 00:20:17,975 --> 00:20:21,722 And the right, over 70,000. 385 00:20:21,747 --> 00:20:24,747 Engines that old are going to need upkeep. 386 00:20:25,355 --> 00:20:27,355 Jet engines are very solid machines 387 00:20:27,380 --> 00:20:29,380 with proper inspection and maintenance. 388 00:20:29,405 --> 00:20:31,405 They can fly on forever. 389 00:20:31,430 --> 00:20:34,430 Anything in the FAA database? 390 00:20:34,930 --> 00:20:39,267 Investigators look into service reports filed by Transair 391 00:20:39,292 --> 00:20:42,617 with the Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA, 392 00:20:42,642 --> 00:20:46,350 to see if the aircraft had any history of engine troubles. 393 00:20:46,375 --> 00:20:49,940 I've got three reports on this aircraft. 394 00:20:50,219 --> 00:20:54,219 The most recent was two-and-a-half years ago. 395 00:20:54,244 --> 00:20:57,229 Left engine failure at 2,000 feet. 396 00:20:58,363 --> 00:20:59,929 That's something. 397 00:21:00,962 --> 00:21:06,229 Did an aging aircraft put the lives of two pilots in jeopardy? 398 00:21:06,496 --> 00:21:08,720 The team researches the repair work 399 00:21:08,745 --> 00:21:11,745 that's been performed on the engines over the years. 400 00:21:12,930 --> 00:21:15,605 Both engines were serviced two years ago 401 00:21:15,630 --> 00:21:19,630 and underwent a daily check the day before the accident flight. 402 00:21:20,496 --> 00:21:22,496 Did they report anything? 403 00:21:24,930 --> 00:21:26,930 No discrepancies. 404 00:21:33,130 --> 00:21:37,130 It's possible that maintenance could have missed something. 405 00:21:38,130 --> 00:21:41,130 Call your contacts at the FAA. 406 00:21:41,130 --> 00:21:44,130 Maybe they can shed some light on Transair. 407 00:21:44,130 --> 00:21:47,130 And I'll speak to maintenance personally. 408 00:21:47,130 --> 00:21:51,130 Because of the possibility that there had been a dual engine failure, 409 00:21:51,130 --> 00:21:54,130 we did a deep dive on the maintenance organization at the airline, 410 00:21:54,130 --> 00:22:00,130 trying to find potential theories for something that could have gone wrong. 411 00:22:01,586 --> 00:22:04,844 Bit of a mess over there at Transair Maintenance. 412 00:22:04,869 --> 00:22:06,138 What did you find out? 413 00:22:06,163 --> 00:22:10,454 Chief Maintenance Inspector quit six weeks ahead of the accident, 414 00:22:10,479 --> 00:22:14,479 citing chronic maintenance issues and being understaffed. 415 00:22:14,929 --> 00:22:19,929 Also found multiple reports from different pilots about engines overheating. 416 00:22:20,296 --> 00:22:23,934 Investigators uncover internal Transair reports, 417 00:22:23,959 --> 00:22:26,292 revealing issues with the engines. 418 00:22:26,525 --> 00:22:31,488 We noticed so many of these reported issues with temperature 419 00:22:31,513 --> 00:22:36,154 that we were starting to think that this might really involve a maintenance issue. 420 00:22:36,179 --> 00:22:39,179 There was just so much smoke, we thought there had to be some fire. 421 00:22:40,696 --> 00:22:43,696 Anything specific to the accident aircraft? 422 00:22:44,246 --> 00:22:49,246 No, they involved other airplanes, not exactly a smoking gun. 423 00:22:50,555 --> 00:22:52,555 Anything from the FAA? 424 00:22:52,580 --> 00:22:57,580 Most of the current inquiries into the company are policy and procedure related. 425 00:22:57,713 --> 00:23:00,417 Nothing to do with engine maintenance. 426 00:23:01,130 --> 00:23:03,334 Investigators don't find any maintenance 427 00:23:03,358 --> 00:23:06,130 issues that would have brought down Flight 810. 428 00:23:09,130 --> 00:23:11,130 We need those engines. 429 00:23:12,105 --> 00:23:14,115 So even though we were discovering these issues 430 00:23:14,139 --> 00:23:16,105 with pilot reports and maintenance records, 431 00:23:16,130 --> 00:23:19,671 there wasn't anything clearly indicating a specific problem 432 00:23:19,696 --> 00:23:22,696 that would have led to this reported dual engine failure. 433 00:23:23,644 --> 00:23:27,337 With a salvage company in place and the weather clearing, 434 00:23:27,362 --> 00:23:34,362 the NTSB is finally able to attempt the recovery of Flight 810 from 350 feet of water. 435 00:23:35,130 --> 00:23:37,118 This was one of the largest water recovery 436 00:23:37,142 --> 00:23:39,130 efforts we have done in a couple of decades. 437 00:23:39,130 --> 00:23:43,130 The wreckage is successfully raised in two large pieces. 438 00:23:43,346 --> 00:23:45,834 The black boxes are recovered from the rear 439 00:23:45,858 --> 00:23:48,346 fuselage and sent to Washington for analysis. 440 00:23:48,646 --> 00:23:53,646 The engines are retrieved separately and brought to a warehouse for inspection. 441 00:23:54,250 --> 00:23:58,255 To be able to see that wreckage come up just creates immense satisfaction 442 00:23:58,280 --> 00:24:01,280 because you're like, OK, now, now we can start this in earnest. 443 00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:09,109 Let's start with this one. 444 00:24:09,701 --> 00:24:13,701 Investigators begin with an examination of the right engine, 445 00:24:13,726 --> 00:24:15,934 the one the pilots say was overheating. 446 00:24:15,959 --> 00:24:17,959 It's in better shape than I expected. 447 00:24:20,793 --> 00:24:24,793 They were in pretty good shape. There was damage due to the water impact. 448 00:24:26,592 --> 00:24:28,317 Let's take a look inside. 449 00:24:28,668 --> 00:24:32,668 They perform a bore scope inspection of the right engine. 450 00:24:32,693 --> 00:24:37,693 It enables them to examine the engine interior without the need for disassembly. 451 00:24:38,743 --> 00:24:40,743 There. Take a look. 452 00:24:41,126 --> 00:24:43,126 Broken fan blades. 453 00:24:44,109 --> 00:24:47,109 See if there's any damage downstream. 454 00:24:52,475 --> 00:24:55,342 Multiple puncture marks on the turbine. 455 00:24:55,793 --> 00:24:58,793 With that type of damage, the engine could have easily overheated. 456 00:25:00,468 --> 00:25:04,468 Investigators discover two fractured turbine blades, 457 00:25:04,493 --> 00:25:07,493 which caused shrapnel damage inside the right engine. 458 00:25:08,242 --> 00:25:12,242 The pilots were correct. The right engine was giving them trouble. 459 00:25:12,996 --> 00:25:16,368 So from the examination on the right engine, 460 00:25:16,393 --> 00:25:18,230 they were able to see that there were blades 461 00:25:18,254 --> 00:25:20,393 that had fractured in the high-pressure turbine. 462 00:25:21,043 --> 00:25:23,043 But it was only those two. 463 00:25:23,068 --> 00:25:27,068 And they knew that it would still be able to produce power, 464 00:25:27,093 --> 00:25:29,093 so it wasn't like a complete failure. 465 00:25:30,192 --> 00:25:35,192 Looks like rust and corrosion inside of the blades caused them to rupture. 466 00:25:37,968 --> 00:25:42,968 The routine maintenance inspection procedures contained in the maintenance manual 467 00:25:42,993 --> 00:25:47,993 would not necessarily have revealed the presence of cracks or one fractured blade. 468 00:25:48,559 --> 00:25:51,968 So this is the engine the pilots said failed first. 469 00:25:53,526 --> 00:25:57,401 Investigators turn their attention to the left engine. 470 00:26:01,592 --> 00:26:03,588 Let's see what we got. 471 00:26:10,281 --> 00:26:12,281 It looks fine. 472 00:26:14,216 --> 00:26:16,216 No internal damage. 473 00:26:16,924 --> 00:26:20,924 The pilots said the left engine failed, followed by the right. 474 00:26:20,949 --> 00:26:24,949 But investigators can't find anything wrong with the left engine. 475 00:26:25,191 --> 00:26:29,191 When we found out that the left engine was undamaged prior to impact, 476 00:26:29,216 --> 00:26:32,704 it really changed the course of our investigation 477 00:26:32,728 --> 00:26:36,216 in terms of focusing more on the crew actions. 478 00:26:36,833 --> 00:26:39,448 We pulled a flight path from the radar data. 479 00:26:41,046 --> 00:26:43,996 Got the CVR data. 480 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:50,717 And here's a copy of the transcript. 481 00:26:51,452 --> 00:26:56,844 Investigators turn to the cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, of Flight 810 482 00:26:56,869 --> 00:27:00,408 to determine why the pilots thought the left engine failed, 483 00:27:00,433 --> 00:27:03,433 as the evidence suggests it did not. 484 00:27:03,700 --> 00:27:05,700 Let's hear it from take-off. 485 00:27:08,472 --> 00:27:09,522 80 knots. 486 00:27:09,905 --> 00:27:10,955 Check. 487 00:27:12,120 --> 00:27:13,003 V1. 488 00:27:13,438 --> 00:27:14,621 Rotate. 489 00:27:15,383 --> 00:27:16,383 V2. 490 00:27:17,232 --> 00:27:18,232 Positive rate. 491 00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:22,000 Gear up. 492 00:27:35,967 --> 00:27:36,967 Stop. 493 00:27:37,366 --> 00:27:38,366 Did you hear that? 494 00:27:40,850 --> 00:27:41,850 Play it again. 495 00:27:42,850 --> 00:27:44,379 Gear up. 496 00:27:46,443 --> 00:27:49,065 Definitely sounds like an engine surge. 497 00:27:49,393 --> 00:27:54,950 They discover that Flight 810 suffered engine trouble 17 seconds after take-off. 498 00:27:55,901 --> 00:27:59,901 Most likely the blades breaking apart in the right engine. 499 00:27:59,926 --> 00:28:00,926 Keep playing. 500 00:28:02,176 --> 00:28:03,176 Lost an engine. 501 00:28:04,317 --> 00:28:05,317 You got it? 502 00:28:05,342 --> 00:28:06,342 Yeah, I got it. 503 00:28:06,901 --> 00:28:09,285 Yep, looks like you lost number... 504 00:28:09,310 --> 00:28:10,310 Number two. 505 00:28:10,409 --> 00:28:11,752 Number two. 506 00:28:13,125 --> 00:28:14,550 Hold it right there. 507 00:28:14,575 --> 00:28:17,736 They both said number two, the right engine. 508 00:28:20,960 --> 00:28:21,960 They were correct. 509 00:28:22,715 --> 00:28:27,459 The pilots' original assessment matches what investigators have discovered. 510 00:28:27,484 --> 00:28:30,484 The initial problem was with the right engine. 511 00:28:30,509 --> 00:28:34,198 So why did they think that the left engine had failed? 512 00:28:35,023 --> 00:28:37,440 We were able to hear the crew discuss. 513 00:28:37,465 --> 00:28:39,898 They had correctly identified the right engine. 514 00:28:39,923 --> 00:28:44,157 So at some point, you know, in their mindset, it had flipped to the wrong engine. 515 00:28:45,088 --> 00:28:46,854 Let's hear what happens next. 516 00:28:47,568 --> 00:28:48,575 Flaps. 517 00:28:49,786 --> 00:28:51,219 Turn 220, heading. 518 00:28:51,542 --> 00:28:53,035 I'll give you the flaps. 519 00:28:57,543 --> 00:29:00,543 Rhoades, 810, we have an emergency. Stand by. 520 00:29:00,726 --> 00:29:02,726 We're on 220, heading. 521 00:29:03,310 --> 00:29:04,754 You can inch up to 2,000. 522 00:29:07,493 --> 00:29:09,493 Captain calls in the emergency. 523 00:29:09,518 --> 00:29:12,518 Tells the first officer to climb to a safe altitude. 524 00:29:12,543 --> 00:29:13,543 All sounds good. 525 00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:16,760 And we're on 220, heading. 526 00:29:18,460 --> 00:29:21,460 Say again. Heading 240. 527 00:29:21,485 --> 00:29:24,485 240, heading. Rhoades, 810. 528 00:29:24,510 --> 00:29:29,510 No, Rhoades, 809. Rhoades, 809. Left 240. 529 00:29:31,510 --> 00:29:35,510 Sounds like there's some overlap with another transair flight. 530 00:29:37,826 --> 00:29:41,314 According to these transcripts, the captain spends the next 531 00:29:41,338 --> 00:29:44,826 minute and 40 seconds communicating with the controller. 532 00:29:45,143 --> 00:29:47,492 That's a long time in a critical moment. 533 00:29:50,367 --> 00:29:54,367 Investigators learn that instead of monitoring the engines... 534 00:29:54,659 --> 00:29:59,659 Rhoades Express, 810, you are cleared visual approach runway four right. 535 00:30:00,092 --> 00:30:04,092 ...the captain is distracted by a conversation with the controller. 536 00:30:04,251 --> 00:30:07,251 OK, Rhoades, 810. We're going to run a checklist. 537 00:30:07,276 --> 00:30:09,276 I'll let you know when we're ready to come to the airport. 538 00:30:09,885 --> 00:30:12,206 When you have an emergency situation, it is 539 00:30:12,230 --> 00:30:14,885 important to aviate, navigate and communicate. 540 00:30:14,910 --> 00:30:17,910 Your third priority is communicating your emergency. 541 00:30:19,843 --> 00:30:20,843 What happens next? 542 00:30:22,676 --> 00:30:24,080 OK, I have control. 543 00:30:24,325 --> 00:30:25,129 Roger. 544 00:30:25,708 --> 00:30:29,744 OK, let's see. What's the problem? What's going on with the gauges? 545 00:30:30,843 --> 00:30:35,248 The captain starts flying the plane and turns his attention to the engines. 546 00:30:35,998 --> 00:30:39,976 So it looks like the number one. Number one's gone? Gone, yeah. 547 00:30:40,509 --> 00:30:43,713 We still have the number two. So we have number two. OK. 548 00:30:45,459 --> 00:30:46,459 Stop. 549 00:30:46,992 --> 00:30:49,613 The FO changes his diagnosis. 550 00:30:50,176 --> 00:30:52,285 Investigators confirm that the first officer correctly 551 00:30:52,309 --> 00:30:54,651 assesses that the right 552 00:30:54,675 --> 00:30:57,176 engine lost power on takeoff. 553 00:30:57,482 --> 00:30:59,818 Yep, looks like you lost number... 554 00:30:59,843 --> 00:31:00,843 Number two. 555 00:31:01,284 --> 00:31:03,811 But less than four minutes later, he tells 556 00:31:03,835 --> 00:31:06,918 Captain Okai it's the left engine that's failed. 557 00:31:06,943 --> 00:31:10,943 So it looks like the number one. Number one's gone? Gone, yeah. 558 00:31:12,377 --> 00:31:13,798 Why? 559 00:31:15,326 --> 00:31:19,029 It wasn't clear why they had changed their minds about it. 560 00:31:21,634 --> 00:31:25,846 The captain then instructs the FO to do the engine shutdown checklist, 561 00:31:26,059 --> 00:31:28,059 but he only gets through the first step. 562 00:31:30,376 --> 00:31:34,032 Hey, we're redline here. We should pull back on the right one a little bit. 563 00:31:34,576 --> 00:31:35,576 OK. 564 00:31:36,593 --> 00:31:39,986 The right engine overheats because of the internal damage, 565 00:31:40,092 --> 00:31:43,536 leading the pilots to believe they're losing both engines. 566 00:31:43,709 --> 00:31:47,269 Once the crew had convinced themselves that they had a dual-engine failure, 567 00:31:47,634 --> 00:31:51,634 They were focused almost exclusively on altitude and airspeed, 568 00:31:51,659 --> 00:31:55,659 and eventually they ran out of options and had to ditch. 569 00:31:56,526 --> 00:32:00,050 It's clear that the right engine, the one with the issue, 570 00:32:00,310 --> 00:32:03,285 is overheating and not producing full thrust. 571 00:32:03,310 --> 00:32:07,310 But what led them to think the left engine wasn't working? 572 00:32:07,310 --> 00:32:10,310 Let's see what the flight data recorder can tell us. 573 00:32:14,576 --> 00:32:16,576 OK, let's see what the engines were doing. 574 00:32:17,071 --> 00:32:19,243 Investigators examine the 575 00:32:19,267 --> 00:32:21,242 engine power data of Flight 810 576 00:32:21,285 --> 00:32:24,285 to determine what actions the pilots took 577 00:32:24,310 --> 00:32:27,076 that led them to believe their perfectly 578 00:32:27,100 --> 00:32:29,310 working engine, the left one, had failed. 579 00:32:31,026 --> 00:32:33,138 After the right engine failed, 580 00:32:33,163 --> 00:32:35,693 both engines are brought back to flight 581 00:32:35,717 --> 00:32:38,684 idle once they level off at 2,000 feet. 582 00:32:44,031 --> 00:32:48,208 That's proper procedure to get the speed down. 583 00:32:48,233 --> 00:32:52,233 But the first officer never told the captain he brought the engines back to idle. 584 00:32:54,966 --> 00:32:58,966 They discover a key step missing in the pilots' actions. 585 00:33:00,450 --> 00:33:06,141 It was procedure for a crew member to verbalise when they moved the engine controls. 586 00:33:06,166 --> 00:33:09,166 In this case, the first officer actually did not do that, 587 00:33:09,191 --> 00:33:12,550 and that could have affected the captain's situational awareness 588 00:33:12,575 --> 00:33:15,216 of where those engine throttles were. 589 00:33:16,049 --> 00:33:20,049 Why did the first officer fail to inform the captain of his action? 590 00:33:22,117 --> 00:33:26,117 Send someone to interview the first officer again about bringing the throttles back. 591 00:33:28,450 --> 00:33:32,108 So it was critical for us to get more information 592 00:33:32,133 --> 00:33:34,742 to better understand what had happened there. 593 00:33:35,621 --> 00:33:38,838 Did anyone actually ever test the throttles? 594 00:33:39,450 --> 00:33:40,941 After they levelled off, 595 00:33:40,966 --> 00:33:43,427 the pilots could have increased power to the 596 00:33:43,451 --> 00:33:46,257 left engine to confirm which engine had failed. 597 00:33:48,616 --> 00:33:53,450 No, the left engine throttle stayed at idle for the rest of the flight. 598 00:33:55,854 --> 00:33:59,788 If you're going into the water and you have no other option left, 599 00:33:59,813 --> 00:34:04,621 you're going to firewall both throttles, just in case it might help. 600 00:34:05,616 --> 00:34:09,113 Why didn't the captain check the first officer's misdiagnosis? 601 00:34:10,450 --> 00:34:11,450 Let's ask him. 602 00:34:13,817 --> 00:34:16,817 When the first officer subsequently said it was the number one, 603 00:34:16,842 --> 00:34:17,921 the captain had just accepted it. 604 00:34:17,946 --> 00:34:22,425 He didn't effectively cross-check that erroneous assertion. 605 00:34:22,450 --> 00:34:27,091 So we wanted to ask him why. 606 00:34:27,116 --> 00:34:29,116 Why did he accept that? 607 00:34:31,716 --> 00:34:34,716 Captain Okai, thanks for meeting with me again. 608 00:34:37,450 --> 00:34:38,450 You're muted. 609 00:34:39,450 --> 00:34:42,774 Investigators speak to Captain Okai one more time 610 00:34:42,799 --> 00:34:46,286 to find out why he thought the left engine had failed. 611 00:34:46,599 --> 00:34:48,599 Sorry about that. Glad I can help. 612 00:34:49,450 --> 00:34:51,841 When Greg told you the left engine had failed, 613 00:34:51,866 --> 00:34:55,607 do you recall initially thinking the right one had failed? 614 00:34:56,816 --> 00:35:00,734 No. The thing with Greg is I've flown with him so many times. 615 00:35:00,759 --> 00:35:02,158 He's never made a mistake. 616 00:35:02,183 --> 00:35:05,183 If Greg says the left is gone, the left engine is gone. 617 00:35:06,694 --> 00:35:12,161 Investigators learn the captain put his faith in his first officer's diagnosis. 618 00:35:12,775 --> 00:35:16,775 While trust is very important when it comes to crew resource management, 619 00:35:16,800 --> 00:35:18,800 you also want to verify. 620 00:35:19,533 --> 00:35:24,109 The captain did not verify the information that the first officer was giving him. 621 00:35:25,192 --> 00:35:26,692 OK. Thank you. 622 00:35:26,717 --> 00:35:27,717 Sure thing. 623 00:35:29,205 --> 00:35:31,940 It's really critical when you do have an engine failure 624 00:35:31,965 --> 00:35:34,607 to look at all the available information 625 00:35:34,632 --> 00:35:40,041 and cross-check and agree that you have identified the correct engine. 626 00:35:40,066 --> 00:35:42,066 In this case, that didn't occur. 627 00:35:43,783 --> 00:35:46,783 What were the power readings when the engines were at idle? 628 00:35:47,792 --> 00:35:50,792 Even if the captain trusted the first officer, 629 00:35:50,817 --> 00:35:54,817 wouldn't there be other indicators showing which engine had failed? 630 00:35:58,195 --> 00:36:02,357 The left engine was 1.05. 631 00:36:02,921 --> 00:36:07,013 The right, 1.12. 632 00:36:07,038 --> 00:36:11,505 The team discovers the power was a little bit lower on the left engine, 633 00:36:11,530 --> 00:36:14,530 even though both engines were set to idle. 634 00:36:14,555 --> 00:36:19,654 OK. Let's see what's the problem. What's going on with the gauges? 635 00:36:19,679 --> 00:36:22,621 They did have slightly different power outputs, 636 00:36:22,646 --> 00:36:26,324 and that is something you would see with two different engines. 637 00:36:26,349 --> 00:36:29,349 That could have really affected the captain's decision-making. 638 00:36:31,359 --> 00:36:33,817 If the captain had checked the gauges, 639 00:36:33,842 --> 00:36:37,258 the readings would have supported his first officer's report 640 00:36:37,283 --> 00:36:39,283 that the left engine had failed. 641 00:36:40,192 --> 00:36:41,766 So it looks like the number one. 642 00:36:41,791 --> 00:36:42,791 Number one's gone? 643 00:36:42,816 --> 00:36:43,910 Gone, yeah. 644 00:36:44,316 --> 00:36:46,316 So we have number two. OK. 645 00:36:49,425 --> 00:36:53,273 But this doesn't explain why the first officer never told the captain 646 00:36:53,298 --> 00:36:56,658 that he brought both throttles back in the first place. 647 00:37:01,663 --> 00:37:03,400 If the first officer had said, 648 00:37:03,425 --> 00:37:05,425 hey, I pulled the thrust back on both engines, 649 00:37:05,450 --> 00:37:07,905 then that might have caused the captain to engage 650 00:37:07,930 --> 00:37:12,352 in a different thought process about what might be going on. 651 00:37:18,045 --> 00:37:21,045 First officer follow-up interview. 652 00:37:21,769 --> 00:37:24,769 Why didn't the first officer of Transair Flight 810 653 00:37:24,794 --> 00:37:27,794 tell the captain he brought the power levers back 654 00:37:27,819 --> 00:37:29,819 after the right engine failed? 655 00:37:30,500 --> 00:37:35,338 He has no recollection of bringing either thrust lever back to idle. 656 00:37:37,485 --> 00:37:41,485 We believe that the first officer forgot because he was busy. 657 00:37:43,082 --> 00:37:44,937 That leads to stress. 658 00:37:44,962 --> 00:37:47,715 Stress leads to tunnelling of attention. 659 00:37:47,740 --> 00:37:51,832 That can lead to fixation on a small number of parameters. 660 00:37:53,148 --> 00:37:57,340 Even if the first officer didn't tell the captain about the thrust levers, 661 00:37:57,373 --> 00:38:00,916 there must have been other signs which engine failed. 662 00:38:03,219 --> 00:38:05,219 Check out the rudder data. 663 00:38:06,046 --> 00:38:09,645 Immediately after the right engine failed on take-off, 664 00:38:09,670 --> 00:38:12,670 5.5 degrees of left rudder is applied. 665 00:38:17,413 --> 00:38:19,413 You got it? Yeah, I got it. 666 00:38:23,291 --> 00:38:26,271 After the right engine lost power on take-off, 667 00:38:26,363 --> 00:38:28,363 the plane pulled to the right. 668 00:38:28,647 --> 00:38:31,647 When the first officer applied the left rudder, 669 00:38:31,852 --> 00:38:33,511 the plane straightened out. 670 00:38:33,877 --> 00:38:36,097 The foot that isn't pressing on the rudder pedal 671 00:38:36,122 --> 00:38:38,122 is the side with the bad engine, 672 00:38:38,147 --> 00:38:42,147 so it's usually a pretty clear indication of which engine has failed. 673 00:38:43,099 --> 00:38:44,899 He held that left rudder 674 00:38:44,923 --> 00:38:46,711 for three minutes. 675 00:38:47,242 --> 00:38:48,921 He had a clear indicator. 676 00:38:48,946 --> 00:38:50,946 But it never registered. 677 00:38:51,211 --> 00:38:54,605 The fact that the first officer was applying left rudder 678 00:38:54,630 --> 00:38:57,402 was an indication that the right engine had lost power. 679 00:38:57,427 --> 00:39:00,021 It's very possible that under those stressful conditions 680 00:39:00,046 --> 00:39:01,285 in the middle of the night over the 681 00:39:01,310 --> 00:39:03,047 water, you could make that mistake. 682 00:39:05,367 --> 00:39:07,406 They made the right assessment initially, 683 00:39:07,431 --> 00:39:09,220 but in the end, 684 00:39:09,244 --> 00:39:11,421 the stress of the situation 685 00:39:11,446 --> 00:39:13,948 degraded their ability to fly the plane. 686 00:39:16,527 --> 00:39:19,402 Investigators now know the series of events 687 00:39:19,427 --> 00:39:22,479 that led to the ditching of Transair Flight 810. 688 00:39:25,079 --> 00:39:28,079 When the right engine loses power after take-off... 689 00:39:32,513 --> 00:39:33,300 Damn! 690 00:39:33,589 --> 00:39:36,589 ...both pilots make the proper assessment. 691 00:39:37,431 --> 00:39:39,673 Yep, looks like you lost number... 692 00:39:39,698 --> 00:39:40,415 Number two. 693 00:39:40,897 --> 00:39:41,831 Number two. 694 00:39:43,449 --> 00:39:46,449 But while the captain communicates with air traffic control... 695 00:39:47,890 --> 00:39:49,466 OK, Rhoades, 810. 696 00:39:49,491 --> 00:39:50,956 We're going to run a checklist. 697 00:39:51,516 --> 00:39:54,516 ..the first officer reduces engine power. 698 00:39:54,616 --> 00:39:57,616 OK, let's see what's the problem. 699 00:39:58,216 --> 00:40:01,523 In a moment of stress, he forgets to tell the captain. 700 00:40:02,306 --> 00:40:04,040 What's going on with the gauges? 701 00:40:04,430 --> 00:40:06,847 The slightly different readings on the gauges 702 00:40:06,872 --> 00:40:08,836 lead the pilots to believe the fully 703 00:40:08,875 --> 00:40:11,016 functioning left engine has failed 704 00:40:11,041 --> 00:40:13,041 So it looks like the number one. 705 00:40:13,066 --> 00:40:14,191 Number one's gone? 706 00:40:14,216 --> 00:40:15,701 The captain relies on the 707 00:40:15,725 --> 00:40:16,940 first officer's assessment 708 00:40:16,965 --> 00:40:18,368 without doing his own 709 00:40:18,392 --> 00:40:19,965 analysis of the situation. 710 00:40:19,990 --> 00:40:21,798 Gone, yeah. 711 00:40:21,823 --> 00:40:23,624 We still have the number two. 712 00:40:23,649 --> 00:40:25,649 So we have number two, OK. 713 00:40:26,514 --> 00:40:28,159 Instead of confirming which 714 00:40:28,183 --> 00:40:30,073 engine had actually lost power 715 00:40:30,106 --> 00:40:32,133 and forgetting their original assessment, 716 00:40:32,266 --> 00:40:34,188 the pilots end up flying 717 00:40:34,212 --> 00:40:35,266 on a damaged engine. 718 00:40:35,983 --> 00:40:37,983 How's the EGT? 719 00:40:38,566 --> 00:40:40,566 It's max, it's beyond max. 720 00:40:41,483 --> 00:40:44,634 Setting them up for an inevitable ditching. 721 00:40:45,067 --> 00:40:48,027 We're in the water! We're in the water! 722 00:41:06,670 --> 00:41:10,120 Before the NTSB's final report is published, 723 00:41:10,145 --> 00:41:12,220 Rhoades Aviation is shut down 724 00:41:12,245 --> 00:41:14,470 by the Federal Aviation Administration 725 00:41:14,495 --> 00:41:17,870 for numerous safety and maintenance violations. 726 00:41:20,319 --> 00:41:21,870 While it may be disappointing 727 00:41:21,870 --> 00:41:24,870 that the crew never actually touched their left engine 728 00:41:24,870 --> 00:41:26,569 that was working properly, 729 00:41:26,594 --> 00:41:29,470 it is a testament to the human limitations 730 00:41:29,495 --> 00:41:32,420 that actually arise when you have stressful, 731 00:41:32,445 --> 00:41:33,992 high-workload situations, 732 00:41:34,017 --> 00:41:36,017 and that's what we need to account for. 733 00:41:36,042 --> 00:41:39,870 With 50 737-200s remaining in service, 734 00:41:39,870 --> 00:41:43,870 it's deemed impractical to fit them with engine sensors 735 00:41:43,870 --> 00:41:46,870 that would alert pilots to a failed engine. 736 00:41:46,870 --> 00:41:50,572 But it's now standard in most passenger airliners. 737 00:41:51,870 --> 00:41:54,870 Engine monitoring technology has improved considerably 738 00:41:54,870 --> 00:41:57,420 since this aircraft was manufactured. 739 00:41:57,445 --> 00:42:00,870 Newer airplanes actually give very clear indications 740 00:42:00,895 --> 00:42:03,895 to the pilot regarding which engine is bad 741 00:42:04,452 --> 00:42:08,720 and reduces the risk of the crew misidentifying it.